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912008 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Judgment and Decree Brent J. Moss 
STATUS CHANGED: closed Brent J. Moss 
Civil Disposition entered for: Hart, Kenneth W, Other Party; Rexburg Urban Brent J. Moss 
Renewal Agency, Subject. 
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7/8/2008 Amended Notice of Appeal Brent J. Moss 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: 
) 
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL 1 PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
AGENCY, ) CONFIRMATION 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
1 
COMES NOW Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Petitioner"), by and through 
its attorneys, Elam & Burke, P.A., and petitions this court, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-1304, et 
seq., for a judicial examination and determination of the validity of the power of Petitioner to 
issue certain bonds and execute certain agreements. Idaho Code 5 7-1304 provides a valid 
mechanism for obtaining an early judicial examination of the validity of actions and the power of 
local entities, by providing certainty prior to the expenditure and commitment of extensive public 
resources, thereby promoting the public welfare. 
This action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction of all parties 
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interested will be obtained by publication and posting, as provided by Idaho Code 5s 
7-1305 and 7-1306. 
11. 
Petitioner is an independent public body corporate and politic and is an urban renewal 
agency created and existing under the authority of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 
50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. Petitioner is a political subdivision 
authorized to institute a judicial confirmation proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code Section 7- 
1304, and pursuant to the definition of Idaho Code Section 7-1303(6). 
111. 
Petitioner is authorized to issue revenue allocation (tax increment) bonds pursuant to the 
terms and provisions of the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, 
as amended and supplemented, for the purpose of financing the undertaking of an urban renewal 
project. 
N .  
As passed by the Legislature, the Local Economic Development Act empowers an urban 
renewal agency to provide for revenue allocation financing as part of an urban renewal plan. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2902 allows for the raising of revenue to finance economic growth and 
development of urban renewal areas within municipalities. A revenue allocation area is defined 
in Idaho Code 5 50-2903(15) as "that portion of an urban renewal area. . . . the equalized 
assessed valuation (as shown by the taxable property assessment rolls) of which the local 
governing body has determined, on and as a part of an urban renewal plan, is likely to increase as 
a result of the initiation of an urban renewal project. . . . The base assessment roll or rolls of 
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revenue allocation area or areas shall not exceed at any time ten percent (10%) of the current 
assessed valuation of all taxable property within the municipality." The Act provides, at Idaho 
Code section 50-2909(4), that revenue allocation will be terminated when the principal and 
interest on any indebtedness or bonds have been paid in full. 
v .  
By Resolution dated November 6, 1991, the City Council of the City of Rexburg created 
an urban renewal agency pursuant to Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, making findings 
regarding the characteristics of the area, implementing the statutory criteria, empowering the 
Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency, authorizing the Mayor to appoint five commissioners to the 
urban renewal agency and finding the North Highway area to be a "deteriorated" or 
"deteriorating" area. 
VI. 
On December 27,1991, following notice duly published and a public hearing, the City 
Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance No. 728, approving the North Highway Urban 
Renewal Plan ("Plan") and making certain findings. On December 30, 1998, following notice 
duly published and a public hearing, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance 
No. 815, approving the North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated 
Urban Renewal Plan") and making certain findings. 
In September 2005, Petitioner authorized the commencement of an eligibility study and 
the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then labeled 
North Highway, South Addition Area. The Eligibility Report, dated November 7,2005, was 
submitted to the Petitioner for its consideration and approval. On November 8,2005, Petitioner 
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accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1. Pursuant to Resolution No. 
2005-1, Petitioner sought authorization to pursue the development of an amendment to the urban 
renewal plan for the City of Rexburg within a geographical area which Petitioner sought the City 
Council's determination of qualification for urban renewal activity. On November 9,2005, the 
City Council of the City of Rexburg reviewed the Eligibility Report and by way of Resolution 
No. 2005-17, accepted the Eligibility Report and deemed the additional area as a deteriorated or 
deteriorating area. Petitioner prepared a proposed Second Amended and Restated Urban 
Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project, including South Addition, for the area 
previously designated as eligible for urban renewal planning and the area proposed to be eligible. 
Such proposed North Highway, South Addition Plan contained revenue allocation financing 
provisions. On November 18,2005, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2005-2, recommending 
adoption of the North Highway, South Addition Plan. On November 21,2005, the North 
Highway, South Addition Plan was submitted to the affected taxing entities. On November 19, 
2005, notice of the public hearing on the North Highway, South Addition Plan was caused to be 
published by the City Clerk of Rexburg, Idaho in the Standard Journal. On Deceinbcr 1,2005, 
the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning Commission considered the North Highway, South 
Addition Plan and its compliance with the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg and 
forwarded its findings to the City Council. On December 21,2005, the City Council of the City 
of Rexburg, following publication of notice and public hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950, 
approving the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban 
Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan") and making certain findings. Ordinance No. 950 became effective upon publication on 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 4 
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December 23,2005. 
On December 4,2007, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, approving a Bond 
Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement") with Zions Bank Public Finance, to provide for 
the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of Petitioner and Zions Balk Public Finance for 
I 
I purchase from Petitioner in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 Revenue Allocation 
(Tax Increment) Bonds. 
On December 4,2007, Petitioner adopted Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Resolution"), 
authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008, in the 
principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 (the "Series 2008 Bonds") for the purpose of 
providing financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition 
of land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities, 
access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and 
furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for 
soccer, football, baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) 
deposit of funds into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufticient to meet the Reserve 
Fund Requirement; and (3) payment of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the 
Bonds. 
Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, have entered into the Purchase Agreement 
dated as of November 13,2007, with respect to the development of a project in accordance with 
the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. 
VII. 
The Resolution includes, by exhibit, the Purchase Agreement between the Petitioner and 
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Zions Bank Public Finance. The Purchase Agreement requires Petitioner to obtain a judgment 
confirming the validity of: 
a. Petitioner's authority under the Constitution and the laws of Idaho to issue 
the Series 2008 Bonds; 
b. that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in 
accordance with their terms; and 
c. that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and enforceable in accordance 
with their terms. 
Petitioner must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel. 
Under the Resolution No. 2007-4, Petitioner is required to tender funds from revenue 
allocation proceeds to the Revenue Allocation Fund. The revenue allocation proceeds deposited 
therein shall be used only for the following purposes and in the following order of priority: first, 
to pay the interest accruing on the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds by required 
deposits into the Bond Fund; second, to pay the principal of the Series 2008 Bonds and any 
Additional Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into the Bond Fund; 
third, to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required deposits thereto, if any; fourth, to fund 
the Administration Fund; fifth, for any other lawful purpose of Petitioner. 
vnr. 
Under Resolution No. 2007-4, the Series 2008 Bonds will be used to finance those 
improvements described therein. 
IX. 
Under the Judicial Confirmation Law, Chapter 13, Title 7, Idaho Code, the governing 
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body of any political subdivision seeking to file a Petition for Judicial Confirmation, must first 
hold a public hearing to consider whether it should adopt a resolution authorizing the filing of the 
petition. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the public hearing, a notice of the time, place and 
summary of the matter must be published. The filing of the petition must be authorized by a 
resolution adopted by the governing body. Petitioner published its notice of public hearing as 
required on January 5, 2008. Petitioner held the public hearing on January 22,2008. As required 
by the Judicial Confirmation Law, Petitioner then convened a special meeting on February 12, 
2008, at least fourteen (14) days later, to consider the resolution. Petitioner convened its meeting 
and adopted Resolution No. 2008-1 on February 12,2008. 
X. 
Petitioner seeks a determination of the validity of Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase 
Agreement, and the Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4, given the 
following potential questions concerning validity of Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Local 
Economic Development Act, Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and 
Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project, including South 
Addition, in light of the following issues: 
1. Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation, contained in Idaho Constitution Article 7, 
Section 5. 
2. Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to private entities as contained in 
Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further 
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generally violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring 
an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year without the assent 
of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3. 
3. Whether by reason of the composition, action and operation of the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency Board of Directors, the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter ego 
of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency therefore violates the provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting 
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8, 
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a 
municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a 
specific year without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8, 
Section 3. 
4. Whether by virtue of the ability of the city comcil to declare itself as the board of 
commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 50-2006(b)(2) and (3), whether 
exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is the alter ego of a municipality. 
5. Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing power 
in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under the 
doctrine of separation of powers, to govern the assessment and collection of tax, to ensure that 
the taxes collected are used in furtherance ofthe legislative purpose and in hrtherance of the 
public purpose. 
6. Whether the provisions of the statute and the ordinance violate the due process 
rights of taxpayers of the State of Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure of public funds 
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collected from taxpayers for a public purpose. 
7. Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I, 
Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which impair the obligation of 
contracts. 
8. Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the Legislature for a "City 
Purpose" in violation of Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. 
9. Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7, Section 7 of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
10. Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits 
received. 
1 1. Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for a judicial examination and determination of the 
validity of the: 
1. Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4 approved by 
Petitioner on December 4,2007; 
2. Purchase Agreement between Petitioner and Bank Public Finance; 
3. Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban 
Renewal Project, including South Addition, approved by the City Council of the City of Rexbug 
by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005; and a declaration that Petitioner is 
duly authorized by a valid state statute to enter into the agreements authorized by Resolution No. 
2007-4, and that Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase Agreement, the Series 2008 Bonds and 
other agreements authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 will be valid and binding on the parties 
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thereto and on all persons interested therein in full accordance with their terms, and thkt all 
Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and Tax Assessor and the 
Madison County Treasurer, he authorized to carry out the duties and obligations set forth in 
Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho 
Code, the Local Economic Development Act, including, but not limited to, the disbursement to 
Petitioner of revenue allocation proceeds. 
DATED This /d fh  day of February, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE 
Ryan ~ h h r u s t e r ,  of the firm 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss: 
County of Madison 
GLEN POND, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the President of the Board of Commissioners, acting in their capacity as the 
governing body of the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency of tbe City of Rexburg; that he has read 
the foregoing instrument, knows the contents thereof, and believes the contents thereof to be true 
and correct. 
- 
Glen Pond, President of the Board, 
Rexburg Redevelopment Agency, the Urban 
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this & day of ~ebruary, 2008. 
Notary l%blic for Idaho 
Residing at: LL-5  , A,!- .--. L 
My Commission ~ x ~ i % d  S/Y/ Z 
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Ryan P. Armbruster 
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Key Financial Center, 10th Floor 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
Petitioner. / JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
In Re: 
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY, 
Notice is hereby given that Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Petitioner") has 
filed a petition, pursuant to Idaho Code $7-1301 et seq., for judicial confirmation of the validity 
of the power of Petitioner to issue certain bonds and notes and execute certain agreements. 
The Petitioner seeks c o n h a t i o n  of the validity of the following: 
1. Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Bond Resolution"), adopted by Petitioner on 
December 4,2007, authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, 
Series 2008 (the "Bonds"); 
CASE NO. c\/ob' /a/ 
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NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 15 
IICIAL CONFIRMATION -- 1 
Xexberg.doc 
2. The Bond Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") dated November 13, 
2007, between Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, the Underwriters, as authorized by 
Resolution No. 2007-4; 
3. The North Highway Urban Renewal Plan ("Plan") approved by the Rexburg City 
Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 728 on December 27, 1991; 
4. The North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated Urban 
Renewal Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 815 on 
December 30, 1998; and 
5. The Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban 
Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 on 
December 21,2005. 
The Bond Resolution and the Purchase Agreement anticipate the issuance of bonds based 
upon revenue allocation (tax increment) financing, as authorized by the Local Economic 
Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. The Series 
2008 Bond proceeds will be used for the purpose of providing financing for the Riverside Park 
Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor 
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related 
furnishings and improvements; construction and h i s h i n g  of a building for sporting and 
community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other public 
recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit of funds into the Debt Service 
Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment 
of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. The total cost of the project is 
NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR 
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estimated to be $6,300,000. The Series 2008 Bonds will be retired by use of revenue allocation 
funds generated from the revenue allocation area. 
The Petition seeks a determination of the validity of the above-referenced documents, 
including Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan, and including Resolution No. 2007-4, and the Purchase Agreement, in light of the existence 
of potential questions concerning the validity of the revenue allocation statute. The Petition 
seeks judicial confirmation of the power of Petitioner to rely on revenue allocation financing. 
Interested parties who wish to view the Petition, Resolution No. 2007-4, or the Purchase 
Agreement may do so at the offices of the Petitioner, c/o The Development Company, 299 East 
4th North, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or the City Clerk's Office, Rexburg City Hall, 12 North 
Center, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or through Petitioner's Counsel at its office located at 251 E. 
Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83702, during office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., 
Monday through Friday. 
Any interested party may appear and move to dismiss or answer the Petition at any time 
prior to the date set for hearing, which has been set for & 
2008, at /o; w A m . ,  in the Madison County Courthouse, before the Honorable Judge 
%+id X~SS.  Any such motion or answer may be filed with the court in the above-entitled 
case. The Petition shall be taken as confessed by all persons who fail to so appear. 
DATED This / 3 day of February, 2008. 
NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
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Ryan P. Armbruster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
rpa@elamburke.com 
tnes@ela1nbur1ce.com 
Atmbruster ISB #I878 
Sullivan ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: I CASE NO. CV 08-121 
Petitioner. I 
URBAN RENEWAJ.. AGENCY OF THE 
CITY OF REXBURG, 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss: 
County of Madison ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY 
JUDY C. COY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the duly qualified and acting Administrative Assistant of the Urban 
Renewal Agency ofthe City of Rexburg ("Agency"). On February 13,2008, I received a 
conformed copy of the Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation ("Notice") 
2. On Februav 14,2008,I caused one conformed copy of the Notice to be posted at 
the Agency's administrative office and Rexburg City Hall pursuant to the requirement of Idaho 
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Code 5 7-1306. The Notice was posted in aprolninent place at the main door of the 
administrative offices of the Agency and the main entrance to the Rexburg City Hall, in a place 
normally used for posting of public notices, and has remained posted there until at least today's 
date and will remain posted there tlxough Marcb 17,2008, and thus was posted for more than 30 
days prior to March 17,2008, the date set for hearing. 
3.  In addition, I caused one confonned copy to be delivered to the Standard Journal, 
a newspaper of general circulation within the City of Rexbwg, for publication for three 
consecutive weeks, the first publication on February 21,2008, and the last publication scheduled 
for Marcb 6,2008. A copy of the PuOlication is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. On or about February 28,2008, an individual seeking infonnation regarding the 
Judicial Confirmation Petition came by tile Agency's adnlinistrative office. He asked a number 
of questions and indicated that he may attend the hearing. To date, the Agency has not received 
any comments regarding the Judicial Confmnation Petition. 
5. The Agency Board of Comlnissioners ("Agency Board") consists of a total of 
nine (9) members. On or about November 18,2005, the Second Amended and Restated Urban 
Renewal Plan was adopted by Resolution of the Agency. At that time one (1) Rexburg City 
Council member, Farrell Young, sat on the Agency Board, in addition to the Mayor of Rexburg, 
Shawn Larsen. 
6. At present, one (1) Rexburg City Council member, Rex Erickson, sits on the 
Agency Board, in addition to the Mayor of Rexburg, Shawn Larsen. 
7. The city of Rexburg has decreed that it will not exercise its power to designate 
itself as the Agency Board under section 50-2006, Idaho Code so long as any Agency bonds are 
outstanding. 
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DATED This &day ofMarch 2008, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 
I 
& day of March 2.008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY C. COY 
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DATEOThis 13th day of February, 2008. 
Is  1 Marilvn R. Rasmussen 
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Thursday, February 
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Ryan P. h b r u s t e r  
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Armbruster ISB #I878 
Sullivan ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: I CASE NO. CV 08-121 
Petitioner. I 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE 
CITY OF REXBURG, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. MOORE 
MICHAEL C. MOORE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am ofcounsel to thelaw firm ofMoore, Smith, Buxton &Turcke, Chtd., which 
serves as bond counsel for the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency ("Agency"). 
2. That our firm has been asked by the Agency to render the approving Bond Counsel 
opinion with respect to the financing for the Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008 
(the "Bonds"). Various legal questions relating to the power of the Agency to issue bonds and notes 
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payable from revenue allocation (tax increment) revenues have arisen in the course of our review. 
In particular, the following legal questions remain unresolved: 
a. Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution requiringuniformity of taxation, contained in Idaho Constitution Article 7, Section 5. 
b. Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending their credit to private entities as contained 
in Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further 
generally violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring an 
indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year, and pledging ad valorem 
taxes for the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in 
Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3. 
c. Whether, by reason of the composition, action and operation of the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency Board of Co~nmissioners, the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter 
ego of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency therefore violates the provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting 
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8, 
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a 
municipality from incuning an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific 
year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of 
qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution h i c l e  8, Section 3. 
d. Whetherby virtue ofthe ability ofthe city council to declare itself as the board 
of commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 50-2006(b)(2) and (3), whether 
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exercised or not, the urban renewal agency is the alter ego of a municipality. 
e. Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing 
power in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under 
the doctrine of separation of powers, to govern the assessment and collection of tax, and to ensure 
that the taxes collected are used in furtherance of the legislative purpose and in furtherance of the 
public puspose. 
f. Whether the provisions ofthe statute and the ordinance violate the due process 
rights of taxpayers of the State of Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure of public funds collected 
from taxpayers for a public pulpose. 
g. Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I, 
Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which impair the obligation of 
contracts. 
h. Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by theLegislature for a "City 
Purpose" in violation of Asticle 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. 
i. Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7, Section 
7 of the Idaho Constitution. 
j. Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits 
received. 
k. Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts. 
All of these questions have an impact upon the validity of the Bonds and notes to be issued 
secured by revenue allocation financing proceeds and are questions that must be resolved before our 
firm can issue an unqualified legal opinion regarding the issuance of the Series 2008 Bonds 
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authorized by the Agency pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4. 
3. Without an unqualified approving opinion of Bond Counsel, the Series 2008 Bonds 
cannot be successfully marketed on the public bond market. 
DATED This lLZ? day of March 2008. 
~ L L  
M HAEL C. MOORE 
d SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN To before me this '$ - day of March 2008 
L m f &  
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: t/- /#-0 9 
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Ryan P. Armbluster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM &BURKE, P.A. 
251 West Front Street, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
(208) 343-5454 
Armbluster: #I878 
Sullivan: #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: 
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY, 
Petitioner. 
CASE NO. 08-121 
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF FILING OF 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION AND REVISED 
NEARING DATE 
Supplemental notice is hereby given that Petitioner Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency 
("Petitioner") has filed a petition, pursuant to Idaho Code 57-1301 et seq., for judicial 
confirmation of the validity of the power of Petitioner to issue certain bonds and notes and 
execute certain agreenlents. 
The Petitioner seeks confirmation of the validity of the following: 
1. Resolution No. 2007-4 (the "Bond Resolution"), adopted by Petitioner on 
December 4,2007, authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, 
Series 2008 (the "Bonds"); 
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF FILING OF rITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION AND 
REVISED HEARING DATE 
l~tellt.Outlool~\HA35MQZ1\Si1ppIeme1ital Notice of Filing Petition 
2. The Bond Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") dated November 13, 
2007, between Petitioner and Zions Bank Public Finance, the Undenvritcrs, as authorized by 
Resolution No. 2007-4; 
3. The North Highway Urban Renewal Plan ("Plan") approved by the Rexburg City 
Council by the adoption of Ordinance No. 728 on December 27, 1991; 
4. The North Highway Amended and Restated Plan ("Amended and Restated Urban 
Renewal Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordiilance No. 8 15 on 
December 30, 1998; and 
5. Tile Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban 
Renewal Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan") approved by the Rexburg City Council by the adoption of Ordi~lance No. 950 on 
December 21,2005. 
The Bond Resolution and the Purchase Agreement anticipate the issuance of bonds based 
upon revenue allocation (tax increment) financing, as authorized by the Local Economic 
Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. The Series 
2008 Bond proceeds will be used for the purpose of providing financing for the Riverside Parlc 
Urban Renewal Project, co~lsisting of (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor 
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related 
furnishings and improvements; construction and furnishing of a building for sporting and 
community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other public 
recreation purposes, and related improvenlents; (2) deposit of funds into the Debt Service 
Reserve Fund in an amount sufficie~lt o meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment 
of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. The total cost of the project is 
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estimated to be $6,300,000. The Series 2008 Bonds will he retired by use of revenue allocation 
funds generated from the revenue allocation area. 
The Petition seeks a determination of the validity of the above-referenced documents, 
including Ordinance Nos. 728,815 and 950, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan, and including Resolution No. 2007-4, and the Purchase Agreement, in light of the existence 
of potential questions concerning the validity of the revenue allocation statute. The Petition 
seeks judicial confimlation of the power of Petitioner to rely on revenue allocation financing. 
Interested parties who wish to view the Petition, Resolution No. 2007-4, or the Purchase 
Agreement may do so at the offices of the Petitioner, c/o The Development Company, 299 East 
4th North, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or the City Clerk's Office, Rexburg City Hall, 12 North 
Center, Rexburg, Idaho 83440, or through Petitioner's Counsel at its office located at 251 E. 
Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83702, during office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., 
Monday through Friday. 
Any interested party may appear and move to dismiss or answer the Petition at any time 
prior to the REVISED DATE SET FOR HEARING, which has been set for MONDAY, 
MARCH 31,2008, AT 10:30 A.M., in the Madison County Courthouse, before the Honorable 
Judge Brent J. Moss. Any such motion or answer may be filed with the court in the above- 
entitled case. The Petition shall be talten as confessed by all persons who fail to so appear. 
DATED This day of March, 2008. 
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Ryan P. Armbruster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front Street. Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
rpa@elamburke.com 
mes@elarnburke.com 
Armbruster - ISB #I878 
Sullivan - ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: I CASE NO. CV 08-121 
Petitioner. I 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE 
CITY OF REXBURG, 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rcxburg ("Agency"), has filed this 
action pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-1301, et seq., seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of 
the power of the Agency to issue certain bonds and execute certain agreements, rcpayment of 
which is secured by revenue allocation, or "tax increment" financing, as permitted by the Local 
Economic Development Act (the "Act"), Idaho Code 5 50-2901, et seq. The Agency seeks to 
confirm its power to issue bonds relying upon revenue allocation financing. Confirmation of the 
Agency's power will depend upon an analysis of the validity of the Act and, to the extent 
necessary, an analysis of applicable provisions of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 (the 
"Law"), Idaho Code § 50-2001, et seq. The Agency has siinultaneously filed a volume of 
Exhibits to this Memorandum. All reference to Exhibits are noted by an identifying number. 
The Agency has also filed the Affidavits of Michael C. Moore and Judy C. Coy in support of its 
Petition. 
11. 
IDAHO'S URBAN RENEWAL LAW AND 
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT 
In 1965 Idaho established a mechanism whereby local govenments were given the 
authority of establishing an urban renewal agency for the purpose of redeveloping dcteriorated or 
deteriorating areas of individual municipalities. See Idaho Code $ 50-2001, et seq. 
In 1988 the Idaho Legislature passed the Act to allow revenue allocation financing by 
individual redevelopment agencies within cities with a population less than 100,000. In 1990 the 
Act was amended to climinate the population limitation. In enacting the Act, the Legislature 
determined that the financing needs of urban renewal areas throughout the state were of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant use of a financing device that had not previously been available to them. 
Since the effective date of the 1990 legislative amendment, all cities within the State of Idaho 
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have been operating under the same provisions of the Act. Since 1988, there have been several 
amendments to the Act. Citation and quotation throughout this memorandum reflect the most 
current codification. 
50-2902. Findings and purpose. It is hereby found and 
declared that there exists in municipalities a need to raise revenue to 
finance the economic growth and development of urban renewal areas 
and competitively d[$iidvatiraged border community arcas. l h e  
purposc of th~s  act is to provide for the allocation of a poltion of the 
property taxes levied against taxable property located in a revenue 
allocation area for a limited period of time to assist in the financing 
of urban renewal plans, to encourage private development in urban 
renewal areas and competitively disadvantaged border community 
areas, to prevent or arrest the decay of urban areas due to the inability 
of cxisting financing methods to promote needed public 
improvements, to encourage taxing districts to cooperate in the 
allocation of future tax revenues arising in urban areas and 
competitively disadvantaged border community areas in order to 
facilitate the long-term growth of their common tax base, and to 
encourage private investment within urban areas and competitively 
disadvantaged border community areas. The foregoing purposes are 
hereby declared to be valid public purposes for municipalities. 
The Act's primary purpose, urban renewal, remained the same. Accordingly, municipalities are 
still authorized to adopt revenue allocatio~l provisions or amend their original urban renewal plan 
to permit for revenue allocation financing: 
50-2904. Authority to create revenue allocation area.An 
authorized municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to 
adopt, at any time, a revenue allocation fiuancing provision, as 
described in this chapter, as part of an urban renewal plan or 
competitively disadvantaged border c o m u ~ ~ i t y  area ordinance. A 
revenue allocation financing provision may be adopted either at the 
time of the original adoption of an urban renewal plan or the creation 
by ordinance of a competitively disadvantaged border comuuity 
area or thereafter as a modification of an urban renewal plan or the 
ordinance creating the competitively disadvantaged border 
community area. Urban renewal plans existing prior to the effective 
date of this section may be modified to include a revenue allocation 
financingprovision. Except as provided below, no revenue allocation 
provision of an urban renewal plan or competitively disadvantaged 
border community arcd ordiriansc. includingall ~tmcndincnrs thereto, 
shall h31.e a durnt~on exceeding twcrity-four (24) years from thc dale 
the ordinance is approved by the municipality. 
"Authorized municipality" is defined in Idaho Code 50-2903(3): 
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(3) "Authorized municipality" or "municipality" means 
any county or incorporated city which has established an urban 
renewal agency, or by ordinance has identified and created a 
competitively disadvantaged border community. 
A specific procedure must be used to adopt revenue allocation financing. Municipalities 
are required to hold a public hearing and pass an ordinance outlining a revenue allocation plan. 
See Idaho Code 5 50-2906. The local governing body is required to prepare a notice indicating 
an urban renewal plan will be established or modified to provide for revenue allocation. Idaho 
Code 5 50-2906(3). "Revenue allocation area" is further defined in the statute: 
(15) "Revenue allocation area" means that portion of an 
urban renewal area. . . the equalized assessed valuation (as shown by 
the taxable property assessment rolls) of which the local governing 
body has determined, on and as a part of an urban renewal plan, is 
likely to increase as a result of the initiation of an urban renewal 
project. . . . The base assessment roll or rolls of revenue allocation 
area or areas shall not exceed at any time ten percent (10%) of the 
cunent assessed valuation of all taxable property within the 
municipality. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(15). Following enactment of an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation 
provision, the urban renewal agency is required to create a special rund for the deposit of revenue 
allocation proceeds. Idaho Code 5 50-2908(3). The Act specifically delineates the purposes for 
which special fund monies may be used. 
50-2909. Issuance of bonds-Bond provisionsrfl) If the 
local governing body of an authorized municipality has enacted an 
ordinance adopting a revenue allocation financing provision as part 
of an urban renewal plan, the urban renewal agency established by 
such municipality is hereby authorized and empowered: 
(a) To apply the revenues allocated to it pursuant 
to section 50-2908, Idaho Code, for payment of the projected 
costs of any urban renewal project located in the revenue 
allocation area; 
(b) To borrow money, incur indebtedness and 
issue one (1) or more series of bonds to finance or refinance, 
in whole or in part, the urban renewal projects authorized 
pursuant to such plan within the limits established by 
paragraph (c) below; and 
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(c) To pledge irrevocably to the payment of 
principal of and interest on such monies borrowed, 
indebtedness incnrred or bonds issued by the agency the 
revenues allocated to it pursuant to 50-2908, Idaho Code. 
All bonds issued under this section shall be issued in 
accordance with section 50-2012, Idaho Code, except that suchbonds 
shall be payable solely from the special fund or funds established 
pursuant to section 50-2908, Idaho Code. 
In addition, while an agency is obligated to repay any indebtedness incurred, the obligation is 
incnrred only to the extent that "the moneys are available in a special fund or funds established 
under section 50-2908, Idaho Codc . . . ." Idaho Code 5 50-2909(2). This limited obligation is 
further clarified in Idaho Code $50-2910. 
50-2910. Bonds not general obligation of agency or  
municipality.-Except to the extent ofmoneys deposited in a special 
fund or funds under this act and pledged to the payment of the 
principal of and interest on bonds or other obligations, the agency 
shall not be liable on any such bonds or other obligations. The bonds 
issued and other obligations incurred by any agency under this 
chapter shall not constitute a general obligation or debt of any 
municipality, the state or any of its political subdivisions. Inno event 
shall such bonds or other obligations give rise to general obligation 
or liability of the agency, the municipality, the state, or any of its 
political subdivisions, or give rise to a chargc against their general 
credit or taxing powers, or be payable out of any funds or properties 
other than the special fund or funds of the agency pledged therefor; 
and such bonds and other obligations shall so state on their face. 
Such bonds and other obligations shall not constitute an indebtedness 
or the pledging of faith and credit within the meaning of any 
constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction. 
111. 
REVENUE ALLOCATION FINANCING 
A. An Introduction to Revenue Allocation Financing 
Historically, heavy reliance has been placed upon the availability of federal funds to 
finance urban renewal projects. The availability of these funds has decreased drastically. See 
Tax Increment Financing,for Development and Redevelopment, 61 OR.L.REV. 123 (1982); Tax 
Increment Financing: A New Source oflunds for Community Redevelopment in Illinois- 
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People, ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 30 DEPAUL L.REv. 467 (1981); The Use o f  Tax 
Increment Financing to Attract Private Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 
Va.Tax Rev. 777 (2001). Consequently, local and state governments have increasingly turned to 
other sources of financing. A tool which has become increasingly popular with local 
governments is the use of revenue allocation financing. Id. Although many states refer to this 
method of financing as "tax increment" financing, the Idaho statute refers to it as "revenue 
allocation." The concept is the same. Revenue allocation financing, simply explained, merely 
allows a taxing entity to divert a portion of funds collected from property taxes without raising 
the rate of the tax itself 
Tax increment financing earmarks a portion of the property 
taxes of a designated area for a particular purpose, such as raising the 
one-third local share. The ad valorem taxes levied on property within 
a designated redevelopment area are divided into two parts. The 
taxes levied on the base value-ihe assessed valuation at the time the 
project began-are allocated to the city, county, schools, and other 
taxing units in the usual manner. The taxes levied on the 
increment-the increase in the assessed valuation over the base 
value-are allocated to the redevelopment authority. The 
redevelopment authority may use the allocated taxes to finance the 
public costs of the redevelopment project, either by paying for current 
projects on apay-as-you-go basis orby repaying tax allocation bonds 
issued by thc redevelopment authority. The financing method is 
premised on the theory that, without the redevelopment project, 
property values would not increase. Therefore, property taxes levied 
on that increase in value may be allocated to pay the costs of 
redevelopment without affecting local taxing units. The taxing units 
eventually benefit from redevelopment; after the incurred 
indebtedness is repaid, the increased property taxes become available 
to the taxing units. 
Tax Increment Financing for Development and Redevelopment, 61 OR.L.REV. 123, 124 (1982) 
(footnote omitted). This financing tool is popular because it avoids reliance upon federal funds 
and allows local government entities to finance projects within their communities based on the 
increases in property value that result from the redevelopment itself. In addition, local 
government entities are able to avoid the unpopular method of financing by increasing property 
taxes. However, because it is the tax and not the tax *evenue that is frozen during the 
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revenue allocation period, the option of increasing tax revenue is still available to all local 
government taxing entities during the redevelopment financing process. Thus, if there is a need 
for local entities, in particular special purpose districts, such as school districts, to increase the 
millage rate during the increment period, and thus increase gross tax revenues, that option is still 
available (though the taxes generated from the increase millage in the tax increment area koin 
the increased assessed value does flow to the urban renewal agency). The revenue allocation 
financing method is thus often viewed as a fair and equitable method of assessing taxes and 
paying for development, which development in turn benefits the entire community. 
As a mechanism for financing redevelopment projects, revenue allocation financing first 
began in 1952 in California. See Tan Increment Financing for Redevelopment in Missouri: 
Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L.REv. 77 (1 985); The Use of Tux Increment Financing to 
Attract Private Investment and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 Va.Tax Rev. 777 (2001). 
At this time, many states are using such a mechanism in one form or another. Some states have 
constitutional provisions allowing for such a financing mechanism. See CaliEConst. art. 13, 
$ 18; 0r.Const. art. IX, $ l(c). See also Cal. Health & Safety Code §$ 33670-33679 (2007); 
0r.Rev.Stat. $5 457.420-,460 (2007). Other states have enacted statutory mechanisms to allow 
the use of this financing tool for local governments. See, list of statutory references on tax 
increment financing in the appendix hereto. Thus far, all 50 states, including Idaho, and the 
District of Columbia have statutory schemes for tax increment or revenue allocation financing. 
B. History of the Citv of Rexburg's Adoption of Revenue Allocation Financing and 
Judicial Confirmation Action 
On November 6, 1991, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution 
No. 91-8, implementing the statutory criteria pursuant to the Law, empowering the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency, and authorizing the Mayor to appoint five commissioners to the urban 
renewal agency. (Ex. 1.) By Resolution No. 91-8, the City Council made certain findings of 
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fact, determining the North Second East Street and Teton River Area to be a deteriorating and 
deteriorated area and authorizing the Agency to establish an urban renewal plan. (Ex. 1.) On 
November 22, 1991, the Agency passed Resolution No. 3, proposing the North Highway Urban 
Renewal Plan ("Plan") for the North Highway Project in the City of Rexburg. The Plan includes 
revenue allocation financing provisions. On November 26, 1991, the City of Rexburg Planning 
and Zoning Commissioll considered the Plan, and by Resolution No. 91.9, declared that the Plan 
was in conformity with the Comprehensive Plan ofthe City of Rexburg. 
Notice of a public hearing by the City Council to consider the Plan was published on 
November 26, 1991 and December 10, 1991. Likewise, on November 25, 1991, notice was 
mailed to the taxing entities regarding the City Council's intent to consider the Plan at its 
December 27, 1991, meeting. During its meeting of December 27, 1991, the City Council of the 
City of Rexburg adopted Ordinance No. 728 enacting a revenue allocation financing area within 
the urban renewal area of the City of Rexburg, pursuant to the Plan. On December 31, 1991, 
Ordinance No. 728, as adopted by the City Council of the City of Rexburg on December 27, 
1991, was published in the Standard Journal, and thus, pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal 
Law, became effective as of December 3 1, 1991, and retroactive to January 1,1991. See Idaho 
Code 9 50-2906(2). Ordinance No. 728 specifically found that the Project Area as defined by the 
Plan is a deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law. 
On November 18,1998, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution 
No. 98.7, making certain findings of fact and determining the North Highway North and South 
Area to be a deteriorating and deteriorated area. Resolution No. 98.7 directed the Agency to 
prepare an urban renewal plan. On November 24, 1998, the Agency adopted Resolution No.98- 
1, adopting the North Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan ("Amended and 
Restated Urban Renewal Plm"), and recommending its adoption by the City Council. The 
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan includes revenue allocation financing provisions. 
On December 9, 1998, the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning Commission considered the 
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Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, and by Resolution No. 98-1 1, found that the Plan 
was in conformity with the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg. 
The City Council, following publication of notice of a public hearing as provided by law 
atld providing notice to other taxing entities duly conducted a public hearing on the Amended 
and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and, following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 81 5 on 
December 28,1998, approving the Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. On December 
30, 1998, a summary of Ordinance No. 815, as adopted by the City Council of the City of 
Rexburg on December 28,1998, was published in the Standard Journal. Pursuant to the Idaho 
Urban Renewal Law, Ordinance No. 815 became effective as of December 30, 1998, and 
retroactive to January 1, 1998. See Idaho Code $ 50-2906(2). Ordinancc No. 815 specifically 
found that the Project Area as defined by the Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan is a 
deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law. 
In September 2005, the Agency authorized the commencement of an eligibility study and 
the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then labeled 
South Addition to the North Highway Urban Renewal Area. The Eligibility Report, dated 
November 7,2005, was submitted to the Agency for its consideration and approval. On or about 
November 8,2005, the Agency accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1. 
(Ex. 2.) Pursuant to Resolution No. 2005-1, the Agency authorized the Chairman of the Board 
of Directors, or the Agency Administrator, to transmit the Eligibility Report to the City Council 
with a rcquest the City Council consider the area identified in the Eligibility Report for 
designation as an urban renewal area and requesting the City Council to direct the Agency to 
prepare an urban renewal plan for the area, which plan may include a revenue allocation 
provisio~~. (Ex. 2.) 
On November 9,2005, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted Resolution No. 
2005-17, making certain findings of fact and determining the South Addition to the North 
Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, to be a deteriorated or deteriorating area. 
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(Ex. 3.) Resolution No. 2005-17 authorized the Agency to prepare an amendment to the North 
Highway Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. (Ex. 3.) 
On November 18,2005, the Agency adopted Resolution No. 2005-2, rccommeiiding 
adoption of the Second Amended and Restated North Highway Urban Renewal Plan, South 
Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan"). (Ex. 4.) The Second 
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan contains revenue allocation financing provisions. 
(Ex. 4.) 
On November 19,2005, notice of the public hearing by the City Council on the Second 
Amended and Restatcd Urban Renewal Plan was published in the Standard Journal. (Ex. 5.) On 
November 21,2005, the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was submitted to 
the affected taxing entities. (Ex. 6.) On December 1,2005, the City of Rexburg Plaming and 
Zoning Cominission considered the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and 
declared its conformity with the Colnprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg. (Ex. 7.) The City 
Council duly conducted a public hearing on the Second Ainended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan and, following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005, approving 
the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and making certain findings. (Ex. 8.) 
On December 23,2005, a summary of Ordinance No. 950, as adopted by the City Council 
of the City of Rexburg on December 21,2005, was published in the Standard Journal. (Ex. 9.) 
Additionally, a copy of Ordinance No. 950 was transmitted to the other taxing entities. (Ex. 10.) 
Pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal Law, Ordinance No. 950 became effective as of December 
23,2005, and retroactive to January 1,2005. See Idaho Code $ 50-2906(2). Ordinance No. 950 
specifically found that thc Project Area as defined by the Second Amended and Restated Urban 
Renewal Plan is a deteriorated or deteriorating area as defined by the Idaho Urban Renewal Law. 
(Ex. 8.) 
On November 21,2007 and November 28,2007, the Agency published its Notice of 
Negotiated Private Bond Sale and Notice of Bond Purchase Agreement in the Standard Journal, 
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notifying the public of its negotiation for and private sale to Zions Bank Public Finance of 
approximately $6,300,000 of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008, for 
improvements, authorized by the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and its 
intent to enter into a Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance. (Ex. 11 .) 
On December 4,2007, the Board of Commissioners ("Board") of the Agency adopted 
Resolution No. 2007-4, approving a Bond Purchase Agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance, 
to provide for the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the Agency and Zions Bank Public 
Finance for purchase from the Agency in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 Revenue 
Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds. (Ex. 12.) A copy of the Bond Purchase Agreement is 
attached to Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 12.) 
On December 4,2007, the Board of the Agency, adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, 
authorizing the issuance of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008 (the "Series 
2008 Bonds") in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 for the purpose of providing 
financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of (1) acquisition of land and 
construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, 
parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and furnishing of a 
building for sporting and commnnity events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, 
baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit of funds 
into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to meet the Reserve Fund 
Requirement; and (3) payment of the reasonable and necessary Costs of Issuance of the Bonds. 
(Ex. 12.) The Project is defined in Section 2.1 of Resolution No. 2007-4 as follows: 
Section 2.1 The Project 
The Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project (the "Project") to be 
financed from the proceeds of the [Series 20081 Bonds shall consist 
of (1) acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor 
swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access road, parking 
facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; coiistructioil and 
furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; 
installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, baseball, and other 
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public recreation purposes, and related improvements; (2) deposit o f  
funds into the Debt Service Reserve Fund in an amount sufficient to 
meet the Reserve Fund Requirement; and (3) payment of  the 
reasonable and necessary Costs o f  Issuance o f  the Bonds. The 
Agcncy hereby authorizes and directs the appropriate officers o f  the 
Agency to carry out the Project consistent with the terms of  this 
Resolution and the Urban Renewal Plan. The total cost ofthe Project 
is estimated to be not to exceed $6,300,000, which shall be paid from 
the proceeds o f  the Bonds. 
On December 12,2007, the Agency caused to be published a notice indicating passage o f  
Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 13.) 
Resolution No. 2007-4 includes, by exhibit, a Bond Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase 
Agreement") between the Agency and Zions Bank Public Finance (the "Underwriters"). The 
Purchase Agreement requires the Agency to obtain a judgment confirming the validity of:  
a. the Agency's authority under the Constitution and the laws o f  Idaho to 
issue the Series 2008 Bonds; 
b. that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in 
accordance with their terns; and 
c. that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and cnforceable in accordance 
with their terms. 
The Agency must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of  Bond Counsel. 
Under the Resolution No. 2007-4, the Agency is required to tender funds &om revenue 
allocation proceeds to the Revenue Allocation Fund. The revenue allocation proceeds deposited 
therein shall be used only for the following purposes and in the following order o f  priority: first, 
to pay the interest accruing on the Series 2008 Bonds and any Additional Bonds by required 
deposits into the Bond Fund; second, to pay the principal o f  the Series 2008 Bonds and any 
Additional Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into the Bond Fund; 
third, to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required deposits thereto, i f  any; fourth, to fund 
the Administration Fund; fifth, for any other lawful purpose of  ihe Agency. (Ex. 12.) 
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IV. 
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
The judicial confirmation procedure is contained in Idaho Code $7-1 301, et seq. Idaho 
Code $ 7-1302(1) indicates the legislative purpose in providing for the judicial confirmation 
procedure. That section states: 
An early judicial examillation into and detennination of the validity 
of the power of any political subdivision to issue bonds or obligations 
and execute any agreements or security instruments therefor promotes 
the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-1304(3), the governing body of any political subdivision 
seeking to file a Petition for Judicial Confinnation, must first hold a public hearing to consider 
whether it should adopt a resolution, authorizing the filing of the petition. At least fifteen (15) 
days prior to the public hearing, a notice must be published in the official newspaper, or papers 
of general circulation within the jurisdiction concerning the public hearing. See Idaho Code 
$ 7-1304(3). The filing of the petition must be authorized by a resolution adopted by the 
governing body. See Idaho Code 5 7-1304(1). The Agency published its notice ofpublic hearing 
as required on January 5,2008, (Ex. 14.) The Agency held the public hearing on January 22, 
2008. As required by the Judicial Confirmation Law, the Agency then convened a special 
meeting fourteen (14) days later to consider the resolution. On February 12,2008, the Agency 
convened its special meeting and adopted Resolution No. 2008-1 authorizing the filing of this 
Petition. (Ex. 15.) 
Idaho Code $7-1304(1) provides that in order to determine validity of a bond or 
obligation, or an agreement or security interest related thereto, a political subdivision 
may file or cause to be filed a petition at any time in the judicial 
district court in and for the district in which the political subdivision 
is located wholly or in part, praying a judicial examination and 
detennination of the validity of any bond or obligation or of any 
agreement or security instrument related thereto. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION - 12 
- .---.a-" 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 44 
Idaho Code $7-1 305 provides the action 1s one in the nature of a proceeding in rem, "and 
jurisdiction of all parties interested may be had by publication and posting. . . ." The publication 
and posting procedure is designed to notify all interested parties of the filing of the petition, so 
that anyonc who may be adversely affected may then appear and challenge the valldity of the 
procedure. See Idaho Code 5 7-1302(3). Idaho Code $ 7-1306(3) indicates "~lurisdiction shall 
be complete after such publication and posting." Idaho Code $ 7-1308(1) further provides that 
the court, following the filing of the petition and publication and posting, "shall examine into and 
determine all matters and things affecting each question submitted, shall make such findings with 
reference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case warrants." 
The judicial confirmation procedure provides for a method by which a political 
subdivision can bring an issue before the court and join all adverse parties. It is similar to a quiet 
title proceeding, probate proceeding, or a name change proceeding, where adverse parties are 
joined in the proceeding by publication and posting. Many statutes provide for jurisdiction by 
publication. See Idaho Code $ 7-801, et seq. (name change); Idaho Code $5 43-405 and 43-406 
(petition regarding confinnation of bonds of irrigation district); Idaho Code $42-3206 (sewer 
district formation); Idaho Code $ 67-4901, et seq. (petition to establish auditorium district). 
On February 12,2008, the Agency adopted and passed Resolution No. 2008-1, 
authorizing the filing of a judicial confirmation proceeding. (Ex. 15.) On February 13,2008, the 
Agency filed its Petition for Judicial Confirmation. (Ex. 16.) Thereafter, the Clerk of the Court 
issued a Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation scheduling this case for hearing on 
March 17,2008. (Ex. 17.) The Agency then caused the Notice to be posted in the appropriate 
locations and published in the Standard Journal, all in compliance with Idaho Code $ 7-1306. 
The Notice was published in the Standard Journal on February 21,2008, and February 28,2008. 
(Affidavit of Judy C. Coy ("Coy Aff."), 7 3.) The Notice will also be published in the Standard 
Journal on March 6,2008. (Coy Aff., 7 3.) 
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The validity of actions taken by the Agency are subject to potential dispute. First, and 
primarily, the validity of these actions must be determined before Bond Counsel can issue an 
unqualified opinion. (See Affidavit of Michael C. Moore ("Moore Aff.")) Additionally, a 
condition of the purchase of the Series 2008 Bonds by Zions Bank Public Finance is a judgment 
confirming the validity of the Series 2008 Bonds and the Bond Purchase Agreement. Clearly, 
these are important legal questions that must be answered before the goals of the Agency can be 
l l l y  accomplished. The Idaho Legislature has provided a mechanism for resolution of these 
important legal questions. The procedure provided is similar to procedures allowed for a 
declaratory judgment, where a court may be asked for a judgment declaring the rights, status, and 
other legal relations of the patties. The Declaratory Judgrnent Act is often used to determine the 
validity of a statute, the validity of an instrument or other subject matter, or the validity of a 
contract prior to an actual breach of that contract. See Idaho Code $ 10-1201, et seq. 
The declaratory judgment procedure has been used in other jurisdictions to determine the 
validity of bonds. 
The plaintiffbelieves it is compelled to take the initiative in bringing 
the matker to a head because of precautionary advice received from 
bond counsel respecting possible legal liability for the payment of 
interest. It is for the benefit ofthe State that plaintiffs bonds should 
continue to enjoy a high rating for the public sale of suchbonds is the 
direct and immediate means by which the capital construction fund 
of the State will obtain the r e h d  of the cost of constructing the 
Thruway. The State's interest in this respect is evidenced in 
Constitution, article 10, section 6. The use of the declaratory 
judgment is necessary in this case to settle a dispute involving the 
meaning or application of a statute. The defendant has failed to take 
action which would dispose of the issue and so long as it remains 
unresolved a possible unprovided for and unascertainable liability, 
involvingmillions of dollars, hangs suspended over the marketability 
in the future of the plaintiffs bonds. 
New YorkState Thruway Auth. v. Hurd, 284 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1967), afd, 286 N.Y.S.2d 436 
Some courts have commented on the declaratory judgment procedure, noting its specific 
purpose to determine rights in advance, before action is taken. 
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A declaratory judgment, by its very nature, is intended to clarify the 
rights o f  parties before those rights are violated. Once rights are 
violated, declaratoryrelief is inappropriate. W e  stated in West Fargo 
Public School District No. 6 v. West Fargo Education Association, 
259 N.W.2d 612,617 (N.D. 1977), that theDeclaratory Judgment Act 
is intended 'to ~rovide a method whereby parties to a justiciable 
controversy may have it determined by a-court in advance o f  any 
Cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted the 
Uniibm Declaratory Judgment Act, from which Chapter 32-23, 
N.D.C.C., was adopted, support our conclusion. For example, in 
Sappv. ABC Credit & Investment Co., 243 Ga. 151,159,253 S.E.2d 
82, 87 (1979), the Supreme Court o f  Georgia stated: 
'The object o f  the declaratory judgment is to permit 
determination o f  a controversy before obligations are 
reuudiated or riehts are violated. As many times vointed out 
Allen v. City ofMinot, 363 N.W.2d 553,554 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis added). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have approved the use o f  a special statutory proceeding to 
judge the constitutionality o f  a particular statute. 
This special proceeding is no ordinaryprivate dispute between 
these petitioners and respondent; it was created by the legislature to 
permit a speedy resolution o f  a public issue on which further action 
by those responsible for the state's fiscal policies might depend. Our 
only jurisdiction under Section 8 is to render a judgment 'as to the 
constitutionality and legality o f  Paragraph 3, Senate Joint 
Resolution 30.' Because o f  this limited grant ofjurisdiction, no other 
relief or order is in issue. 
It should be clear to Oregon voters and the legislature that a 
declaration that the proposed amendments were submitted b y  an 
improper procedure has substantial practical significance. First, we 
do not take for granted that respondent's view ofher duty to place the 
amendments on the ballot will remain the same in the light o f  this 
opinion. W e  are given no jurisdiction to advise her in this 
proceeding. W e  refer to a possible reconsideration by the Secretary 
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o f  State only to meet the argument that the proceeding is without 
practical substance. 
Second, we do not lose sight o f  the fact that it was the 
Legislative Assembly that made this provision for a speedy 
adjudication of  the validity o f  the disputed procedure. Possibly 
members of  the legislature wished to be in a position to suggest 
further legislative action in case the validity o f  the amendments 
proved seriously doubtful. W e  cannot assume that the validity of  the 
disputed procedure would be of  no practical importance, when the 
legislature took exhaordinary steps to have it decided by this court in 
priority to all other matters. 
I f  the present dispute were not justiciable, the validity o f  the 
procedure by which this amendment was submitted could not be 
tested by means of  this proceeding under Section 8.  Decision 
whether the constitutional amendments and the sales tax statute 
became law or not would have to await a later challenge to their 
validity i f  they should gain approval by the voters. This delay, with 
its risk o f  legal complications and fiscal tunnoil at a later time, is 
what Section 8 was designed to avoid. The petitioners' interests as 
pleaded in the petition, the genuine disagreement between these 
parties over properly identified and briefed legal issues, and the 
possibility that our judgment may affect respondent's further action 
together bring this proceeding under Section 8 within the bounds of  
justiciability. 
Hart v. Paulus, 676 P.2d 1384,1387 (Or. 1984). 
h1 this case, Bond Counsel for the Agency has indicated without a decision on the validity 
o f  these bonds using revenue allocation financing in Idaho, an unqualified bond opinion cannot 
be issued and bonds cannot be sold. (See Moore Aff.)  Additionally, Zions Bank Public Finance 
will not purchase the Series 2008 Bonds without a confirming judgment. Consequently, this is 
precisely the type o f  case which requires use o f  the judicial confinnation procedure, to allow 
determination o f  the controversy before bonds are sold. 
The legislature was no doubt aware o f  the drastic consequences that can occur i f  a 
financing project, with the accompanying issuance o f  public bonds, is allowed to proceed without 
a judicial assessment of  the validity o f  the particular transaction. Lawsuits arising from the 
default on public bonds issued by the Washington Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS") 
dominated news reports in the 1980's. In 1983, the Idaho Supreme Court held certain Idaho 
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cities had no authority to enter into power purchase agreements after WPPSS had sold bonds to 
the public premised upon the validity o f  these agreements. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 
432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983). The resulting financial catastrophe clearly demonstrates the need for a 
pre-issue declaratory judgment procedure for the protection o f  the public. 
On July 3 ,  1990, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Idaho Falls 
RedeveIopment Agency v. Countryman, 118 Idaho 43,794 P.2d 632 (1990). The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied a petition for writ o f  mandamus, saying the Agency had another plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 635. By its decision, the supreme court implied a petition for 
judicial confirmation was available to test the validity o f  any tax increment financing project 
The judicial confirmation method o f  obtaining an early resolution of  bond issues is a 
practice dating to the early 1900's in Idaho. A number o f  cases discuss the judicial confirmation 
statute that applies to irrigation districts. These cases address the validity of  a confirmation 
procedure and the res judicata effect o f  a confirmation judgment. In American Falls Reservoir 
Llist. v. Thrall, 39 Idaho 105,228 P.  236 (1924), the court stated: 
It is a matter o f  common knowledge that bonds about which 
there is no question as to their validity and payment at maturity can 
be sold for more than bonds which are liable to be assailed and 
questioned years after their issuance, and that bonds o f  doubtful 
validity are reluctantly taken at any price. It was doubtless for the 
purpose o f  settling this class o f  questions in advance and thereby 
making the bonds o f  irrigation districts more readily salable and at 
better prices than they would otherwise command that the legislature 
passed the confirmation acts providing that districts might, before 
offering their bonds, have all questions affecting their validity 
judicially and finally determined. The confirmation proceeding is in 
the nature o f  a proceeding in vem, the object being to determine the 
status of  the district and its power to issue valid bonds. 
Id. at 135 (citations omitted), 
The court went on to state that once the proceedings were confirmed, the decision was res 
judicata as to all owners o f  land given constructive notice o f  the proceedings: 
Notice o f  the confirmation proceedings was given, and the owners of  
all lands assessed were entitled to appear before the court in this 
proceeding, in which the court was authorized to correct all enors in 
MEMORANDUM Dl SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION - 17 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 49 
the assessment, apportionment and distribution of costs. This 
constitutes due process of law and is not a taking of property without 
compensation. 
The method which the legislature has provided and which has 
been followed is clearly within its constitutional power, and the law 
is valid and the proceedings had bind all the lands within the district 
and the owners thereof. 
Id. at 145. 
The court has reached a similar holding in several other cases. See also Nampa Irr. 
Dist. v. Brose, 11 Idaho 474, 83 P. 499 (1905); Smith v. Progressive Irr. Dist., 28 Idaho 812, 
156 P. 1133 (1916); and Knowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 87 (1909) 
In Crane Creek R.A. Board v. Irr. Dist., 48 Idaho 662,284 P. 557 (1930), the court said: 
The attacks directed against the contract in this suit could and should 
have been made in the confirmation proceedings. The decree binds 
all parties and precludes further examination of the questions there 
determined. 
Id. at 667. 
In Koch v. Canyon County 2008 W L  204232,4 (2008)' taxpayers brought action against 
the county contending that the lease agreement entered into by the County violated Article VIII, $ 
3 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. The Court noted: 
The Idaho legislature has enacted the Judicial Confinnation Law, LC. $5 7-1301 
et seq., which provides a procedure enabling political subdivisions to obtain a 
judicial determination of the validity of a proposed obligation. The County 
recognized that the lease agreement may violate Article VIII, $3,  but elected not 
to seek a determination of whether it did. Had it done so, the Plaintiffs could have 
appeared in the proceeding to raise their objections. LC. $ 7-1307. 
Id. at 4. 
Thus, based upon the foregoing case authority, the Idaho courts have approved of and 
reinforced the judicial confirmation tool over the course of the last century. 
'Please note that this case has not yet been released for publication in the permanent law 
reports. Until the case is released, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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v. 
OTHER IDAHO PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING AND USE OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
Several other actions in the State of Idaho involved the issue of the validity of tax 
increment financing and resulted in judicial confirmation of Agency action. 
A petition for judicial confirmation, In re Boise Redevelopment Agency, Case 
No. 91781, Fourth Judicial District, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued 
by the Honorable Duff McKee. 
Another petition for judicial confirmation, In the Matter of Twin Falls Urban 
Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Case No. 41756, Fifth Judicial 
District, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable George 
Granata. 
A third petition for judicial confirmation, filed in In re Urban Renewal Agency of 
Boise City, Case No. 93240, Fourth Judicial District, resulted in Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable Deborah Bail. 
A fourth petition for judicial confirmation filed in In re Urban Renewal Agency o f  
Idaho Falls, Case No. 40006, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the 
Honorable Marvin M. Smith. (Ex. 18.) 
A fifth petition was filed in Madison County, Case No. CV-92-00212, In re 
Urban Renewal Agency of Rexburg, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued 
by the Honorable Grant L. Young. (Ex. 19.) 
A sixth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of Boise City, aka Capital City 
Development Corporation, filed in the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada, 
Case No. 98126, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable 
Judge Carey. 
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A seventh petition, In re Twin Falls Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation 
(Tax Increment) Bonds, filed in the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Case 
No. 9500252D, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree issued 
by the Honorable Roger Burdick. 
An eighth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of the City ofAmmon, filed in the 
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, Case No. CV-95-757 (Ex. 20), resulted in Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Honorable Judge Marvin M. Smith. 
A ninth petition, In re Urban Renewal Agency of the City ofAmmon, filed in 
Bonneville County, Case No. CV-96-5952, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
issued by the Honorable Judge St. CIair. (Ex. 21.) 
A tenth petition, In re Twin Falls Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation 
(Tax Increment) Bonds, filed in the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Case 
No. 9801 806D, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree issued 
by the Honorable Daniel Meehl. 
An eleventh petition, In the matter of: Lewiston Urban Renewal Agency Revenue 
Allocation Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Lewiston, Idaho, filed in Nez Perce 
County, Case No. CV 06-02398, resulted in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment 
and Decree by the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie. 
A twelfth petition, In the matter of: Caldwell Urban Renewal Agency Revenue 
Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency o f  the City of Caldwell, Idaho, filed 
in the Third Judicial Disti-ict, Canyon County, Case No. CV-2006-7456-C, resulted in Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order issued by the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie. 
A thirteenth petition, In the matter of: Urban Renewal Agency Revenue Allocation 
Bonds, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Caldwell, Idaho, filed in the Third Judicial District, 
Canyon County, Case No. CV-2007-9073, resulted in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order issued by the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie. 
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Only one judicial confirmation proceeding seeking a determination of the validity of tax 
increment financing resulted in a finding this method of financing was invalid. See In re Urban 
Renewal Agency of Boise City, Ada County Case No. CV-OC-98-00978-D. (Ex. 22.) In this 
proceeding the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse found tax increment financing violated 
Article VIII, 5 1 of the Idaho Constitution. However, subsequent to Judge Newhouse's decision, 
Article VIII, $ 1  was amended. See S.J.R. No. 107 (S.L. 1998, p. 1363). This amendment was 
ratified at the 1998 general election. As amended, tax increment financing does violate 
Article VIII, 5 1 under Judge Newhouse's analysis. 
VI. 
VALIDITY OF THE REVENUE ALLOCATION 
FINANCING MECHANISM 
Several constitutional and statutory questions are presented in this judicial confirmation 
proceeding. The following are the major issues to be addressed: 
(1) Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation, contained in the Idaho Constitution, Article 7, 
Section 5. (Petition, 7 X(1)) 
(2) Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to private entities as coiltained in 
Article 8, 5 4, and Article 12, 5 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and whether it further generally 
violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from incurring an 
indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year and pledging ad 
valorem taxes for the payment of such indebtedness without the assent of qualified electors, as 
provided in Idaho Constitution, Article 8, 5 3. (Petition, 1[ X(2).) 
(3) Whether by reason of the coinposition, action, and operation of the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency Board of Directors, the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter ego 
of the City of Rexburg, and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Rexburg 
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Urban Renewal Agency therefore violates the provisions o f  the Idaho Constitution prohibiting 
municipalities from lending credit to private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article 8, 
Section 4, and whether it further violates provisionsof the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a 
municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a 
specific year and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment o f  such indebtedness without the 
assent of  qualified electors, as provided in Idaho Constitution, Article 8 ,  Section 3.  (Petition, 
7 X(31.1 
(4) Whether by virtue o f  the ability of  the city council to declare itself as the board o f  
commissioners of  the urban renewal agency under Idaho Code $5 50-2006(b)(2) and (3), whether 
exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is the alter ego o f  a municipality. (Petition, f j  X(4).) 
( 5 )  Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing power 
in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and standards as required under the 
doctrine o f  separation o f  powers, to govern the assessment and collection o f  tax, to ensure the 
taxes collected are used in furtherance o f  the legislative purpose and in furtherance of  the public 
purpose. (Petition, 7 X(5).) 
(6) Whether the provisions o f  the statute and the ordinance violate the due process 
rights o f  taxpayers o f  the State of  Idaho, by not requiring the expenditure o f  public funds 
collected from taxpayers for a public purpose. (Petition, 7 X(6).) 
(7) Whether implementation of  revenue allocation financing violated Article I ,  
Section 16 o f  the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws that impair the obligation o f  
contracts. (Petition, f j  X(7).) 
( 8 )  Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the legislature for a "City 
Purpose" in violation o f  Article 7 ,  Section 6 of  the Idaho Constitution. (Petition, f j X(8).) 
(9) Whether the revenue allocation method o f  taxation violates Article 7 ,  Section 7 o f  
the Idaho Constitution. (Petition, 7 X(9).) 
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(10) Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits 
received. (Petition, X(10).) 
(1 1) Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts. (Petition, 
T X(1 11.) 
Each of these constitutional and statutory questions will be addressed in turn. Based on 
an exhaustive analysis of the Idaho Constitution and decisions from other jurisdictions which 
have nearly unanimously upheld the implementation of revenue allocation financing, it is clear 
that Idaho's law is sufficient to withstand constitutional challenge, and thus judicial confirmation 
of the proposed method of financing is appropriate. 
A. Standards Governing Constitutional Questions 
The present judicial confinnation process seeks a dctcrmination from the court on a 
number of constitutional issues. Consequently, the standards governing any decision on the 
constitutionality of a statute should be reviewed. The legislature is presumed to have acted 
within its constitutiollal power. Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 525 P.2d 957 (1974); Western 
Beverage, Inc. v. State, 96 Idaho 588,532 P.2d 930 (1974). Legislative enactments are presumed 
constitutional. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5,696 P.2d 856 (1985); State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 
162,686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App. 1984). Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of 
the constitutionality of a statute. State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707,518 P.2d 969 (1974); Caesar v. 
Williams, 84 ldaho 254,371 P.2d 241 (1962). Statutes must be construed whereverpossihle to 
afford a constitutional interpretation. Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796,451 P.2d 542 (1969). 
It is the duty of the courts to uphold legislative enactments wherever possible. Hecla Mining 
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 108 Idaho 147,697 P.2d 1161 (1985). 
B. The Revenue Allocation Financing Provisions Do Nut Violate the C:oustitutional 
Requirenrent of L'niformih. of Taxation. 
The Idaho Constitution requires all taxes be levied in a uniform manner. 
$5. Taxes to be uniform-Exemptions.-A11 taxes shall be 
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits, 
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of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected 
under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxaiion of all property, real and personal: 
provided, that the legislature may allow such exemptions froin 
taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all 
existing exemptions provided by the laws of the territory, shall 
continue until changed by the legislature of the state: provided 
further, that duplicate taxation of property for the same purpose 
during the same year, is hereby prohibited. 
Idaho Const. Art. 7, $ 5. The basic purpose for the uniformity provision is to distribute the 
burden of taxation evenly and equitably, as far as practical. 84 C.J.S. Taxation $22 at 76. This 
equality in taxation is accomplished when t h e m  ofthe tax falls equally and impartially on 
all the persons and property subject to it, so that no higher rate or greater levy in proportion to the 
value of such property is imposed on one person or species of property than on others similarly 
situated or of like character. 84 C.J.S. Taration $ 22 at 78 (emphasis added). 
The uniformity provision of the Idaho Constitution is violated when an assessed tax is 
levied unevenly within the same class of subjects within the taxing district when one class of 
property is systematically assessed at a higher percentage of actual cash value, thereby subjecting 
the taxpayer to a higher rate of taxation than applies to other property within the taxing district. 
The requirement of uniformity is violated not only when the tax is 
levied unevenlv within the same class of subiects but also when one 
class of propesy is systematically assessed 2 a higher percentage of 
actual cash value, subjecting the taxpayer to a higher rate of taxation, 
than applies to other prope;ty within the taxingdistrict. 
County ofAda v. Red Steer Drive-Ins, Etc., 101 Idaho 94,97-98,609 P.2d 161 (1980). The 
uniformity provision in Idaho is concerned with one taxpayer bearing a proportionately heavier 
burden than another taxpayer, similarly situated, in the same taxing district. From apurely 
logical perspective, the revenue allocation financing legislation should not run afoul of the 
concerns of the uniformity clause. A taxpayer situated outside the urban renewal area would still 
pay property taxes based on the assessed value of the property, as would a taxpayer within the 
urban renewal project area. The only difference in treatment is not with respect to the assessment 
of tax, but only with respect to the distribution of the tax proceeds. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a uniformity challenge in Board of Trustees of Joint 
Class A School District No. 151 in Twin Falls County v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Cassia County, 83 Idaho 172,359 P.2d 635 (1961), where a statute provided for a county tax 
levy i f  a school district in the county had a fmding deficiency. School District 151's bounda~ies 
did not encompass all o f  Cassia County and included a portion o f  neighboring Twin Falls 
County. County taxpayers outside School District No. 151, or within another school district, had 
to pay an additional tax in order to support School District No. 151. The court held the tax did 
not violate the constitutional uniformity requirement, because it applied to all emergency needs 
o f  all school districts in the county. 
The fact that the need for such emergency funds may be 
greater in one area or district within the county, than in another, does 
not invalidate the levy. W e  are not here dealing with a special tax 
levy against the property in one district, the proceeds o f  which are 
used in another. It is a county tax levied equally and uniformly upon 
all taxable property in the county. The taxpayers are not assessed as 
members o f  a school district but as citizens o f  the county. The fund 
is apportioned fairly and equitably to the various schools within the 
county according to their needs. 
The fact that the proceeds o f  a tax levy are apportioned in 
varying amounts and that some districts receive less than the mount 
o f  levy therein does not constitute lack o f  uniformity, where the tax 
is apportioned reasonably and according to need in an effort to 
equalize education or standards throughout the county. 
Id. at 178. 
Revenue allocation financing legislation has withstood constitutional uniformity 
challenges in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48,60 
(Iowa 1975); People Ex Rel. City o f  Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242,249 (Ill. 1980); 
Metropolitan Development and I5ousing Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427,429-30 (Tenn. 
1979); Sigma Tau Gamma, Etc. v. City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85,93-94 (Wis. 1980). The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court pointedly recognized under revenue allocation financing laws, there 
was no taxpayer who was singled out for preferential treatment over any other taxpayer. 
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Under tax increment financing. . . there is no disproportionate impact 
upon taxpayers within the same territorial boundaries of the unit 
imposing the tax. All taxpayers within the territorial limits of each 
local governmental unit . . . continue to be taxed at a uniform rate 
based upon valuations uniformly arrived at. No taxpayer or group of 
taxpayers is being singled out for preferential treatment either in the 
form of an exemption from taxation or a tax credit. Thus, we 
conclude, taxation under tax incremental financing is uniform. 
City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d at 94. In City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980), the 
Nevada Supreme Court dismissed a petitioner's challenge of revenue allocation financing 
legislation on uniformity grounds, stating that the contentions "lack relevant authority, and 
therefore need not be considered. . . . Moreover, we find the contentions without merit." Id. at 
640 (citations omitted). 
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld its revenue allocation financing law over a challenge 
based on the uniformity and equality requirements of the Kansas Constitution. State, ex re1 
Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 (Kru~. 1980). The Kansas court stated: 
The only possible nonuniformity or inequality would result 
from the statutory allocation or distribution of the tax money already 
collected. Article 11, Section 1, does not require uniformity and 
equality in the distribution of tax money. That constitutional 
provision only requires the legislature to provide for a uniform and 
equal of assessment and taxation. . . . That constitutional 
provision has not been made applicable to the distribution or 
allocation of taxes after they are collected. 
Id. at 562 (original emphasis). Thus the Kansas court held the revenue allocation financing 
legislation applied uniformly throughout the taxing district, and the constitutional mandate of 
uniform and equal taxation had been fulfilled. Id. at 562-63. 
In Meierhenvy v. City oflluron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984), the supreme court of South 
Dakota upheld a challenge to revenue allocation financing on unifonnity grounds. The court 
clearly held that uniformity relates to the levy of taxes and does not limit the authority to allocate 
or distribute public funds collected through such levies. 
Although it is true that under the Act the additional tax 
revenues derived from the increase in the assessed valuation of the 
property within the tax incremental district is earmarked for the 
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repayment o f  the project costs, SDCL 11-9-31, and thus is not 
available to defray the costs o f  school and local governmental 
operations, this fact does not necessarily render the Act 
unconstitutional. Constitutional requirements o f  equality and 
uniformity relate to the levy o f  taxes, and neither the requirement o f  
unifonnity nor o f  equal protection o f  the law limit the legislature's 
authority to allocate or distribute public funds, Douglas Indep. 
School Dist, No. 3 v. Bell, 272 N.W.2d 825 (S.D.1978); Dean v. 
Coddington, supra. The findings that the governing body o f  the 
municipality must make as a prerequisite to establishing a tax 
incremental district, SDCL 1 1-9-8, presuppose that in the absence o f  
the creation o f  the district the assessed valuation o f  the property 
within the area o f  the proposed district will not increase and, indeed, 
will likely decline. 
Meierheny v. CityofIuron, 354N.W.2d 171, 177 (S.D. 1984). InSouth Bendpublic 
Transportation Corporatioiz v. City of South Bend, the Indiana Supreme Court also upheld the 
statute on similar grounds. 
Appcllunts next conrend that the tax allucalion financingplan 
set onr In ind. Code $ 18-7-7-39. I .  r1currr. does not incet the exisrine 
criteria governing taxation by spkcid taxing districts and does n$ 
meet the uniform and equal taxation requirement o f  Article 10, 
Section 1 o f  the Indiana Constitution. Appellants complain that the 
burden of  the costs o f  the improvements falls not only on the people 
and property within the Allocation Area but also indirectly on 
residents outside o f  the Area but within overlapping taxing units. 
They cite the SouthBend Community School Corporation, St. Joseph 
County, the South Bend Public Library, and the St. Joseph County 
Park Board as examples of  taxing units which overlap both the 
Allocation Area and other areas outside the corporate limits o f  the 
city. They complain that a taxpayer, such as appellant Helling, who 
resides outside o f  the city but within the area o f  the overlapping 
taxing units, will indirectly bear a portion o f  the cost o f  the 
redevelopment financing but will not receive any special benefits 
therekom. W e  see no merit to this argument since the overlapping 
taxing units will eventually share the benefits o f  the higher assessed 
values in the redevelopment area. W e  have consistently held that the 
legislature has the power to create special taxing districts without 
regard to the boundaries o f  the municipal or political subdivisions o f  
the state. "[Tlhepower exercised is a legislative one, and there is no 
express or implied limitation upon the power found in the 
constitution." 
South Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217,222-23 
(Ind. 1981). The Indiana court held the uniformity provision does not limit the expenditure o f  
funds collected through taxation. 
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lIlt has consistentlv been held that the uniformity clause protects 
. , 
residents against discriminatory assessment procedures and docs not 
cuntrol lcgisla!ive expenditure tlecisiuns. Tax 311ocation financing 
does not &ange the bisic rate of assessment and all taxpayers within 
the territorial limits of each taxing unit continue to be taxed at a 
uniform rate based upon valuations uniformly arrived at. 
In at least six other states, the supreme courts have upheld tax 
allocation financing statutes against challenges based upon tax 
uniformity clauses similar to ours. These jurisdictions all recognized 
that uniformity clauses aim to protect against discriminatory 
assessment procedures and do not apply to legislative expenditure 
decisions. 
Id. at 223. 
In Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, the Colorado court made a similar ruling: 
Denver contends that this provision is violated because of the unequal 
distribution of its ad valorem revenues. Specifically, Denver argues 
that this provision is violated because a portion of the tax revenues 
from the levy upon property within the project area are allocated to 
DURA for retirement of the bonds. 
Colo.Const. Art. X, Sec. 3, however, has not been held to 
require equal distribution of tax revenues, nor do we today render 
such an interpretation. Rather, this provision requires that the burden 
of taxation be uniform on the same class of property within the 
jurisdiction of the authority levying the tax. Citizens Committee for 
Fair Taxation v. Warner, 127 Colo. 121, 254 P.2d 1005 (1953); 
Leonard v. Reed, 46 Colo. 307, 104 P. 410 (1909); Ames v. People, 
26 Colo. 83, 56 P. 656 (1899); Palmer v. Way, 6 6010. 106 (1881). 
It is auuarent from the discussion that the tax burden upon owners of 
property within the project area and othcr owners of p;operty within 
Dcnver is the same. Accordingly, we find no \,iolation ofColo.Cons1. 
- .  
Art. X, Sec. 3. 
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374,1386 (1980). 
Upon infonnation and belief, no court has invalidated a revenue allocation financing law 
on the basis of a uniformity constitutional provision. See also Tax Increment Financing for 
Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L.REv. 77 (1985). Consequently, 
Idaho's law should similarly be upheld against any challenge based on Article 7, 6 5, of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
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C. Revenue Allocation Financing Does Not Violate the Prohibition Against a 
Governmental Entity Lending Credit. 
Article 8, 5 4, and Article 12, $ 4, of the Idaho Constitution prohibit governmental 
entities from loaning credit to or for the benefit ofprivate interests. Article 8, 5 4, provides: 
No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school 
district, or other subdivision, shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith 
thereof directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of any 
individual, association or corporation, for any amount or for any 
purpose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, contract or 
liability of any individual, association or corporation in or out of this 
state. 
Article 12, 5 4, similarly provides: 
No county, town, city, or othermunicipal corporation, by vote 
of its citizens or otherwise, shall ever become a stockholder in any 
joint stock company, corporation or association whatever, or raise 
money for, or make donation or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any 
such company or association . . . . 
There are a number of Idaho cases interpreting this particular provision and a similar 
provision which applies to the Idaho Legislature. In one case dealing with the legislative 
provision, Article 8, $ 2, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the history of this type of a 
constitutional provision and its intended application. 
The history of this constitutional provision, and others of its kind 
adopted in our sister states is well known. As stated succinctly in one 
law review article: 
"In the nineteenth century, the United States was 
enjoying a rapid westward expansion. A key element in this 
expansion was the construction of railroads and other 
communication and transportatioil systems, the routes of 
which vastly influenced growth. An adjacent railroad was 
ofien crucial to the economic growth, if not the very 
existence, of many localities. As a result, state and local 
govemnents, in order to encourage specific routes and spurs, 
offered financial assistance to struggling railroads. This 
assistance was not entirely without precedent in light of 
earlier successes with similar projects such as the Erie Canal. 
Governmental assistance usually took the form of stock or 
security purchases, or co-signatures on bonds issued by 
railroads. Since these private ventures were at best highly 
speculative, many failed, leaving governmental units, and thus 
the taxpayer, either holding worthless stock certificates or, 
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even worse, liable for large inadequately secured debts. 
During the depression of 1837 nine states defaulted on, or 
repudiated, debts of this type. These repudiations were made 
easier because a significant portion of the debt certificates 
were held by European investors who desired a stake in the 
American venture. 
"The resulting economic crisis led to the passage of 
constitutional provisions designed to limit state indebtedness 
and restrict governmental involvement in private ventures. 
Forty-five state constitutions contain provisions prohibiting 
the lending of credit . . . ." 
Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,560,548 P.2d 35,60 (1976) (footnotes 
omitted). A similar concern was expressed by the court in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick 
Kong Corporation: 
The purpose of such a prohibition is clear. Favored status should not 
be given any private enterprise or individual in the application of 
public funds. The proceedings and debates of the Idaho 
Constitutional Convention indicate a consistent theme running 
through the consideration of the constitutional sections in question. 
It was feared that pfivate interests would gain advantages at the 
expense of the taxpayers. This fear appeared to relate particularly to 
railroads and a few other large businesses who had succeeded in 
gaining the ability to impose taxes, at least indirectly, uponmunicipal 
residents in western states at the time of the drafting of our 
constitution. We are led to the firm conviction that only private 
interests were intended to fall within the strictures of those sectioiis 
relating to "association," "corporation" and "joint stock company." 
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yiclc Kong Corporation, 94 Idaho 876,883-84,499 P.2d 575 
(1972). The court in Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217,458 P.2d 213 (1969), 
attempted to define the word "credit" withi11 this constitutional provision. 
The word "credit" as used in this provision implies the imposition of 
some new financial liability upon the State which in effect results in 
the creation of State debt for the benefit of private enterprises. This 
was the evil intended to be remedied by Idaho Const. art. 8, § 2, and 
similar provisions in other state constitutions. 
Id. at 221-22 (footnote omitted). Several separate lending-of-credit issues are raised by the 
revenue allocation financing law. 
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1. The Citv of Rexburg Is Not Lending Its Credit to a Private Entity. 
This issue was addressed in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corporation, 
94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). The Idaho Supreme Court in YickKong held the 
constitutional provisions regarding lending of credit apply only if the governmental entity is 
lending its credit to or for the benefit of pr&& interests. Id. at 883-84. See also Idaho Falls 
Consolidated Hospital v. Bingham County Board, 102 Idaho 838,642 P.2d 553 (1982). In Yick 
Kong, the court held that the Agency, ''being a public and not a private enterprise, does not fall 
within the strictures and prohibition of Article 8, 5 4 and Article 12, 5 4 of the Idaho Constitution 
. . . ." Id. at 884. This conclusion was based upon the court's finding the Agency could not 
impose taxes upon the residents of the city or encumber public assets to the advantage of private 
enterprise. Id. 
Even with the addition of the revenue allocation financing mechanism, the Agency 
remains unable to exercise any power to levy or collect taxes. See Idaho Code $$50-2007 
and 50-2910. Revenue allocation bonds are payable froin a special account funded by 
incremental tax revenues. However, the issuance of such bonds does not encumber public assets 
because the Act limits the payment of revenue allocation bonds to revenues available in the 
special fnnd. The Act specifically indicates no encumbrance of public funds is intended or 
allowed. See Idaho Code 5 50-2910. 
As to this issue, Yick Kong remains viable authority for the proposition that the Agency is 
a public entity. The Agency's specific purpose is to aid in the development and redevelopment 
of a deteriorated or deteriorating areas within the city. This is clearly a public purpose, as the 
court held in Yick Kong, and will be discussed later in this memorandum. Consequently, the 
Agency does not lend its credit to a private entity in violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
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2. The Agencv Is Not a Governmental Entitv Subieet to the "Lendinv Credit" 
Prohibition of the Idaho Constitution. 
Article 8, $4,  and Article 12, $4,  of the Idaho Constitution do not specifically include a 
redevelopment agency within the parameters of their proscriptions, but they do include a catchall 
"other subdivision." The question presented is whether the Agency should be included within 
this "other subdivision" provision. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled on this question in Boise 
Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corporation, 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). In 
addressing the issue of whether voter approval was necessary for the encumbrance of Agency 
property, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly ruled the Agency was not a "subdivision of the state." 
We further hold that the [Redeveloument Agency1 is not a 
subdivision of the state within the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 of 
Article 8 of the Idaho Constitution. As pointed out in Lloyd v. Twin 
Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941), the 
questioned authority has no powers of taxation and therefore the 
provisions of Article 8, Section 3 do not apply. Herein plaintiff has 
no ability to actually encumber any of the resources of the City of 
Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property holdings. 
Id. at 882-83 (emphasis added). Even with the addition of the revenue allocation financing 
mechanism, the Agency remains powerless to encumber the general funds of the city or assess 
taxes on the general public. While the Agency can now serve as a recipient for tax h d s  
assessed and collected by a public entity, the Agency has no independent power of taxation. 
Yick Kong thus remains viable authority on this point. 
This issue may also turn on whether the Agency is an "alter ego" of the city of Rexburg. 
The alter ego issue will be discussed in more depth later in this memorandum in connection with 
the voter approval sections of the Idaho Constitution. Resolution of that issue also requires 
reference to the authority of the Yiclc Kong case. 
Regarding the lending credit provision, a specific concern has been the availability of the 
general revenue fund to satisfy any obligation created through the lending of credit. If the 
general revenues are available for the repayment of obligations, the taxpayers' interests are 
placed in jeopardy if the obligation is incursed to aid a private scheme. The fact the Agency has 
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no general revenue power and thus cannot affect the general revenue fund in which the public has 
a unique interest excludes the Agency from the proscriptions of these constitutional provisions. 
In addition, the fact the only encumbrance created lies against the fund created to receive the 
revenue il~ilitates against a finding the lending credit provisions are implicated. 
3. Proceeds of Revenue Allocation Bonds Are Issued for the Benefit of a Public 
Use. 
-
Some courts have engrafted a public purpose requirement onto the lending credit 
provision. It appears Idaho has also adopted this analysis. In Engelklng v. Investment Board, 
93 Idaho 217,458 P.2d 213 (19691, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically stated where funds 
were being used to increase the earnings of the state, that was a predominant and public use, and 
the credit clause was intended to preclude state action which aims to aid various private schemes. 
Thus, where the funds are used to effectuate a broad public purpose, no violation of the crcdit 
clause can be shown. 
Certainly, public interests in Rexburg are beiiefittcd by the issuance of the revenue 
allocation bonds for redevelopment. The proceeds fi-om these bonds will be used to finance the 
acquisition of land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing 
facilities, access road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and imnprovements; construction 
and furnishing of a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for 
soccer, football, baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements - all of 
which clearly serve a public purpose. While those facilities will provide the incidental benefits 
of stimulating and assisting private development, they clearly fulfill the valid public purpose of 
eliminating urban deterioration, stimulating the local economy, and increasing the tax base for 
the various taxing districts, all to the benefit of the taxpayers in the expanded urban area. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has specifically upheld a redevelopment agency's authority to condemn 
property on the grounds that a public use was served by the urban renewal plan. See Yick Kong, 
94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). The same analysis should apply to the lending credit 
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provisions of the constitution. Further discussion of the public purpose argument is included 
within this memorandum, in the discussion of due process requirements. 
4. Authorities From Other Jurisdictions Uphold Revenue Alfocation Fiuaucin~ 
Under a Lending Credit Provision. 
A number of jurisdictions have considered the constitutionality of revenue allocation 
financing under constitutional provisions similar to Article 8 ,$4 .  Most of the courts have 
upheld the revenue allocation financing laws under such provisions. See Denver Urban Renewal 
Authority V. Byrne, 6 18 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); People Ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 
403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980); In re Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988); 
City ofDuluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986); CLty ofMinneapolis v. Wurtele, 
291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); City ofSparlcs v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980); Meierhenry v. 
City ofHuron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984); Metropolitan Development andHousing Agency v. 
Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). A similar 
challenge under Idaho's provisions should also withstand attack. 
D. The Issua~~ce of Revenue Allocation Bonds Does Sot Viulate the Curistitutional 
Kecluireme~lt of \'oter Approval for the Issuance of Debt 
.- 
Article 8, $ 3, of the Idaho Constitution states: 
No county, city, board of education or school district, or other 
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in 
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income 
and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two- 
thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof. . . . 
Under settled Idaho law, voters must approve both general obligation bonds (secured by the full 
faith and credit of the issuer) and revenue bonds (secured only by a pledge of a special fund) 
issued by one of the enumerated governmental entities. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 
670 P.2d 839 (1983), cert. denied, Chemical Bankv. Asson, 469 U.S. 870, 105 S.Ct. 219, 
83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32,129 P. 643 (1912); City of 
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388 (2006). Revenue allocation bond financing by the 
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Agency raises two categories of issues under Article 8, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution: 
(1) whelhcr bonds payable from and secured by incremental tax revenues constitute 
"indebtedness" or "liability"; and, if so, (2) whether the Agency is one of the enumerated 
governmental entities. 
1. Revenue Allocation Bonds Do Sot  Constitute "Indebtedness" or "Liability" 
for P~~rposes of Article 8 , s  3, of the ldaho Constitution. Additionally, the 
Bonds Are Sot a Pledee of Ad Valorem Taxes for the Payment of Such 
Indebtedness. 
hi Asson v. City ofBurley, 105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (19?Y3), cevt. denied, the Idaho 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing rejection of the "special fund" doctrine. Adopted in 
the majority of other jurisdictions, that doctrine holds that "a municipality does not contract 
indebtedness or incur liability, within the constitutional limitation, by undertaking an obligation 
which is to be paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the 
property purchased or constructed." Asson, 105 Idaho at 438. Consequently, even though 
revenue allocation bonds would be payable solely out of a "special fund" funded by incremental 
tax revenues attributable to appreciation in value of the tax base due to the improvements 
financed by the bond proceeds, the special fund doctrine apparently will not immunize such 
bonds from classification as "indebtedness" or "liability" for purposes of Article 8, 5 3. 
Absent the special fund doctrine, there appears to be a split of authority among 
jurisdictions on the issue of whether obligations issued in conjunction with tax increment 
financing are "debts" within constitutional confines. See generally Oklahoma City Urban 
Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research Authority ofOklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,688 
(Okla. 2000), 
There is a line of case law which supports the proposition that revenue allocation bonds 
do not fall within the constitutional terms of "indebtedness" or "liability." For example, in South 
Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981): 
Appellants further argue that the tax allocation bonds do constitute 
debt within the meaning of Article 13, Section 1 of the Indiana 
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Constitution since they ultimately involve the general taxing power 
of the municipality. A careful study of the law negates this analysis. 
The Redevelopment Commission can only apply incremental tax 
revenues which are attributable to increases in the assessed value of 
taxable property in the Allocation Area to the repayment of the bonds. 
If the value of property does not increase, the bonds will not be 
repaid. Therefore, the original taxing power of the municipality will 
not be changed. 
Id at 221 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court specifically relied upon the provisions of 
the revenue allocation statute in making a determination that a debt was not created by the 
financing mechanism. 
The Act specifically provides that the bonds and other 
obligations of the agency are not a debt or obligation of the 
community (which is defined in the Act as a city, county or 
combination ofthe two), thestate, or any of its political subdivisions. 
In addition, the enabling statute, the proposed bond resolution, the 
proposed bond form, and the city ordinance ofratification all prohibit 
the use of credit of the city for the repayment of the bonded 
indebtedness. The bondholders can look only to revenues from the 
operation of the facility and the allocated taxes, for retirement of the 
bond obligation. Under the subject statute, providing for this 
arrangement, there can be no city debt created contrary to 
Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4; nor can there be a lending of the city's 
credit in contravention of Article VI, Scction 29. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 1975) (footnotes omitted) 
Idaho's revenue allocation financing statute contains provisions very similar to those 
addressed by the court in Tribe. For example, Idaho's statute specifically indicates the credit of 
the city is not available for repayment of the bond. Idaho Code 9 50-2910. Under Idaho's 
provisions, as in Utah's provisions, the bondholders may look only to revenues from the 
operation of the facility and the allocated taxes for retirement of the bond obligation 
Consequently, Idaho's revenue allocation statute does not provide for a "debt" within the 
meaning of the constitutional limitations in Article 8, 9 3. 
Other courts, however, have reached a different conclusion. In City of Tucson v. Corbin, 
623 P.2d 1239, 1243-44 (Ariz. 1981), the Arizona statute empowered the &, not a 
redevelopment agency, to implement a revenue allocation financing program for redevelopment 
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purposes. The court acknowledged that "the city's general funds would not be liable even in the 
event that no incremental tax revenues are ever collected." Id. at 1243. Nevertheless, the court 
found the bonds to be invalid. 
The key constitutional infirmity in Arizona's tax increment 
statutes is that they allow the pledge of proceeds from ad valorem 
taxation to pay off municipal property tax increment bonds. Even 
though the incremental tax revenues are placed into a special fund, 
the special fund doctrine does not remove these bonds &om the 
category of obligations which must be approved by the voters under 
our constitution. 
Id. at 1243. The Arizona court cited State, ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v. 
Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963). 
If the revenues in [a special fund] derive exclusively from the 
operation of the device or organ of goverment financed by the fund, 
as in the case of a toll bridge, or the operation of the State Liquor 
Control Board, or from the sales or leases of publicly owned lands, 
any securities issued solely upon the credit of the fund are not debts 
of the state, but debts of the fund only. But if the state undertakes or 
agrees to provide any part of the k n d  from any general tax, be it 
excise or ad valorem, then securities issued upon the credit of the 
fund are likewise issued upon the credit of the state and are in truth 
debts of the state. 
Id. at 842. The court also cites similar holdings in Keutucky, Miller v. Covipzgton Development 
Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976), and in Iowa, Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 
64 (Iowa 1975) 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida receded from precedent and held tax-increment 
financed bonds constitute long-term debt requiring approval by referendum as mandated by the 
Florida Constitution. Strand v. Escambia County, 2007 WI, 2492294,4 (Fla. 2007). In Strand, 
t h e m ,  not a redevelopment agency, adopted an ordinance establishing the Southwest 
Escambia Improvement District and the Southwest Escarnbia Improvement Trust Fund, 
authorizing the use of tax increment financing to fund the trust. Id. at 1. Additionally, the 
county adopted a resolution authorizing the county to issue bonds not exceeding $135,000,000 
for the purpose of financing a four lane road-widening project. Id. The bonds were to reach 
maturity no later than 35 years after revenues are first deposited into the trust fund. Id. 
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The county filed a Complaint for Validation seeking validation of the bond issuance. Id. 
at 2. Dr. Strand intervened. Id. The circuit court entered final judgment validating the bond 
issuance, concluding that the county had authority to issue the subject bonds without first 
obtaining approval by referendum mandated by article VII, section 12 of the Florida Constitution 
Id. Dr. Strand appealed the final judgment. Id. at 3 .  
The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that tax increment financed bonds 
were not subject to the Constitutional referendum requirement based on the premise that the 
Constitutional language 'payable from ad valorem taxation" referred only to the pledge of ad 
valorem taxingpower, not to the pledge of ad valorem tax revenues. Id. at 3 .  Upon review of 
the language in article VII, section 12 of the Constitution and the facts of the case, the Court 
concluded that there was no support for the distinction made between the pledge of taxing power 
and the pledge of tax revenues. The Court stated: 
In contrast, Escarnbia County plans to issue bonds to finance the widening of a 
road, a typical county capital project. And, unlike Miami Beach, the only primary 
funding to service the bonds is ad valorem tax revenues. The County would only 
appropriate revenues from secondary, non-ad valorem sources if the tax increment 
revenues are insufficient to service the bond debt. In effect, the County wants to 
pledge revenue from ad valorem taxation for thirty-five years as the primary 
source of funding a road improvement project without the consent of the 
electorate. We are concerned that allowing this would abrogate the referendum 
requirement of article VII, section 12 for long-term debt and render meaningless 
the phrase "payable from ad valorem taxation." It also appears that such a result 
would violate the purpose of this constitutional restraint on the power of local 
governments to incur long-term debt. 
Id. at 5 .  
The Court appeared concerned that in the case before it, the county was attempting to do 
indirectly that which it could not do directly: attempting to indirectly pledge ad valorem taxation 
for the repayment of long-term bonds used to finance a capital project. Id. The Court held: 
[Tlhe phrase "payable from ad valorem taxation" in article VII, section 12 refers 
not only to a pledge of the taxing power itself but also to a pledge of ad valorem 
tax revenues. And, because tax increment financing pledges funds obtained from 
ad valorem tax revenues, bonds that rely upon such financing schemes are bonds 
"payable from ad valorem taxation." Consequently, approval of such bonds by 
referendum, as mandated by article VII, section 12, must be obtained. 
Id. at 4. 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held tax increment bonds issued to finance an economic 
development project were debts within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution because they 
attempted to bind future legislative bodies to make apportionments through a clear promise that 
the payments would continue for a period up to twenty five-years. Oklahoma City Urban 
Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research Authority of Oklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,687 
(Okla. 2000). In response to the Court's decision, the Oklahoma legislature amended the Local 
Development Act providing that it was the intent of the Legislature in adopting the Local 
Development Act that no long-term contractual obligation be created by the mere adoption of an 
ordinance or resolution establishing an increment district, and that such ordinance or resolution 
constituted a legislative act that could be repealed, modified, or amended at any time during the 
term of the district by subsequent action of the governing body. In re Application of Oklahoma 
Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87,89-90 (Okla. 2004). Since then, the Oklahoma 
Court has held that tax increment districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on 
municipal debt. See, In re Application of Oklahoma Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 
87,89-90 (Okla. 2004); Hawey v. City of Oklahoma City, 11 1 P.3d 239 (Okla. 2005); City of 
Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d 80 (Okla. 2004). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the development authority was 
the sole entity liable for repayment of the bonds, not the city. In re Application of Oklahoma 
Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87,94 (Okla. 2004). The Court held that the 
development authority was a "public trust7' and that previous decisions of the Court had held that 
the indebtedness by the issuance of revenue bonds under a public trust was the indebtedness of 
the trust, not the city. Therefore, the public trust did not violate the municipal debt provisions of 
the Oklahoma Constitution and was not subject to the constitutional requirements of voter 
approval. Id. at 94-95. See, Grimes v. City of Oklahoma City, 49 P.3d 719,726-727 (Okla 2002); 
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Arthur v. City of Stillwater, 61 1 P.2d 637,641 (Okla. 1980). See also, Morris v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 299 P.2d 131, 136-137 (Okla. 1956). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that urban renewal agencies are not one of the 
governmental entities enumerated in Article VIII, 9 3 of the Idaho Constitution. See Boise 
Redevelopment Agency v. YickKong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 881-882,499 P.2d 575 (1972). 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho case law, the issuance of tax increment revenue bonds by an urban 
renewal agency cannot constitute a debt subject to voter approval under Article VIII, 5 3. Based 
on the Court's decision in Yick Kong, this Court does not need to engage in an analysis of 
whether the issuance of such bonds constitutes a "debt" requiring voter approval because the 
Agency is not subject to the voter approval requirements of Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The decisions by the Courts in Florida and Arizona are distinguishable because in each 
case the entity issuing the bonds was subject to the voter approval requirements of their state 
constitutions; therefore, the only remaining issue was whether such bonds were debts of a 
municipality requiring voter approva1. As noted above, Supreme Court of Idaho precedent has 
held that the Agency is not an enumerated entity subject to the voter approval requirements under 
Article VIII, 8 3. 
The rationale for determining that the Agency is not the alter ego of the municipality is 
based upon the idea that the Agency cannot use the city taxing power for the repayment of bond 
obligations under the Idaho statute and the fact that it is the Agency that is responsible to repay 
the bonds, not the city or county. Additionally, the Court's decision in Yick Kong, holding the 
Agency was not the alter ego of Boise City, was predicated on its finding that the degree of the 
city's contro1,over the Agency did not compromise the Agency's independence. In that case, the 
Court found the municipality and the entity to be separate and distinct. Consequently, revenue 
allocation bonds issued under the Idaho redevelopment statute cannot be deemed to be debts of a 
municipality, and thus the statute does not violate Article 8, 8 3. 
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2. 'The Agencv 1s Not 811 Enumerated Guvel.nmeutal Entitv Forbidden From 
Issuing Debt \\'ithoot \'oter Approval. 
Resolution of the issue of whether the Agency is a political subdivision subject to the 
constitutional requirements of voter approval rests on an analysis of whether the Agcncy is an 
"alter ego" of the municipality. Analysis of the alter ego issue must be undertaken both in 
connection with the voter approval provision and the lending credit provision. This alter ego 
issue was specifically addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. 
Yick Kong Corporation. The action was brought by the Agency to condemn Yick Kong 
Corporation's property for urban renewal purposes. The condemnee challenged the 
constitutionality of the law, the validity of the Agency sought to be crcated by the statute, and the 
ability of the Agency to operate under the authority granted by that statute. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho 
at 877. In particular, even though no revenue bonds were to be issued to finance the 
condemnation, the condemnee contended that the Agency's "authorized activities, insofar as the 
issuance of revenue bonds without the consent of the electorate was concerned, violate[d] 
Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution." Id. at 880. The condemnee contended that the 
Agency was subject to the constitutional voter approval requirement, either because the Agency 
was the "alter ego" of the city of Boise or because the Agency was itself a "subdivision of the 
state." 
The Idaho Supreme Court held the Agency was not the alter ego of the City of Boise, 
even though (1) the city had to make a finding of a deteriorated area before the redevelopment 
agency could exercise any of its power; (2) the Boise mayor and city council appointed the 
Agency's commissioners; and (3) the Boise mayor and city council had the power to remove thc 
commissioners. The court reasoned that "while the particular city may trigger the existence of 
the [redevelopment agency], it cannot control its power or operations." Id. at 881. The court 
reasoned further that the appointment procedures did not cause inherent control in the city, and 
the removal procedures were not arbitrary or solely in the discretion of the city. Under the 
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statute, removal could only occur after a hearing and only for inefficiency or neglect o f  duty or 
misconduct in office. The court concluded the legislature intended only to allow a local voice in 
the selection of  the commissioners, and "the degree of  control exercised by the city o f  Boise does 
not usurp the powers and duties o f  the [Agency]. The close association between the two entities 
at most shows two independent public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes." Id. 
at 882. The court noted "[tlhere is no attack upon the integrity or independence o f  the 
commissioners . . . ." Id. The court's decision the Agency was not the alter ego o f  Boise City 
was predicated, therefore, on its finding the degree o f  the city's control over the Agency did not 
compromise the Agency's independence. 
The facts concerning the existing relationship between the Agency and the city o f  
Rexburg now vary only slightly from the facts discussed in Yick Kong. At the time Yick Kong 
was decided, the law prohibited any member o f  the city council fiom sitting on the board o f  
directors of  the redevelopment agency. Since Yick Kong was decided, however, $ 50-2006 o f  the 
law was specifically amended to allow a city council to terminate an existing agency board 
without cause and to designate itself as the agency board, during which time the board would 
operate, according to the statue, as an "arm o f  the state government, entirely separate and 
distinct from the municipality. . . ." Idaho Code 8 50-2006(b)(2). In 1986, the law was again 
amended to eliminate a conflict o f  interest provision which had previously prohibited city council 
members from sitting on the board. The city retains its statutory power to appoint other council 
members to the Board, as well as its power to designate the City Council as the Board, and 
thereby cause the Board to operate as an "arm o f  the state government." Id. At the time the 
Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was adopted by Resolution o f  the Ageucy, 
one Rexburg City Council member and the Mayor o f  Rexburg sat on the Agency Board. (Coy 
Aff. ,  7 5.) The Agency Board consists of  a total o f  nine ( 9 )  members. At present, one Rexburg 
City Council member and the Mayor o f  Rexburg sit on the Agency Board. (Coy Aff., 7 6.) 
However, the city o f  Rexburg has decreed that it will not exercise its power to designate itself as 
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the Agency Board so long as Agency Bonds are outstanding even though Idaho Code 
(i 50-2006@)(2) would allow such appointment. (Coy Aff., 7 7.) (See also Ex. 12.) 
The principles of Yick Kong remain viable. The Agency and the city remain completely 
separate entities, with separate governing bodies and separate functions. The city, by express 
acceptance, remains unable to "control [Agency] power or operations." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 
880 (See also Ex. 12.) Although there remains an association between the two entities and there 
is cooperation between them, the association "at most shows two independent public entities 
closely cooperating for valid public purposes." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 881; see also Idaho Code 
(i 50-2015. 
Relying on Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941), 
the court in Yick Kong further held the Agency was not a "subdivision of the statc" within the 
meaning of Article 8, (i 3 or 4, of the Idaho Constitution. In Lloyd, the court evaluated the 
constitutionality of the Housing Authorities Act and the legality of Housing Authority bonds 
payable from and secured by housing project revenues and United States Government grants. 
Like the Law, the Housing Authorities Act did not permit the Authority to levy or collect a tax. 
The court held that the Authority "was not a county, city, town, township, board of education, or 
school district or other subdivision of the state, within the meaning of Article 8, 5 3, of the 
Constitution, and the prohibition expressed in that section does not apply to it." Lloyd, 62 Idaho 
at 598. The court reached this conclusion because liability for repayment of the bonds issued by 
the Authority was limited to funds derived exclusively from income and revenues of the housing 
projects or grants and contributions from the federal government. The Lloyd court, inter alia, 
relied on State v. State Board ofEducation, 56 Idaho 210,215,52 P.2d 141, 143 (1935), which 
reasoned that a 30-year loan from the United State Government, payable froin revenues arising 
from operation of an infirmary constructed with loan proceeds, was not subject to Article 8, (i 3, 
because the Board of Regents did not have any taxing power; could not collect or levy taxes of 
any kind; and were not representatives of the municipality, territory, subdivision, or taxing unit 
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of the state. The regents were merely the managers and corporate representatives of an 
educational institution, which was dependent on state and federal appropriations and private 
donations for its finances and operating expenses. See Lloyd, 62 Idaho at 600. 
Analogizing to the Housing Authority in Lloyd, the Yiclc Kong court noted the Agency 
had "no powers of taxation, and therefore, the provisions of Article 8, 9 3, do not apply." Yick 
Kong, 94 Idaho at 882-83. The court also noted the Agency "has no ability to actually encumber 
any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property 
holdings." Id. at 883. Thus, pursuant to the authority of Yick Kong, the Agency is not a 
subdivision of the stale, and voter approval provisions are inapplicable. 
Voter approval provisions would be applicable to any city, county, or other entity 
enumerated in the constitution which secks to use revenue allocation financing. At the present 
time the legislature has chosen to allow only urban renewal agencies the option of such a 
financing mechanism. This was a legislative judgment and one which should be respected in the 
absence of a clear constitutional violation. 
3. 'The Suureme Court of Idaho's Dccision In Citv ofBoise v. k'ruzic.r Does Xot 
Applv to the Agencv's lssuancr of Revenue Allocation Bonds. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho recently construed the "ordinary a ~ d  necessa~y" clause of 
Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution. City ofBoise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 
(2006). In Frazier, the city petitioned for judicial confirmation to permit it to incur debt to 
finance expansion of the airport parking facilities without a public vote. Id. Mr. Frazier 
intervened. Id. The district court held the expansion was an ordinary and necessary expense 
which did not require a public vote. Id. Mr. Frazier appealed. Id. The Supreme Court held 
while the expansion of parking facilities was an "ordinary" expense, it was not a "necessary" 
expense, therefore requiring voter approval. Id. at 392. 
As previously noted, article VIII, 9 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars the 
enumerated entities froin incurring debts or liabilities without voter approval unless the proposed 
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undertaking is for an "ordinary and necessary" expense. Id. at 389-390. The Court engaged in an 
analysis regarding whether the city's proposed project was an "ordinary and necessary" expense, 
concluding the expenditure did not qualify as a "nccessary" expense. Id. at 391-392. 
In this case, the Agency is not petitioning for judicial confirmation based upon the 
"ordinary and necessary" clause o f  article VIII, 5 3. In fact, the "ordinary and necessary" clause 
is not applicable to the Agency. As mentioned above, the Agency is not a political subdivision 
subject to the constitutional requirements o f  voter approval (see Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 882.); 
therefore, the "ordinary and necessary" proviso clause does not apply to the Agency. 
Furthermore, Idaho's revenue allocation statute does not provide for a "debt" within the meaning 
o f  the constitutional limitations in article VIII, 5 3. Therefore, the Agency revenue allocation 
bonds do not constitute "indebtedness" or "liability" under the Constitution. Consequently, the 
decision in Frazier is dlstinguishable from the facts o f  this case. 
E. The Urban Renewal Law Does Not Unlawfnllv Delegate Taxing Power. 
Another potential constitutional challenge is the concept o f  delegation o f  legislative 
authority. Under Article 3, 5 1 ,  o f  the Idaho Constitution, all legislative power is vested in the 
Senate and House o f  Representatives. In order to delegate that legislative authority, the 
particular delegation must contain a meaningful standard. See Greater Boise Auditorium 
District v. Royal Inn ofBoise, 106 Idaho 884,784 P.2d 296 (1984). 
The Act does not violate this constitutioiional provision for several reasons. First, the 
power o f  the Agency itself is merely to collect tax increments from the taxing district themselves 
and expend those funds for specified purposes. Thus, the Agency is not vested with any 
legislative authority to affect the taxing power o f  rcsidents within the district. It is the districts 
themselves who retain that authority. Consequently, any delegation problem must be addressed 
to the taxing districts themselves. In Sun Valley Company v. City of Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 
708 P.2d 147 (1985), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the delegation issue with regard to the 
legislature's enactment o f  a resort tax provision allowing resort cities to impose excise taxes in 
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the form of a tax on hotel and motel rooins and liquor by the drink. The court interpreted 
Article 7, $ 6, of the Idaho Constitution as permitting the legislature to invest municipal 
corporations with the authority to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporations. 
Sun Valley Co., 109 Idaho at 426-27. Consequently, pursuant to the supreme court's 
interpretation, revenue allocation funds may be transferred to the Agency for use for urban 
renewal purposes. 
Further, in Sun Valley Company, the supreme court determined the delegation doctrine 
only serves to limit delegation of legislative authority to the executive or judicial branches. See 
Sun Valley Co., 109 Idaho at 427. Consequently, delegation to a legislative branch, such as a city 
council, does not violate the delegation doctrine. 
Finally, the supreme court ruled the nondelegation doctrine is a doctrine of administrative 
law and not precisely applicable to a case where a municipal entity is vested with the power of 
taxation. Id. at 428. Consequently, pursuant to the authority of Sun Valley Company, the 
nondelegation doctrille would not operate to invalidate any provision of the Act or Law. 
F. The Act and Law Do Not Violate the Due Process Rights of Tax~avers in the State 
of Idaho. 
There is a general requirement that the expenditure of public funds must be made only 
where the funds are expended for a public purpose. In Idaho this requirement arises from the due 
process provision of the Idaho constitution. Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer, 
97 Idaho 535,548 P.2d 35 (1976). 
In this case the legislature has made a determination the use of revenue allocation 
financing is necessary to fund redevelopment in the State of Idaho. In addition, the legislature 
has specifically made findings that redevelopment, the elimination of urban deterioration, and 
stimulation of economic activity are public purposes. Many courts have ruled legislative findings 
that funds are being expended for a public purpose will cany great weight. Wilmington Parking 
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Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954). Downtown redevelopment has been identified 
as a public purpose in many eminent domain cases. 
At least two courts have suggested that the redevelopment of 
downtown areas, in and of itself, is a public use or public purpose in 
the same way that the renewal of slums is a public use. In State v. 
Coghill the Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld the city of 
Charlestown's plan to lease private commercial space in a publicly 
owned parking garage and expressly noted that revitalization of the 
city's downtown was a public purpose. The court stated, 
Certainly the creation of aesthetically appealing, 
convei~ient, and efficient downtown urban centers is a public 
purpose and may be considered in determining the validity of 
a particular parhlg facility. The development of modern 
urban centers with open spaces, fountains, and malls in which 
people may gather and enjoy an enhanced social and 
intellectual life is a public purpose. 
More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Paley upheld 
a local government's issuance of bonds to be used to acquire 
property-by condemnation if necessary--for resale to private 
downtown developers. The target area was blighted, and therefore, 
the court relied on earlier cases upholding urban renewal in reaching 
its decision. The Illinois court, however, did not end its analysis with 
an analogy to the urban renewal cases; rather, the court went on to 
express its belief that redevelopment of the downtown area was 
justifiedbecause downtown redevelopment itselfis apublic purpose: 
[Tlhe city's determination to promote the commercial rebirth 
of its downtown area is a public purpose. . . . In so holding, 
today's decision notes that the application of the public- 
oumose doctrine to sanction urban redevelovment can no 
iongerberesrricted to areas where cnmc, vacancy, or physical 
decay produce undesirable livi~lgcunditions or imperil public 
health. Stin~ulation of comlnersial growvth and rcmoval of 
economic stagnation are also objectives which enhance the 
public weal. 
Lawrence, Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development 
Projects, 35 VAND.L.REV. 293-94 (1 982) (footnotes omitted). 
Redevelopment projects are also favored in that they: (1) ease the financial burden of city 
govemment; (2) encourage the use of existing city facilities; (3) assist in society's efforts to 
conserve energy by concentrating redevelopment in a downtown core; and (4) enhance a 
municipality's ability to provide a suitable living environment. 
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One objective of these proiects is to ease the financial burden of city 
povemment. New downtown develovment, of course. will add to tax 
base: the same value. however, also would be added if the 
development occurred on the citv's fringe, as long as it was still 
within the city limits. More important, the city's service 
infrastructure, especially the streets and utilities, is already in place in 
the downtown area; the same inay not be true, however, for a new 
development elsewhere in the city, and thus the city government 
might have to build new streets or extend utility lines to the areas 
where the development is occurring. Downtown development, then, 
encourages the use of existing city facilities rather than requiring 
construction ot'new ones. Thus, a city's encv~ragem?~il ofdo\vntc~,n 
projects at least to some cxtent reflects only its careful strwardship of 
limited public resources. . 
A second goal of downtown develovment is to assist in 
societv's efforts to conserve energy. If gasoline prices increase 
further, the use of public transportation undoubtedly will become an 
increasingly important conservation strategy; Downtown 
development uniquely supports this strategy because the downtown 
area is the hub of existing public transportation systems and will 
continue to occupy that position if these systems expand because of 
shortages of energy supply. Indeed, one definitional characteristic of 
a "downtown" inay be that it lies at the center of the city's public 
transportation system. Furthermore, high density, large-scale 
developments-which characterize the typical downtown 
project-are more energy-efficient than smaller, detached buildings 
that house the same activities. Moreover, if downtown development 
draws developers to the inner city and away from its fi-inges, the city 
perhaps could avoid losing some of the producing farmland at the 
city's edge to other uses. 
A third goal of downtown develovment is to enhance the 
cauacitv of a varticular municivalitv to generate those attributes that 
make cities exciting to their citizens and valuable to the community 
at. These attributes-cultural institutions, highly specialized 
commercial enterprises, and the capacity to generate the new small 
businesses that are the primaty source of new jobs in our 
economy-are the things that distinguish cities from other forms of 
community organization. Most scholars would agree that cultural 
institutions and specialized commercial enterprises will prosper only 
in cities of significant size and density. Moreover, considerable 
evidence supports the proposition that cities are more effective as 
settings for new, job-creating enterprises when they are large and 
development is dense. Thus, as cities decentralize, they are less likely 
to perform this characteristic community role. Downtown 
redevelopment will not itself reverse decentralization, of course, but 
it clearly is a necessary component of such a reversal. 
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Projects, 35  VAND.L.REV. 293-97 (1982) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
Given that all of these public purposes are served by redevelopment of the North 
Highway, South Addition Area of the city of Rexburg by the Agency, the due process rights of 
taxpayers are not violated by use of public funds for a private purpose. 
. Use of Re\~enueAJlocation Financing Docs Sot Impair Existing Contracts in 
Violatior1 of Article 1.6 16. of the ldahqConstitution. 
Article 1, 5 16, of the Idaho Constitution bars the enactment of any state law which would 
impair the obligation of contracts. This restriction applies to municipalities as well as to the 
state. City ofHayden v. Washington Water Power Company, 108 Idaho 467,700 P.2d 89 
(Ct.App. 1985). Where taxing districts within or overlapping the revenue allocation area have 
issued general obligation bonds, it is very likely that these bonds have been secured by a pledge 
of property tax revenues. Purchasers of those honds likely anticipated that unless the taxing 
district issued additional general obligation bonds, following approval by the voters, property tax 
revenues collected by the district would be available to pay the debt service on such honds. 
Revenue allocation financing may arguably make a portion of these available property tax 
revenues unavailable to pay the debt service on the older general obligation debt bonds. Thus the 
question is whether adoption of revenue allocation financing or the issuance of revenue 
allocation financing honds by the petitioner would constitute an impairment of contracts in 
violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
This argument has been presented and rejected by the courts of a number of different 
states evaluating similar revenue allocation financing statutes. In South Bend Public 
Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981), the court 
reasoned: 
The same general tax revenues previously available to the other 
taxing districts will likewise be available after the plan is operative. 
The portion of the tax revenues allocated to the Department 
represents an amount generated as a result of increased property 
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valuation due to the redevelopment project. Therefore, since the 
other taxing districts have not lost the benefit o f  any tax revenues 
which would have otherwise been available, no impairment o f  
contracts has occurred. 
Id. at 225. Courts in South Carolina and Florida have reached the same conclusions. Wolper v. 
City Council of the City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d. 871 (S.C. 1985); Kelson v. City ofPensacola, 
483 So.2d 77 (Fla.App. 1986). 
The same analysis is applicable to revenue allocation financing within the state o f  Idaho. 
Consequently, the issuance o f  such revenue allocation financing bonds does not impair contracts 
in violation o f  the Idaho Constitution. 
VII. 
EVEN IF A PORTION OF THE STATUTE IS L'NCONSTITL'TIOSAI., 
THE OFFEN1)INC; PORTIOSS ARE SEI'ERABLE 
The provisions o f  the Act indicate the Legislature's strong desire that the local economic 
development statutes remain intact despite any potential constitutional problems. Idaho Code 
$ 50-2912 states that the provisions o f  the Act are severable, and i f  any portion is declared 
invalid, such invalidity does not affect the remaining portions o f  the statute. Consequently, 
should this court find any portion o f  the Act invalid, that portion should be excised and the 
remainder validated. 
THE TAXES PAID TO THE AGENCY ARE NOT TAXES "IMPOSED" BY 
THE LEGISLATURE FOR A "CITY PURPOSE," IN VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE 7,9 6, OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
' 
Article 7 ,  9: 6 ,  o f  the Idaho constitution provides the legislature shall not "impose taxes" 
for a "city purpose": 
The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose o f  any county, 
city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in 
the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and 
collect taxes for all purposes o f  such corporation. 
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It can be argued that urban renewal is a "city purpose," and by enacting the Act, the legislature 
bas "imposed taxes" for a "city purpose" in violation of Article 7, $ 6. Urban renewal, however, 
is not only a "city purpose," but is also a "statewide concern" and therefore is a legitimate area 
for state legislation. See Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 879-80; Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, although under the Act the taxes collected by Madison 
County on the incremental value of property within the revenue allocation area are paid by 
Madison County to the Agency, before that could happen the city of Rexburg had to make certain 
tindings, take certain organizational steps, and adopt an authorizing ordinance. See Idaho Code 
$$  50-2005, 50-2006,50-2904 through 50-2907. Therefore, because the levy of taxes for the 
Agency is not self-executing under the Act (i.e., the city had the option of not taking the 
prerequisite steps), the Legislature has not "imposed" taxes within the meaning of Article 7, $ 6. 
IX. 
Article 7, $ 7, of the Idaho Constitution provides that no "property [in a county, city, 
town, or other municipal corporation] shall be released or discharged from . . . its proportionate 
share of taxes to be levied for state purposes": 
All taxes levied for state purposes shall be paid into the state treasu~y, 
and no county, city, town or other municipal corporation, the 
inhabitants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released or 
discharged from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be levied 
for state purposes. 
The state is authorized to levy an ad valorem tax on real property within the state. Idaho Const. 
Art. 7, $9; Idaho Code $ 63-61 1. Arguably the foregoing language requires that an ad valorem 
tax levied for state purposes be levied against the full value of property in each "county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation," and to divert the state's portion of that ad valorem tax on 
the incremental value of property in the redevelopment area to the Agency "releases" or 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION - 51 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 83 
"discharges" that property kom part of its "proportionate share" of taxes to be levied for state 
purposes in violation of Article 7, 5 7. However, under a plain reading of the foregoing 
language, Article 7, 5 7, only prohibits the "release" or "discharge" of a tax levied for state 
purposes after it has been levied and does not prohibit the legislature from excluding a portion of 
the full value of property within a revenue allocation area from the value against which the state 
tax is levied. 
THE AMOUNT OF TAX THE AGENCY WILL RECEIVE 
UNDER THE ACT BEARS A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
TO THE BENEFIT RECEIVED BY THE TAXPAYER 
There is a rule of constitutional dimension requiring a rational relationship between the 
amount of tax that is levied and the corresponding benefit that is received by the taxpayer. 
Bothwell v. Salt Lake County Drainage Dist. No. 2,39 P.2d 737 (Utah 1935). This rule is likely 
rooted in either the due process clause (Article 1, $ 13, of the Idaho Constitution; Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution) andlor the prohibition against the taking of private 
property without just compensation (Article 1, 5 14, of the Idaho Constitution provides that 
"[plrivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation . . . shall be 
paid therefore"; the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation"). 
Under the Act the Agency does not set its own tax rate. Instead, the Agency's tax rate is 
equal to the cumulative total of the tax rates of each taxing district in which the revenue 
allocation area is located. Idaho Code $ 50-2908. Therefore, the Agency's tax rate is determined 
solely by the rates that those taxing districts decide to levy in any given year and, arguably, bears 
no rational relationship to the benefits received by the revenue allocation area. However, since 
all of the tax monies received by the Agency which are not used by the Agency for the benefit of 
the revenue allocation area will eventually be returned to the taxing entities that would have 
otherwise received them (see Idalto Code $ 50-2909(4)), the taxpayers will eventually receive the 
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benefit of all of the taxes that they have paid, and the foregoing rule is not violated. See 
Bothwell, 39 P.2d at 741. 
XI. 
THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE 
OTHER TAXING DISTRICTS THAT PROVIDE SERVICES T O  THE AREA 
IMPROVED BY THE PROPOSED REVENUE ALLOCATION FINANCING 
As discussed earlier, Article 1,s 13, of the Idaho Constitution contains the due process 
clause. The due process clause has been interpreted to require a public purpose he demonstrated 
whenever public funds are expended, thus protecting the rights of the public at large. See Idaho 
Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976). Arguably, under the Act, 
tax revenues are being "diverted" from other taxing entities to the Agency. Generally, as long as 
the process provides meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to appear, the guarantees 
provided under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions will have been discharged. See 
Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,666 P.2d 639 (1983). 
The public objectives of tax increment have been accepted by numerous courts in many 
jurisdictions. See Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing, 19 Washburn 
L.J. 536 (1980). The process by which an Idaho municipality can adopt a revenue allocation 
project within an urban renewal plan is specifically defined within the Act. 
The City Council must enact an ordinance in accordance with chapter 9, title 50, Idaho 
Code, and conduct a public hearing as provided in $50-2008(c), Idaho Code. The city must also 
prepare a notice stating: 
(a) that an urban renewal plan or modification thereto . . . has been 
proposed and is being considered for adoption, and that such plan or 
modification thereto . . . contains a revenue allocation financing 
provision that will cause property taxes resulting from any increases 
in equalized assessed valuation in excess of the equalized assessed 
valuation as shown on the base assessment roll to be allocated to the 
agency for urban renewal . . . purposes; and . . . (c) that a public 
hearing on such plan or modification will be held by the local 
governing body pursuant to section 50-2008(c), Idaho Code. The 
notice shall also state the time, date, and place of the hearing. . . . 
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Idaho Code 5 50-2906(3). 
In addition to the general notice requirements, the Agency and municipality must ensure 
other taxing entities are provided additional notice. The taxing entities are given additional 
specific notice of the plan and the public hearing before the City Council. 
At least thirty (30) days but not more than sixty (60) days prior to the 
date set for final reading of the ordinance, the local governing body 
shall publish the notice in a newspaper of general circulation and 
transmit the notice . . . to the governing body of each taxing district 
which levies taxes upon any taxable property in the revenue 
allocation area and which would be affected by the revenue allocation 
financing provision of the urban renewal plan proposed to be 
approved by the local governing body. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2906(3). 
These mandatory notice requirements were discharged by the City of Rexburg and the 
Agency, thus providing the taxing entities with meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity 
to appear. The taxing entities were provided written notice of the hearing date before the City 
Council. (Exs. 13 and 14.) The due process requirements of the Idaho Constitution have been 
adequately met. See Glengmy-Gamlin Protective Association v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 675 P.2d 
344 (Ct.App. 1983); Gay v. County Commissioners, 103 Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App. 
XII. 
THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED FOR THE PROJECT CONSTITUTE 
PUBLIC ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE ACT AND LAW 
As stated elsewhere in this memorandum, an urban renewal project was deemed a 
legitimate public purpose in the case of Yick Kong v. BRA. (See discussion on pages 37-38, 
supra and pages 60-62, inpa.) The specific activities authorized under Resolution No. 2007-4 
and defined as the Project under 8 2.1 of the Resolution consist primarily of traditional public 
facilities for a public purpose. (Ex. 12.) Both the Act and Law provide specific definitions of 
authorized activities, facilities, and project. 
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The Law defines the powers of  an agency as follows: 
50-2007. Powers.-Every urban renewal agency shall have 
all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the 
purposes and provisions o f  this act, including the following powers 
in addition to others herein granted: 
(a) to undertake and carry out urban renewal projects and 
related activities within its area of  operation; and to make and execute 
contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the 
exercise o f  its powers under this act; and to disseminate slum 
clearance and urban renewal information; 
(b) to provide or to arrange or contract for the furnishing 
or repair by any person or agency, public or private, o f  services, 
privileges, works, streets, roads, public utilities or other facilities for 
or in connection with an urban renewal project; to install, construct, 
and reconstruct streets, utilities, parks, playgrounds, off-street parking 
facilities, public facilities, other buildings or public improvements; 
and any improvements necessary or incidental to a redevelopment 
project; and to a&Tee to any conditions that it may deem reasonable 
and appropriate attached to federal financial assistance and imposed 
pursuant to federal law relating to the determination o f  prevailing 
salaries or wages or compliance with labor standards, in the 
undertaking or carrying out o f  an urban renewal project and related 
activities, and to include in any contract let in connection with such 
a project and related activities, provisions to klfil l  such o f  said 
conditions as it may deem reasonable and appropriate; . . . 
An urban renewal project is defined under the Law as follows: 
(10) "Urban Renewal project" may include undertakings 
and activities o f  a municipality in an urban renewal area for the 
elimination of deteriorated or deteriorating areas and for the 
prevention o f  the development or spread o f  slums and blight, and may 
involve slum clearance and redevelopment in anurban renewal area, 
or rehabilitation or conservation in an urban renewal area, or any 
combination or part thereof in accordance with an urban renewal 
plan. Such undertakings and activities may include: 
(a) Acquisition o f  a deteriorated area or a deteriorating 
area or portion thereof; 
(b) Demolition and removal o f  buildings and 
improvements; 
(c) Installation, construction or reconstruction o f  streets, 
utilities, parks, playgrounds, off-street parking facilities, public 
facilities or build~ngs and other improvements necessary for carrying 
out in the urban renewal area the urban renewal objectives o f  this act 
in accordance with the urban renewal plan; 
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(d) Disposition of any property acquired in the urban 
renewal area; including sale, initial leasing or retention by the agency 
itself, at its fair value for uses in accordance with the urban renewal 
plan except for disposition of property to another public body; 
(e) Carrying out plans for a program of voluntary or 
compulsory repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other 
improvements in accordance with the urban renewal plan; 
(f) Acquisition of real property in the urban renewal area 
which, under the urban renewal plan, is to be repaired or rehabilitated 
for dwelling use or related facilities, repair or rehabilitation of the 
structures for guidance purposes, and resale of the property; 
(g) Acquisition of any other real property in the urban 
renewal area where necessary to eliminate unhealthful, insanitary or 
unsafe conditions, lessen density, eliminate obsolete or other uses 
detrimental to the public welfare, or otherwise to remove or to 
prevent the spread of blight or deterioration, or to provide land for 
needed public facilities; 
(h) Lending or investing federal funds; and 
(i) Construction of foundations, platforms and other like 
structural fonns. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2018(10). 
The Act also provides specific definition and authorization of the use of revenue 
allocation proceeds 
(13) "Project" or "urban renewal project" . . . may include 
undertakings and activities of a municipality in an urban renewal area 
for the elimination of deteriorated or deteriorating areas and for the 
prevention ofthe development or spread of slums and blight, andmay 
involve slum clearance and redevelopment in an urban renewal area, 
or rehabilitation or conservation in an urban renewal area, or any 
combination or part thereof in accordance with an urban renewal 
plan. Such undertakings and activities may include: 
(a) Acquisition of a deteriorated area or deteriorating area 
or portion thereof; 
(b) Demolition and removal of buildings and 
improvement; 
(c) Installation, construction, or reconstruction of streets, 
utilities, parks, playgrounds, open space, off-street parking facilities, 
public facilities, public recreation and entertainment facilities or 
buildings and other improvements necessary for carrying out, in the 
:IRMATION - 56 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 88 
urban renewal area . . . , the urban renewal objectives of this act in 
accordance with the urban renewal plan. . . . 
(d) Disposition of any property acquired in the urban 
renewal area . . . (including sale, initial leasing or retention by the 
agency itself) . . . at its fair value for uses in accordance with the 
urban renewal plan except for disposition of property to another 
public body; 
(e) Carrying out plans for a program of voluntary or 
compulsory repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other 
improvements in accordance with the urban renewal plan; 
( f )  Acquisition of real property in the urban renewal area 
. . . which, under the urban renewal plan, is to be repaired or 
rehabilitated for dwelling use or related facilities, repair or 
rehabilitation of the structures for guidance purposes, and resale of 
the property; 
(g) Acquisition of any other real property in the urban 
renewal area. . . where neeessaryto eliminate unhealthful, insanitary 
or unsafe conditions, lessen density, eliminate obsolete or other uses 
detri~nental to the public welfare, or otherwise to remove or to 
prevent tbe spread of blight or deterioration, or to provide land for 
needed public facilities . . . ; 
(h) Lending or investing federal funds; and 
(i) Construction of foundations, platforms and other like 
structural forms. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(13). 
Facilities are defined as: 
(9) "Facilities" means land, rights in land, buildings, 
structures, machinery, landscaping, extension of utility services, 
approaches, roadways and parking, handling and storage areas, and 
similar auxiliary and related facilities. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2903(9). 
Based on these statutory definitions and the overall public purpose of an urban renewal 
project as stated by the supreme court in Yick Kong, the project as defined in Resolution 
No. 2007-4 constitutes public activities authorized by the Act and Law. 
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TllE IJSE OF T I N  BOYD PROCEEDS .\WETS THE REQL1iRER1EN1' 
'1'HAl'AI.l. PIIUI.IC FUNI)S BE EXPENDED FOR A PUBI.IC PURPOSE 
In addition to what might be termed hard construction costs, Resolution No. 2007-4 also 
authorizes the Agency to pay the costs of issuance from bond proceeds. Additionally, Resolution 
No. 2007-4 authorizes the Agency to use revenue allocation proceeds to pay for the costs of 
administration. 
The Resolution states as follows: 
Cost of Acauisition and Construction, with respect to the 
Project, shall include, together with any other proper item of cost not 
specifically mentioned herein, the Costs of Issuance, the wst of 
demolition, the cost ofacquisition and construction ofthe Project and 
the financing thereof, the cost, whether incurred by the Agency or 
another, or field surveys and advance planning undertaken in 
connection with the Project, and the cost of acquisition of any land or 
interest therein required as the sites thereof or for use in connection 
therewith, the cost of preparation of the sites thereof and of any land 
to be used in connection therewith, the cost of any indemnity and 
surety bonds and insurance premiums, allocable administrative and 
general expenses of the Agency, allocable portions of inspection 
expenses, financing charges, legal fees, and fees and expenses of 
financial advisors and consultants in connection therewith, cost of 
audits, the cost of all machinery, apparatus and equipment, cost of 
engineering, the cost ofutilities, architectural services, design, plans, 
specifications and surveys, estimates of cost, the payment of any 
bonds or notes of the Agency (including any interest and redemption 
premiums) issued to temporarily finance the payment of any item or 
items of cost of the Project and payable from the proceeds of Bonds, 
and all other expenses necessary or incident to determining the 
feasibility or practicability of the Project, and such other expenses not 
specified herein as may be necessary or incident to the construction 
and acquisition of the Project, the financing thereof, and the placing 
of the same in use and operation. 
Costs of Administration shall mean, with respect to the 
Project, the Agency's expenses (includingreserves for such expenses) 
for allocable administration and general expenses of the Project, 
legal, financial, architectural and engineering expenses, fees and 
expenses of fiduciaries under this Resolution, bond insurance, 
guaranty andlor letter of credit fees, interest and finance charges, 
trustee fees, if any, paying agent and registrar fees, and any other 
normal expenses or contingencies required to be paid or provided for 
by the Agency, all to h e  extent properly attributable to the Project 
and payable by the Agency. 
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Cost(s) of Issuance shall mean printing, rating agency fees, if 
any, legal fees, underwriting fees, fees and expenses of the Bond 
Registrar, bond insurance premiums, if any, and all other fees, 
charges, and expenses with respect to or incurred in connection with 
the issuance, sale, and delivery of the Bonds. 
(Ex. 12.) 
Administrative costs are payable, however, only pfrer principal and interest on the Bonds 
have been paid. 
Section 5.1 : REVENUE ALLOCATION FUND 
There has heretofore been created a fund, held by the Agency, 
separate and apart from all other funds of the Agency, designated the 
Revenue Allocation Fund (the "Revenue Allocation Fund"). All 
hcremental Tax Revenues shall be promptly deposited upon receipt 
by the Agency into the Revenue Allocation Fund. The Incremental 
Tax Revenues deposited therein shall be used only for the following 
purposes and in the following order of priority. 
First, to pay the interest accruing on the Bonds and any 
-
Additional Bonds by required deposits into the Bond Fund; 
M, to pay the principal of the Bonds md any Additional 
Bonds payable within the next Bond Year by required deposits into 
the Bond Fund; 
m, to fund the Debt Service Reserve Fund by required 
deposits thereto, if any; 
m, to fund the Administration Fund; 
Fifth. for any other lawful purpose of the Agency. 
Resolution No. 2007-4. (Ex. 12.) 
These ancillary costs are all necessary to completely carry out the Project and are fully 
authorized under the Act. 
(12) "Project costs" include, but are not limited to: 
(a) Capital costs, including the actual costs of the 
construction of public works or improvements, facilities, buildings, 
structures. and oermanent fixtures: the demolition. alteration. 
remodeling, repa& or reconstruction of existing building$, structures; 
and permanent fixtures; the acquisition ofe~uipment: and the clearing 
- A - 
andgrading of land; 
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(b) Financing costs, including interest during construction 
and capitalized debt service or repair and replacement or other 
appropriate reserves; 
(c) Real property assembly costs, meaning any deficit 
incurred from the sale or lease by a municipality of real or personal 
property within a revenue allocation district; 
(d) Professional service costs, includiug those costs 
incurred for architectural, planning, engineering, and legal advise and 
services; 
(e) Direct administrative costs, includiug reasonable 
charges for the time spent by municipal employees in connection with 
the implementation of a project plan; 
( f )  Relocation costs; 
(g) Other costs incidental to any of the foregoing costs. 
Idaho Code $ 50-2903(12). 
XIV. 
Ih'CREMENTAL TAXES USED TO PAY THE BONDS 
A m  USED FOR A "PUBLIC PURPOSE" 
The requirement that public funds be used for a "public purpose" is of constitutional 
dimension, but is not expressly slated in either the United States or the Idaho Constitution. For a 
discussion of the constitutional provisions that implicitly give rise to the "puhlic purpose" 
requirement, see Idaho Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,559 n.42,548 P.2d 35, 
59 11.42 (1976). Because the private entities located in a revenue allocation area will be 
benefitted by the expenditure of proceeds from the bonds, it can be argued that the taxes used to 
repay those bonds are not being used for a "puhlic purpose." This argument, however, has been 
consistently rejected by other courts because any benefit to private entities as a result of 
expenditures under an urban renewal plan is merely "incidental" and does not defeat the public 
purpose requirement. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); 
Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954); and Lawrence, 
Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development Projects, 
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35 VAND.L.REV. 277,293-94 (1982) (footnotes omitted). In YickKong, the supreme court 
adopted that position, stating that "[mlere incidental benefits to private interests will not 
invalidate such an urban renewal plan." Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 579. 
Furthermore, where the Idaho Legislature has declared certain expenditures to be for a 
"public purpose," the court will only overturn that finding if it is found to be "arbitrary" or 
"unreasonable." In Idaho Water Resource Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,559, 548 P.2d 35, 59 
(1 976), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
[A] declaration by the Legislature of public purpose is normally 
afforded great deference, although it is by no means binding or 
conclusive upon this Court. It will not be overturned, however, 
unless it is found to be arbitrary or unreasonable. 
In this case the Idaho Legislature has made a finding that expenditures under the Law are for a 
"public purpose": 
It is hereby found and declared that there exist in municipalities of the 
state deteriorated and deteriorating areas (as herein defined) which 
constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state; that the 
existence of such areas contributes substantially and increasingly to 
the spread of disease and crime, constitutes an economic and social 
liability imposing onerous municipal burdens which decrease the tax 
base and reduce tax revenues, substantially impairs or arrests the 
sound growth of municipalities, retard the provision of housing 
accomodations, aggravates traffic problems and substantially 
impairs or arrests the elimination of traffic hazards and the 
improvement of facilities; and that the prevention and elimination of 
these conditions is a matter of state policy and state concern in order 
that the state and its municipalities shall not continue to be 
endangered by areas which are focal centers of disease, promote 
juvenile delinquency, and consume an excessive proportion of its 
revenue because of the extra services required for police, fire, 
accident, hospitalization and other forms of public protection, 
services and facilities. 
It is further found and declared that the powers conferred by 
this act are for public uses and ouruoses for which public money may 
be expended as herein provided . . . . 
Idaho Code 5 50-2002 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly the legislature has determined that raising the revenue to finance the urban 
renewal project for a limited period is a public purpose for municipalities. Idaho Code 
§ 50-2902. 
In this case the legislature has made a determination that the use of revenue allocation 
financing is necessary to fund redevelopment in the State of Idaho. In addition, the legislature 
has specifically made findings that redevelopment, the elimination of deteriorated or 
deteriorating areas, and the stimulation of economic activity are public purposes. 
Give11 that all of these public purposes are served by redevelopment of the North 
Highway, South Addition Area, the due process rights of taxpayers are not violated by use of 
public funds for a private purpose. Consequently, because that finding is not "arbitraIy" or 
'knreasonable," the court should defer to that legislative finding that a "public purpose" exists. 
XV. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing legal arguments, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court issue 
a judgment of judicial confirmation, confirming the power of Petitioner to issue its Series 2008 
Bonds based upon revenue allocation financing. 
DATED this day of March, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CASE LAW ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
a. City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239 (Ariz.App. 1980) (Bonds issued by 
city, not redevelopment agency, and tax increment statute allowed pledge of 
ad valorem taxation proceeds to pay off municipal property tax increment 
bonds without voter approval); 
b. Bell Community Redevelopment v. Woosley, 214 Cal.Rptr. 788 (Ca1.App. 
1985); 
c. Brown v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 214 Cal.Rptr. 626 (Cal.App. 
1985); 
d. Denver Urban RenewalAuthority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); 
e. State Ex Rel. City of Gainesville v. St. Johns, 408 So.2d 1067 (Fla.App. 1982) 
(redevelopment ad valorem tax increment appropriation may not be required of 
water management special taxing district); 
f. Kelson v. City ofPeiwacola, 483 So.2d 77 (Fla.App. 1986); 
g. Strand v. Escambia County, 2007 WL 2492294 (Fla. 2007) (tax-increment 
financed bonds constitute long-term debt requiring approval by referendum as 
mandated by the Florida Constitution); 
h. People Ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980) (revenue 
allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity challenge); 
i. South Bend Public Transportation Corporation v. City of South Bend, 
428 N.E.2d 21 7, 222-23 (Ind. 1981) (uniformity provision docs not limit the 
expenditure of funds collected through taxation); 
j. Richards v. City ofMuscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975) (bonds issued by 
city, not urban renewal agency, held to be "constitutional debt;" different result 
would be obtained if mllnicipal conkract were used) 
k. Dilley v. City of Des Moines, 247 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1976); 
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1. State Ex. Rel. Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 ( I h .  1980) (revenue 
allocation financing law upheld over a challenge based on constitutional 
unifonnity and equality requirements); 
m. Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976) (strict 
and state-specific limitation imposed by narrow special purpose doctrine); 
n. In Re Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1988); 
o. School District of the City ofPontiac v. City ofAuburn Hills, 460 N.W.2d 258 
(Mich.App. 1990); 
p. R.E. Short Co. v. City ofMinneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978); 
q. City ofMinneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); 
r. City ofDuluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986); 
s. Tax Increment Financing Commission v. J. E. Dunn Construction, 781 S.W.2d 
70 (Mo. 1989); 
t. Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 566 P.2d 41 5 (Nev. 1977) (act unconstitutional as 
special legislation benefitting only two specific cities); 
u. City ofSparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980) (petitioner's challenge of 
revenue allocation financing legislation on uniformity grounds dismissed); 
v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority v. Medical Technology and Research 
Authority of Oklahoma, 4 P.3d 677,688 (Okla. 2000); 
w. In re Application of Oklahoma Development Finance Authority, 94 P.3d 87, 89 
(Okla. 2004) (acknowledged amendment to statute after 2000; tax increment 
districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt); 
x. City of Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d 80 (Okla. 2004) (tax increment districts do 
not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt); 
y. Harvey v. City of Oklahoma City, 11 1 P.3d 239 (Okla. 2005) (tax increment 
districts do not violate the constitutional provisions on municipal debt); 
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z. Meierhenry v. City ofHuron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984) (uniformity relates 
to the levy of taxes and does not limit the authority to allocate or distribute 
public funds collected through such levies); 
aa. W o w  v. City Council of City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. 1985); 
bb. Metro Dev. &How. Agcy. v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979) (revenue 
allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity challenge); 
cc. El Paso Co. Com. Col. Dist. v. City ofEl Paso, 698 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App. 
1985) (city cannot pledge and use incremental ad valorem tax revenues 
belonging to community college for non-educational purposes); 
dd. City ofEl Paso v. El Paso Commun. College, 729 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1986); 
ee. Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); 
ff. Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelop., 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979); and 
gg. Sigma Tau Gamma, Etc. v. City ofMenomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85 (Wis. 1980) (revenue allocation financing legislation withstood constitutional uniformity 
challenge). 
STATUTES ON TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
a. Ala.Stat. 5 11-99-1, et seq. (2007); 
b. Alaska Stat. 8 29.47.460 (2007); 
d. Ark.Stat.Ann. 5 14-168-305, et seq. (2007); 
e. Cal. Health & Safety Code $5 33670-33679 (2007); 
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Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. $5  12-65(c) to -65(f) (2007); 
Del. Code tit. 22, $ 1701 etseq. (2007); 
D.C. Stat. $2-1217.01 etseq. (2007); 
Fla.Stat.Ann. $ 163.335(5) (2007); 
Ga.Stat. $ 36-94-01, et seq. (2007); 
Haw.Rev.Stat. $ 46-101 (2007); 
1li.Comp.Stat. ch. 65, F) 511 1-74.4-8 (2007); 
Ind. Code $ 36-7-14-27 (2007); 
Iowa Code F) 403.19 (2007); 
Kan.Stat.Ann. $8 12-1770 et seq. (2007); 
Ky.Rev.Stat. $5 65.490, et seq. (2007); 
La.Rev.Stat. 33:9032 (2007); 
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 30-A, $ 5227 et seq. (2007); 
Md. Art. 41, $ 14-201, etseq. (2007); 
Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 40, $ 59 (2007); 
Mich.Stat.Ann. $5  125.1801 to -1830 (2007); 
Minn.Stat.Ann. $ 469.175 (2007); 
Miss.Code Ann. 5 21-45-1, et seq. (2007); 
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aa. 
bb. 
CC. 
dd. 
ee. 
ff 
gg. 
hh. 
ii. 
jj. 
kk. 
11. 
mm. 
nn. 
Mo.Rev.Stat. $ 99.800, et seq. (2007); 
Mont. Code Ann. $$ 7-15-4282 to -4292 (2007); 
Neb.Rev.Stat. $ 18-21 16 (2007); 
Nev.Rev.Stat. $$ 279.674-685 (2007); 
N.H.Stat. $5 162-K9 to 162-K10 (2007); 
N.J. Stat. $ 52:27D-459 et seq. (2007); 
N.M.Stat.Ann. $ 5-15-15 (2007); 
N.C.Gen.Stat. $ 160A-515.1 (2007); 
N.D.Cent. Code $ 40-58-20 (2007); 
N.Y.Gen.Mun. $ 970-0 (Consol. 2007); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. $ 725.01, et seq. (2007); 
0kla.Stat. tit. 62, $ 861 (2007); 
0r.Rev.Stat. $5 457.420-,460 (2007); 
Pa. Stat. tit. 53 $ 6930.1 et seq. (2007); 
R.LGen. Laws $45-33.2-1, et seq. (2007); 
S.C.Code Ann. $ 31-6-10, et seq. (2007); 
S.D. Codified Laws $5 11-9-1 to -46 (2007); 
Tenn. Code Ann. $ 13-20-205 (2007); 
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qq. Tex. Local Gov't Code tit. 12 $ 374.031, et seq. (2007); 
n. Utah Code Ann. $ 17C-2-201 et seq. (2007); 
ss. Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, $5 1891-1900 (2007); 
tt. Va.Code Ann. $ 58.1-3245, et seq. (2000); 
UU. Wash.Rev.Code 5 39.88.010, et seq. (2007); 
w. W.Va.Code $ 7-11B-1, etseq. (2007); 
ww. Wis.Stat.Ann. 5 66.1 105 (2007); and 
xx. Wyo.Stat. 5 15-9-120 (2007). 
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Ryan P ,  Armbruster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
rpa@elamburke.com 
mes@elamburke.com 
Armbruster - ISB #I878 
Sullivan - ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: I CASE NO. CV 08-121 
Petitioner. 
On or about March 24,2008, Kenneth W. Hart filed his Response to Petition for Judicial 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE CITY 
OF REXBURG, 
Confirmation ("Opposition Memorandum"). The Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
("Agency") now submits this Reply Brief in support of its Petition for Judicial Conbat ion.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION 
Under settled Idaho law, the Agency is not the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg ("City") i 
1 
i 
or a subdivision of the State of Idaho. Therefore, the Agency's issuance of revenue allocation 
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(tax increment) bonds do not require voter approval under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Since the Agency is not subject to the voter approval requirements under Article 8, 
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the Court does not need to analyze whether the issuance of 
such bonds constitutes "indebtedness" or "liability" for purposes of that constitutional provision. 
Similarly, because the Agency is not an enumerated entity subject to the Article 8, Section 3 
limitations, the Court does not have to perform an analysis of the "ordinary and necessary" 
proviso. Finally, since the Agency is a public entity, the City is not lending its credit to a private 
entity in violation of Article 8, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Based on the above, the 
Agency's authority to issue the Series 2008 Bonds does not violate Article 8, Sections 3 and 4. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Agency Is Not a Governmental Entity Forbidden from Issuing Debt Without 
Voter Approval. 
Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the Agency is subject to the 
constitutional requirements of voter approval under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution 
because the Agency is the "alter ego" of the City or, in the alternative, the Agency constitutes a 
"subdivision of the state." To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Idaho has expressly held that 
urban renewal agencies are not one of the governmental entities enumerated in Article 8, Section 
3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
1. The Aeencv is not the "alter eeo" of the Citv. 
Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other 
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in 
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income 
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and revenue provided for it for such year, without ihe assent of 
two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof. . . . 
Generally, Mr. Hart argued that the Agency is the "alter ego"of the City based upon the 
degree of the City's control over the Agency. Mr. Nart supported his argument with the assertion 
that the Agency is governed by the City, benefits the City, was established by the City, 
commissioners, are appointed by the City, and the City can terminate the board of commissioners 
andlor declare itself as the board. 
The issue of whether an urban renewal agency is the "alter ego" of a city has been 
expressly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong 
Corp.., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). In YickKong the urban renewal agency sought to 
condemn Yick Kong Corporation's property for urban renewal purposes. Id. at 877. The 
condemnee challenged the constitutionality of the urban renewal law, the validity of the urban 
renewal agency sought to be created by the statute, and the ability of the urban renewal agency to 
operate under the authority granted by that statute. Id. Although revenue bonds were not at 
m e  condemnee argued that the urban renewal agency was subject to the constitutional 
voter approval requirement under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution because the 
urban renewal agency was the "alter ego" of the City of Boise or because the urban renewal 
agency was itself a "subdivision of the state." Id. at 880. 
The wndemnee argued that the urban renewal agency was the "alter ego" of the City of 
Boise, essentially based on the City's degree of control over the agency, e.g., (1) the City had to 
make the finding of a deteriorated area before the agency could exercise any of its powers; (2) the 
Boise mayor and city council appointed the agency's commissioners; and (3) the Boise mayor 
and city council had the power to remove the commissioners. Id. at 881. 
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The Court concluded that the agency was not the "alter ego" of the City of Boise. Id. at 
882. The Court reasoned that the agency was an entity of legislative creation and that the 
legislature established the agency's powers, duties and authorities. Id. at 881. The Court further 
reasoned that the legislature intended there to be a local voice in the question of whether a 
particular municipality had a need for urban renewal, thus requiring a finding of need by the 
municipality prior to the time an agency could come into existence. Id. The Court stated that 
"[wlhile the particular city may trigger the existence of the [agency], it cannot control its powers 
or operations." Id. The Court reasoned further that the appointment procedures did not cause 
inherent control in the city, and the removal procedures were not arbitrary or solely in the 
discretion of the city. Id. at 882. The Court stated: 
The degree of control exercised by the City of Boise does not usurp 
the powers and duties of the [agency], and the close association 
between the two entities at most shows two independent public 
entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes. 
Id. 
In essence, the Court's finding that the agency was not the "alter ego" of the city was 
predicated on the Court's finding that the degree of the city's control over the agency did not 
compromise the agency's independence. 
The principles of Yick Kong remain viable authority. The facts concerning the 
relationship between the Agency and the City of Rexbnrg are nearly identical to the facts 
discussed in YickKong. The Agency and the City of Rexbnrg are completely separate entities, 
with separate governing bodies and separate functions. The cooperation between the two 
separate entities is for valid public purposes. The Agency is not the "alter ego'' of the City; 
therefore, the voter approval requirements of Article 8, Section 3 do not apply. 
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2. The Agencv is not a "subdivision of the state." 
Mr. Hart argued in the alternative that if the agency was not an "alter ego" of the City, 
that it could be a "subdivision of the state." As noted above, the Supreme Court of Idaho has 
expressly concluded that urban renewal agencies are not subdivisions of the state within the 
meaning of Article 8, Sections 3 and 4. 
The Court in YickKong relied on the Court's decision in Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing 
Authority, which held that the housing authority did not have any powers of taxation and, 
therefore, the provisions of Article 8, Section 3 did not apply. YickKong, 94 Idaho at 882-883 
(citing 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1104 (1941). Analogizing to the housing authority in Lloyd, the 
Court in Yick Kong concluded that the urban renewal agency has "no ability to actually encumber 
any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property 
holdings." id, at 883. Based on the Court's decision in YickKong, the Agency is not a 
subdivision of the state; therefore, the voter approval provisions of Article 8, Section 3 do not 
B. Since the Agency Is Not Subject to the Voter Approval Requirements of Article 8, 
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the Court Does Not Need to Analyze (1) 
Whether the Issuance of the Revenue Allocation Bonds Constitutes ccIndebtedness" 
o r  "Liability"; Or, (2) Whether the Subject Project Constitutes an "Ordinary and 
Necessary" Expense. 
1. Since the Agencv is not an enumerated entitv subject to the voter avvroval 
reauirements of Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. an analvsis of 
whether the issuance of the revenue allocation bonds constitute "indebtedness" or 
"liabilitv" is unnecessary. 
Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the issuance of the revenue 
allocation (tax increment) bonds constitutes debt under Article 8, Section 3. 
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It is the Agency's position that the revenue allocation bonds do not constitute "debt" 
within the meaning of the wnstitutional limitations of Article 8, Section 3 because the 
bondholders may look only to the revenues eom the allocated taxes for retirement of the bond 
obligation and the Idaho statutes specifically indicate that the credit of the city is not available for 
repayment of the bond. 
However, it is also the Agency's position, as argued above, that the Agency is neither an 
"alter ego" of the City of Boise or a "subdivision of the state." Since the Agency is not an 
enumerated entity under Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the voter approval 
requirements therein do not apply. Therefore, an analysis of whether the issuance of the bonds 
constitutes a debt within the constitutional limitations of Article 8, Section 3 is not necessary. 
2. Since the Aoencv is not an enumerated cntitv subicct to thc voter anoroval 
reauirenients of Articlc 8, Section 3 of the lddio Constitution. an analysis of 
whether the subject vroiec! constitutes an "ordinarv and necessarv" expense is not 
.
Mr. Hart, citing to City ofBoise v. Frazier, argued in his Opposition Memorandum that 
the project sought to be funded with revenue allocation (tax increment) bonds is not ''ordinary 
and necessary" expense, thus requiring voter approval. 
In general, Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution bars cities from incuning debts 
or liabilities without voter approval unless the expenditure is for an "ordinary and necessary" 
expense. City ofBoise v. Fraziev, 143 Idaho 1 ,  137 P.3d 388 (2006); Article 8, Section 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
As set forth above, the Agency is neither an "alter ego" of the City of Boise or a 
"subdivision of the state." Since the Agency is not an enumerated entity under Article 8, Section 
3 of the Idaho Constitution, the voter approval requirements therein do not apply. 'Therefore, an 
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analysis of the "ordinary and necessary" proviso is not required. Consequently, the decision in 
Frmier is distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
C. The City of Rexburg Is Not Lending its Credit to a Private Entity in Violation of 
Article 8, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Mr. Hart argued in his Opposition Memorandum that the City improperly pledged its 
credit to the Agency in violation of Article 8, Section 4 of the Constitution. 
This issue was also addressed in YickKong. In YtckKong, the Supreme Court of Idaho 
held the constitutional provisions regarding lending of credit apply only if the governmental 
entity is lending its credit to or for the benefit of interests. Id. at 883-84. In Yick Kong, 
the court held that the agency, "being a public and not a private enterprise, does not fall within 
the strictures and prohibition of Article 8, 5 4 and Article 12, 8 4 of the Idaho Constitution. . . ." 
Id. at 884. The Court's conclusion was based upon the Court's finding the agency could not 
impose taxes upon the residents of the city or encumber public assets to the advantage ofprivate 
enterprise. Id. 
The Yick Kong decision remains viable authority that the Agency is a public entity, and 
thus, the City does not lend its credit to a private entity in violation of Article 8, Section 4. 
In. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there is no factual dispute. Based upon the legal arguments presented in the 
opening Memorandum and set forth above, the Agency respectfully requests this Court issue a 
judgment of judicial confirmation, confirming the power of the Agency to issue its Series 2008 
Bonds based upon revenue allocation financing. 
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DATED this&'day of March, 2008. 
ELAM &BURKE, P.A. 
~ & e $  for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @day of  arch, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Kenneth W. Hart 
367 Salem Avenue 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
- U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 32 Federal Express 
- Facsimile Transmission 
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Kenneth W. Hart 
367 Salem Ave. 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
(208)356-9661 
Respondent in opposition to the Rexburg 
Urban Renewal Agency's petition for Judicial Confirmation. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAJ30, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
MADISON 
CASE NO. CV08-121 
In re: 
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY, 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
COMES NOW respondent Kenneth W. Hart presenting pro se, pursuant to 
Idaho Code 7-1301 through 7-13 13. Idaho Code specifically grants standing 
to "any other person interested ..." 
DISCUSSION 
(1) "Article VIII 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars cities ftom 
incurring debts or liabilities without first conducting an election to secure 
voter approval for the proposed expenditure. The section, however, contains 
*390 a notable exception. No public vote is required if the expenditure is for 
an 'ordinary and necessary' expense" (see Idaho Supreme Court's "I11 
Analysis" in City of Boise v. Frazier - Exhibit C) 
Thus the petitioner needs and seeks a finding by this court (judicial 
confirmation) that the project instant is "ordinary and necessary." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently addressed the "ordinary and 
necessary issue" in CITY OF BOISE v. FRAZIER. In 2006 OPINION 37, 
the court repeatedly sets a standard of EMERGENCY EXPENSE, 
UNAVOIDABLE EXPENSE such as criminal trial costs, and expenditures 
to INSURE PUBLIC SAFETY such as repair damage from floods or similar 
,- 
catastrophe. The court described "necessary" as truly urgent and 
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unavoidable, something that the government agency was legally obligated to 
perform promptly and that ". . . under the proviso clause of Article VIII $ 3  
there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such 
year." The petitioners offer no assertions that the proposed outdoor 
swimming facility qualifies as an "ordinary and necessary" exception in 
Article VIII, sec. 3. 
The claim of the Agency to possess "revenue allocation fmancing powers" 
by Idaho Code 50-2901-50-2912 and bonding authority by Idaho Code 50- 
2012 -50-2902 clearly violates the higher authority of the Idaho 
Constitutional provisions against long term debt without the assent of 213 of 
the electors in Article VIII, sec. 3. For the purpose of funding an outdoor 
swimming facility, the AgencyJCity does not meet the "ordinary and 
necessary" exception requirements. 
In fact, the City of Rexburg had a bond election on August 3,2004 for the 
purpose of issuing $4,000,000 in bonds to pay for the acquisition and 
construction of an outdoor swimming facility. The bond election failed (see 
exhibit B). The city has made no further attempts to seek voter approval of 
the project. This petition seems to be the city's attempt to avoid the 
necessity of voter approval. 
(2) It should be noted that the AgencyICity is not planning to issue Revenue 
Bonds -that is the bonds will not be paid back from the revenues and fees 
generated by the patrons of the swimming pool facility. The bonds the 
petitioners desire will be paid off from property taxes diverted from the city, 
county, school district, library, etc. (See exhibit A) to the Agency. These 
amounts are based on already increased property values, not on theoretical 
possible increases as in the case of some urban renewal agencies just starting 
out. 
(3) Also note that this is a true indebtedness or debt. Exhibit A of the city's 
bond purchase agreement describes all of the characteristics of debt when 
referring to these bonds. They will have a Dated Date from when the 
interest starts. They will have a Closing Date, an Issue Size, true interest 
cost (TIC), a maturity schedule, defined Principal and Interest Rates. 
This reminds one of the "Duck" concept: If it swims like a duck, waddles 
like a duck, quacks like a duck, eats like a duck, etc. than it doesn't matter 
what one calls it, it's a Duck. 
(4) Rexburg City Authority: The petition claims the Rexburg Urban 
Renewal Agency (Agency) to be an independent body. By any construction 
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and reasonable interpretation of the English language, the Agency is 
governed by the City, benefits the City, was established by the City, 
commissioners are appointed by the City, and the City can terminate the 
board. The city can declare itself as the board of commissioners and have 
the city council replace all the commissioners [Section 50-2006(b) (2) and 
(3)] The City doesn't even need to give a reason. Indeed, all the authority 
asserted by the Agency comes from the City. In this respect it is no different 
than any other city department such as police, fire, or parks. The ultimate 
purpose even includes a city recreational facility which will be owned and 
operated by the city. This is just like the "Duck" concept mentioned earlier. 
To claim the Agency is "an urban renewal agency of the state of Idaho7' 
independent of the city of Rexburg is simply misleading. A city pledge 
stating that it won't exert its control does not change the nature of the 
relationship. If the Agency commissioners decided to deed the pool to their 
best friend, then the City would need to step in to stop it. Exhibit A shows 
the benefits provided to the Agency which will be used to benefit the City's 
outdoor swimming facility. The swimming pool facility is not being used as 
collateral for the bonds. Could the Agency give the pool to the county, the 
school district or any individual? They intend to give the pool to the city 
even before the bonds are paid off. Yet just as much taxes were diverted 
from the county and school district to pay off the bonds as were given up by 
the city (see exhibit A). If the agency is not considered the city, then could 
it be an "other subdivision" mentioned in the first sentence of Article VIII 
$3. It's very difficult to see the Agency as independent of the city. 
(5) Another problem with the petition (specifically with the Bond Resolution 
and the Bond Purchase Agreement) is that they are too vague in that they do 
not state the maturity date of the bonds - city Resolution No. 2007-4 states 
the closing date as "to be determined." The North Highway Urban 
Renewal District was started late in 1991 with the property values based on 
the value of property as of January 1, 199 1. Idaho S m - 2 9 0 4  states: 
Except as provided below, no reven& allocation provision of 
an urban renewalplan or competitively disadvantaged border 
communitv area ordinance, including all amendments thereto, 
- 
.shall have &ation exceedin-idthe 
d w x & a n u &  approved by the municipality. 
Therefore any bonds, if allowed by this court, should ha& a maturity date 
before ~ e c e i b e r  31,2014 (which is 24 years from Jan. 1, 1991). The 
statute then lists four possible exceptions to the above. Exception 1 should 
not apply - judicial consent should limit the dollar amount of the bonds so 
that they could be totally paid off by December of 2014. Exception 3 
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mentions the date when the law was changed from 30 years to 24 years and 
implies that the 30 year time frame is no longer operative. Exceptions 1 
through 4 will not apply if the court limits the maturity date of the bonds to 
the 24 year time frame. 
The petitioner seeks a determination of the validity of Resolution No. 2007- 
4 (the Bond Resolution) and the Purchase Agreement, yet a key element of 
the bond financing would be the maturity date and the amount of time 
allowed for the Agency to pay off the bonds. To merely state that these key 
items are "to be determined" and to allow a confirmation letting the Agency 
fill in the blanks later does not seem correct. Allowing the confirmation of 
the petition would be like giving the Agency and city a blank check with 
respect to when the bonds should be paid off (and also with respect to the 
amounts that would need to be paid each year). In other documents 
examined at city hall and in verbal comments the city has made to the 
respondent, the city says that the bonds can have a maturity date as late as 
December of 2021. This would be in violation of the 24 year rule stated in 
the statute. 
DETERMINATION OF THE COURT 
Based on the respondent argument, the Agency is in reality a city department 
in every respect. The bonding authority asserted is without foundation. 
Despite claims to the contrary, it would be impossible to disassociate the 
City from the Agency in the event of default or any facet of the bonding 
process. This is a City project in every respect regardless of assertions to the 
contrary. 
By releasing tax revenues otherwise destined for various units of 
government (see Exhibit A) with legal taxing authority, those units are 
making a DE FACT0 pledge of their faith and credit contrary to provisions 
in Idaho Constitution Article VIII, sec. 4: 
"SECTION 4. COUNTY, ETC., NOT TO LOAN OR GIVE ITS 
CREDIT. No county, city, town, township, board of 
education, or school district, or other subdivision, 
shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith thereof 
directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of 
any individual, association or corporation, for 
any amount or for any purpose whatever ...I1 
Certainly by virtue of foregoing tax revenues on improvements and 
annreciated value within the Urban Renewal District, all the units of 
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government with levy authority are "pledging their credit or faith thereot' to 
the repayment of bonded indebtedness of the Agency. Those revenues are a 
prime source of funding for the project. 
SUMMARY and PRAYER 
Respondent prays the court find: 
A. The fmancing scheme is unconstitutional based on Article VIII, sec. 3 of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
B. The Idaho Constitution prevails over Idaho Code with respect to any 
indebtedness for any purpose. 
C. The Agency is in every respect a division, department of the City of 
Rexburg and the project is for the sole benefit of the City. 
D. Without the tax revenues from units of government with taxing 
authority, it would be impossible to repay the long term debt. 
E. The City and Agency are attempting to get court approval for a project 
requiring approval of the electorate. 
F. If in the judgment of the court, the bonds are to be allowed, the 
respondent requests that a maturity date for the bonds be set by the court. 
The validity of the bonds could not be determined without some 
limitation on the maturity date. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition should be denied. The project should be placed before the 
voters at an election as provided in the Idaho Constitution Article VIII, sec.3 
DATE M& 2q,  2 b o @  
Kenneth W. Hart, pro se 
Respondent 
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State of Idaho 1 
1 
County of Madison County ) 
On this A day of % t,k ,20&, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Publ~c for Idaho, personally appeared .dev tne~h & v  
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledge 
to me that helshelthey executed the same. 
n\i WITNES WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year 
in this certificate first above written. 
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Exhibit A 
The spreadsheet below shows the amounts of money (rounded to the nearest dollar) that was taken from the County, City of Rexburg, 
School District, Cemetery, etc. and diverted (given) to the North Highway Urban Renewal District for the year 2007. This payment 
for 2007 represents the increase in property tax from the time the Agency was started (or from the time when it was amended) up to 
the end of year 2007. Note that the Urban Renewal Agency does not affect the amount of property tax a property taxpayer pays. 
It does affect how the tax revenues are distributed. In 2006, $421,082 was diverted to the Agency. In 2007 $496,000 was diverted to the 
the Agency. Each year the amounts diverted from the various entities (County, City, School District, Library, Mosquito Abatement, and 
Ambulance as shown below) get larger because property values in the District grow larger rather than smaller. 
Summary of data taken from Rexburg North Highway 2007 Urban Renewal 1-0007 
Mosquity 
Abatement 
UP & UR 2 $  2 7 $  1 4 $  1 7 $  720 
Main Roll 190.482 114.107 3.007 77.137 19.981 47.699 1.695 18,231 9,456 11,915 493,710 
02 Missed Roll 703 421 11 285 74 1 76 6 67 35 44 1,822 
Totals $191,463 $114,694 $3,022 $ 77,534 $20,084 $47,945 $ 1,704 $ 18,325 $ 9,505 $ 11,976 $496,252 
Source of Data: the Madison County Treasurer's Office (March, 2008) 
-. - 
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'7 "7 rage 1 01 L e- " 
Marilyn Rasmussen Ex f f l@t~ -  I3 
~ ~ . 
From: April Howard [aprilh@rexburg.org] 
Sent: Thursday, March 20.2008 2:03 PM 
To: Marilyn Rasmussen 
Subject: Resolution with Bond results 
Mayor Larsen read Resolution 2004-14 which canvassed the votes for the General Bond Election on August 03, 
2004. 
RESOLUTION NO. 2004-14 
A RESOLUTION OF THE ClTY COUNCIL OF THE ClTY OF REXBURG, 
IDAHO, CANVASSING AND DECLARING THE RESULTS OF THE 
GENERALOBLIGATION BOND FOR $4,000,000 HELD IN SAID CITY ON 
TUESDAY, AUGUST 03,2004. 
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Rexburg, Idaho has requested the electorate to  vote INFAVOR 
of or AGAINST an Aquatic Center for the City o f  Rexburg, Idaho; and 
WHEREAS the City Council has set the maximum amount of the General Obligation Bond not to exceed 
$4,000,000 to pay the cost of acquisition and construction of  an outdoor swimming facility, and related cost; and 
WHEREAS the bonds to  mature and to  be payable from a levy of taxes over a term which may be less 
than but which shall not exceed thirty (30) years; and 
WHEREAS the City o f  Rexburg has outstanding revenue bond indebtedness in  the amount of  $2,190,657, 
and the City has no general obligation debt, and the interest rate anticipated on the proposed bonds is 5% per 
annum. 
WHEREAS the total amount to  be repaid over the life of the proposed bonds, 
principal and interest, based on the anticipated interest rate is estimated to  be $7,806,172; and 
WHEREAS the lSt, znd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Notice of Election of said election having been duly published in  
the Rexburg Standard Journal, Rexburg, Idaho, as provided by law for five consecutive weeks; and 
WHEREAS, the Clerk of  said City has caused 1' and 2" Notice of  Sample Ballots containing the options 
to  vote INFAVOR of or AGAINST the General Bond Election to  be printed as required by law; and, 
WHEREAS, after the due and legal election held In said City on August 03, 2004, the Judges o f  said 
election have made their returns thereof and this City Council has found that in all manner said election was 
conducted according to  law and has canvassed the sage. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE 
MAYOR AND ClTY COUNCILOFTHE C I N  OF 
REXBURG, IDAHO: 
That the City Council of the City of Rexburg, Idaho, sitting as a canvassing board and having before it the 
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proceedings and returns from the General Obligation Bond Election held in the City of Rexburg, Idaho, 
on Tuesday, August 03, 2004, does hereby canvas and certify the returns of said election and the results of the 
voting as shown on Exhibit A. 
That said election was duly held during the hours prescribed by law and at the polling places designated. 
That the number of ballots cast corresponds with the check list of the voters. 
That those electors voting INFAVOR of the General Bond Election totaled 815, which is less than the 
two-thirds (213) majority of the qualified voters voting at the election; and 
That those electors voting AGAINST the General Bond Election totaled 874, which is in excess of the 
one-third (113) of the qualified voters voting at the election. 
That those electors voting an under vote (neither selecting INFAVOR of or AGAINST) the General Bond 
Election totaled 3 non votes. 
That those electors voting an over vote (selecting both INFAVOR of and AGAINST) the General Bond 
Election totaled 1 non vote. 
That the City Council of the City of R$xburg, Idaho, sitting as a canvassing board on August 4,2004 does 
hereby certify that the election failed to attain the requisite 213'~ majority of votes INFAVOR of the issuance of 
the General Obligation Bond Election, and; 
THEREFORE THE ELECTION TO ISSUE GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS IN THE AMOUNT NOTTO EXCEED 
$4,000,000.00 FAILS. 
APPROVED by the Council on August 4,2004 
SIGNED by the Mayor on August 4,2004 
Shawn Larsen, Mayor 
ATTEST: 
Blair D. Kay, City Clerk 
April Howard 
Deputy City Clerk 
Phone: 208-359-3020 
Fax: 208-359-3022 
Email: aprilh@rexburg.org 
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Page 4 of 12 
137 P.3d 388 
143 Idaho I, 137 P.3d 388 
(Cite as: 143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388) 
held, the district court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and granted the City's petition. 
The district court found parking capacity to be an 
integral part of the operation of a regional airport 
and the parking facilities at the Boise Airport lo he 
inadequate to meet current or future needs. The dis- 
trict court additionally found that the proposed five 
level parking facility was not new construction, but 
instead was an expansion of the existing facility. As 
a result, the district court determined the expansion 
project was an "ordinary and necessary" expense 
that did not require a public vote for its approval, 
and that leasing parking space to rental car compan- 
ies would not be an impermissible gift of the City's 
credit because such leases were consisaent with 
public use of the facility 
Frazier filed a timely appeal that is now before this 
Court. 
11. STANDARD OF REVlEW 
[l][2][3] This Court defers to the factual findings of 
the district court unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous. Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF .  Magnuson 
Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999). 
This Court exercises free review of tile district 
court's application of the relevant law to the facts. 
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782, 
784 (1999). Constitutional issues are questions of 
law over which we also exercise free review. State 
v Weber, 140 Idaho 89,91,90 P.3d 314,316 (2004). 
UI. ANALYSIS 
Article VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally 
bars cities from incurring debts or liabilities 
without first conducting an election to secure voter 
approval for the proposed e~pendi tnre .~~ '  The 
section, however, contains *390 a notable excep- 
tion. No public vote is required if the expenditure is 
for an "ordinary and necessary" expense 
"authorized by the general laws of the state ...." This 
Page 3 
exception is referred to as the "proviso clause." 
City o f  P ocatello v . P eterson, 9 3 Idaho 774, 778, 
473 P.2d 644,648 (1970). 
F'Nl. The full text of Article VIII, 5 3 of 
the Idaho Constihilion, entitled 
"Limitations on county and municipal in- 
debtedness," provides: 
No county, city, h o d  of education, or school dis- 
trict, or other subdivision of the state, shall in cur 
any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for 
any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income 
and revenue provided for it for such year, without 
the assent of two thirds (213) of the qualificd elect- 
ors thereof voting at an election to be held for that 
purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of incur- 
ring such indebtedness, provisions shall be made 
for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay 
the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and 
also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of 
the principal thereos within thirty (30) years from 
the time of contracting the same. Any indebtedness 
or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall 
he void: Provided that this section shall not be 
construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary 
expenses authorized by the general laws of the state 
and provided furCher that any city may own, pur- 
chase, construct, extend, or equip, within and 
without the corporate limits of such city, off street 
parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and 
air navigations facilities, and for the purpose of 
paying the cost thereof may, without regard to any 
limitation herein imposed, with the assent of two 
thirds (213) of the qualified electors voting at an 
election to he held for that purpose, issue revenue 
bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which 
to be paid solely from revenue derived from rates 
and charges for the use of, and the service rendered 
by, such facilities as may be prescribed by law, and 
provided further, that any city or other political 
subdivision of the state may own, purchase, con- 
struct, extend, or equip, within and without the cor- 
porate limits of such city or political subdivision, 
water systems, sewage collection systems, water 
treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, and may 
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rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities, 
and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof, may, 
without regard to any limitation herein imposed, 
with the assent of a majority of the qualified elect- 
ors voting at an election to be held for that purpose, 
issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and in- 
terest of which to be paid solely from revenue de- 
rived from rates and charges for the nse of, and the 
service rendered by such systems, plants and facilit- 
ies, as may he prescribed by law; and provided fur- 
ther that any port district, for the purpose of cany- 
ing into effect all or any of the powers now or here- 
after granted to port districts by the laws of this 
state, may contract indebtedness and issue revenue 
bonds evidencing such indebtedness, without the 
necessity of the voters of the port districteauthoriz- 
ing the same, such revenue bonds to be payable 
solely from all or such part of the revenues of the 
port district derived from any source whatsoever 
excepting only those revenues derived from ad 
valorem taxes, as the port commission thereof may 
determine, and such revenue bonds not to be in any 
manner or to any extent a general obligation of the 
port district issuing the same, nor a charge upon the 
ad valorem tax revenue of such port district. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the district court ruled that the 
parking expansion was an ordinary and necessary 
expense within the meaning of the constiiution. 
Consequently, the district court concluded the City 
was lawfully authorized to incur liabilities in order 
to financc its completion. Frazier argues the ex- 
pansion is not an "ordinary and necessary" under- 
takmg and therefore the City must obtain the con- 
sent of the voting public before entering into the 
proposed fmancing agreement. 
A. The Development of Article VIII, 5 3 
Article VIII, 5 3 has been part of Idaho's Constitu- 
tion since the beginning of statehood. The draft ver- 
sion of Article VIIl, 5 3 that was submitted to the 
1889 Idaho Constitutional Convention was modeled 
after and nearly identical to Article XI, 5 18 of the 
California Constitution of 1879. See 1 PROCEED- 
INGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITU- 
TIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889. 589 
(1912) (henceforth 1 PROCEEDINGS); CAL. 
CONST. of 1879, Art. XI, 5 18. The intention was 
to prevent local government entities from incurring 
debts without approval from the voters and a clear 
plan to retire those debts. DONALD CROWLEY & 
FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE 
CONSTITUTION 170 (1994). 
Broadly speaking, Article VIII, 5 3 imposes two re- 
quirements to he met by local governments before 
incnning indebtedness. The first requirement is a 
public election securing two-thirds of the vote, and 
the second is the collection of an annual tax suffi- 
cient to pay the debt within t h i i  years. The re- 
mainder of the section consists of exceptions to 
those requirements, beginning with the previously 
mentioned proviso clause and continuing with lan- 
guage added in a series of subsequent amendments 
not applicable to our analysis. 
When the draft version of Article VIE, 5 3 was 
presented to the constitutional convention, it was 
amended by the delegates to add the words 
"provided, that this section shall not be construed to 
apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses au- 
thorized by the general laws of the state." 
SeeIDAHO CONST. art VIII, 5 3; 1 PROCEED- 
INGS at 584-94. Delegate William Claggett offered 
the original proviso clause. See1 PROCEEDINGS 
at *391 586. Claggett explained his intent to the 
other delegates, stating: "[wle all know that in the 
practical administration of county government, that 
there sometimes will be extraordinary expenses, 1 
mean extraordinary expenses in the ordinary admin- 
istration of affairs." Id at 588. By way of example, 
CIaggett mentioned the payment of witness fees. Id. 
Other delegates mentioned juror fees and criminal 
court expenses, id at 590, the expense of con- 
trolling streams and ditches, id at 592, and "any 
emergency" id at 587. 
B. Tlie P roposed Parking Expansion Is Not An 
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"Ordinary And Necessary" Expense Under Art- 
icle VnI, § 3 
In determining whether the proposed parking ex- 
pansion is ordinary and necessary, we turn first to 
the question of whether it is "ordinary." This Court 
has previously held an expense to be ordinary "if in 
the ordinary course of municipal business, or the 
maintenance of municipal property, it may be and is 
likely to become necessary." Hamon v. City of 
ldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 
(I  968). 
[4] ldaho law provides for local governments to 
maintain and operate airports. LC. $ 50-321. The 
City's proposal to expand the Boise airport's park- 
ing facilities to keep pace with rising demand is en- 
tirely consistent with "the ordinary course of muni- 
cipal business" in operating City property and is a 
type of expense that "may be and is likely to be- 
come necessary." See Hanson, 92 Idaho at 514, 446 
P.2d at 636 (defming "ordinary" in the context of 
the proviso clause). As a result, the City's proposed 
project is an "ordinary" expense under the circum- 
stances before us. 
The phrase "ordinary and necessary," however, is 
read in the conjunctive. See h s o n  v. City of Burley, 
105 Idaho 432, 443, 670 P.2d 839, 850 (1983). 
Therefore, in order for the expenditure at issue to 
he "ordinary and necessary" it must also qualify as 
"necessary." See id. The proper defmition of 
"necessary" as it is used in the proviso clause mer- 
its especially close sclutiny in this case. We have 
articulated two definitions of the term as it appears 
in the clause. Most recently, this Court quoted 
Black's Law Dictionary for the proposition that " 
'[nlecessary' means 'indispensible' " [sic]. 
Peterson, 93 ldaho at 778, 473 P.2d at 648. The dif- 
ficulty with defining "necessary" as 
"indispensable" is that the definition is cirtnlar and 
provides little guidance. In particular, such a defini- 
tion does not assist a court in distinguishing truly 
necessary expenditures from those that are. merely 
desirable or convenient. 
Earlier, in Dunbar v. Board of Commissioners of 
Cartyon County, 5 Idaho 407, 412, 49 P. 409, 411 
(1897), we wrote that in order for an expense to 
qualify as necessary under the proviso clause "there 
must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at 
or during such year." (Emphasis added). The mean- 
ing of "necessary" in the proviso clause takes on 
added clarity under the Dunbar test because ex- 
penditures qualify as "necessary" only if they are 
truly urgent. The Dunbar test has the additional be- 
nefit of matching closely with the types of ex- 
penditures the delegates at the Idaho Constitutional 
Convention discussed when they debated Article 
VIII, $ 3 of our state constitntion. Those expendit- 
ures included unavoidable expenses, such as cany- 
ing on criminal trials and abating flood damage, 
that could not he delayed. See1 PROCEEDINGS at 
590-2. We 0hsefve that the expenditures contem- 
plated by the delegates involved immediate or 
emergency expenses, such as those involving public 
safety, or expenses the government entity in ques- 
tion was legally obligated to perform promptly. 
Although our decisions in the years since Dunbar 
was handed down have been broadly consistent 
with the Dunbar test, we have not employed that 
test expressly. See e.g., Bd. of County Cornm'rs v. 
Idaho Health F ac. A uth., 96 Idaho 498, 510, 53 1 
P.2d 588, 600 (1975) (expanding a hospital); 
Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (replacing 
unsafe airport terminal); Ifamon v. City of Idaho 
Falls, 92 ldaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) (creating 
a police re t iment  fund); Corum v. Common Sch. 
Dist. No. 21, 55 Idaho 725, 47 P.2d 889 (1935) 
(paying teacher salaries); Lloyd Corp, v. Bannock 
County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217 (1933) 
(providing relief for the unemployed); Thomas v. 
Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921) 
(provid'mg for *392 police and f i e  protection ser- 
vices); Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150 
P. 35 (1915) (paying organizational expenses for a 
new county); Hickey v. City of Nampa, 22 ldaho 41, 
124 P. 280 (1912) (rebuilding the city's destroyed 
water system for f i e  protection and domestic water 
supply); Burler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 
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83 P. 234 (1905) (satisfying a tort judgment and 
paying the salaries of city officers and employees). 
Here, we retuni to the test stated in Dunbm and 
hold that in order for an expenditure to qualify as 
"necessary" under the proviso clause of Article 
VIII, 5 3 there must exist a necessity for makimg the 
expenditure at or during such year. 
In Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Idaho 
156, 167, 37 P. 277, 280 (1894), this Court wrote 
that an expenditure to provide for a temporary jail 
was an ordinary and necessary expense for Ban- 
nock County. Such an expense, we observed, 
"might very properly he expended, when necessary, 
for repairing a jail already built; and as it was paid 
for a temporary jail" it was an ordinary and neces- 
sary expense. Id. In the same case, this Court de- 
termined a debt to purchase land on which to build 
a permanent courthouse was not ordinary and ne- 
cessary. We wrote that "[iJt is, of course, the duty 
of the commissioners to provide a suitable place for 
holding of the courts and public offices, jails, etc.; 
but such rooms must be temporarily provided, at as 
little expense as is consistent with providing suit- 
able quarters, until the question can be submitted to 
the people." Id at 168, 37 P. at 281. 
Discussing Article VIII, $ 3 of our state constitu- 
tion, we observed in Williams v. City ofEmmett that 
[tlhe Idaho Constitution is imbued with the spirit of 
economy, and in so far as possible it imposes upon 
the political subdivisions of the state a pay- 
as-you-go system of finance. The rule is that, 
without the express assent of the qualified electors, 
municipal officers are not to incur debts for which 
they have not the funds to pay. Such policy entails 
a measul-e of crudity and inefficiency in local gov- 
ernment, but doubtless the men who drafted the 
Constitution, having in mind disastrous examples of 
optimism and extravagance on the part of public of- 
ficials, thought best to sacrifice a measure of effi- 
ciency for a degree of safety. The careful, tbrifly 
citizen sometimes gets along with a crude instru- 
mentality until he is able to purchase and..pay for 
something better. And likewise, under the Constitu- 
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tion, county officers must use the means they have 
for making fair and equitable assessments until they 
are able to pay for something more efficient or ob- 
tain the consent of those in whose interests they are 
supposed to act. 
51 Idaho 500, 505, 6 P.2d 475, 476 (1931) (quoting 
Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank v. Clearwater 
County, 235 F. 743,754 @.Idaho 1916)). 
151 Applying our interpretation of the phrase 
"ordinary and necessary" in this instance, we ob- 
serve that the parkimg expansion proposed by the 
City falls outside the proviso clause. We do not 
doubt the City's contention that parking facilities 
are an important part of a well hnctioning airport. 
Nor do we question the important role the Boise 
airport plays in our transportation infrastructure and 
regional economy. However, regardless of the im- 
polmce of public airport parkh~g, circumstances 
do not require the erection of a permanent parkmg 
structure on an immediate or emergency basis. The 
volume of traffic passing through the Boise airport 
has been growing for some time, and the airport .it- 
self has been improved to meet this rising demand. 
Rather that1 being a sudden emergency thrust upon 
the City, the need for expanded parking facilities is 
an expected expense for which the City has been 
able to plan. In the short term, the City has been 
shuttling travelers unable to secure onsite airport 
parking back and forth from parking areas located 
offsite. As with the courthouse and jail in Bannock 
County, we see that here the City is in a position to 
provide a temporary substitute to a permanent 
structure. Our state constitution requires the City to 
make do with such measures until sufficient normal 
revenue becomes available or the question of 
whether to enter into debt to build the desired per- 
manent structure can be submitted to the people in 
accordance with Article VIII, $3.  
*393 In its ruling in this case, the district court de- 
termined the proposed parking expansion was an 
ordinary and necessary expense because it found 
adequate parking facilities to be "critical" to the op- 
eration of the Boise h i o r t .  However, that parlcing 
~ i m  to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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facilities are important, or even critical to the oper- 
ation of the airport is insufficient to satisfy the con- 
stitutional requirements of Article VnI, $ 3. In- 
stead, we have held that there must exist a necessity 
not simply for the expenditure, hut also for making 
the proposed expenditure at or during such year. 
Dunbar, 5 ldaho at 412,49 P. at 41 1. 
Additionally, the district cou~t ruled the proposed 
expenditure was ordinary and necessary because the 
City's plan called for the expansion of an existing 
parking facility rather than new construction. Spe- 
cifically, the City intended to build a multiple floor 
parking garage on laud already being used as sur- 
face parking, ind the parking garage thus created 
would be connected to an existing multiple floor 
parking structure. The district court accurately cited 
to our decisions in Board o f Cou nty Commission- 
ers, 96 ldaho 498, 531 P.2d 588, and Peterson, 93 
Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644, for the proposition that 
expenses incurred in the repair and improvement of 
existing facilities can qualify as ordinary and neces- 
sary under the proviso clause. 
Both Board of' County Commissioners and 
Peterson, however, are distir~guishable %om this 
case. First, in both cases we noted the important 
safety implications of the proposed expenditures. In 
Board of County Commissioners we stressed the 
impact of public health in relation to the proposed 
hospital expansion. 96 Idaho at 510, 531 P.2d at 
600. In Peterson we noted the safety threat posed to 
passengers by an unsound aiqort passenger termin- 
a1 and other facilities the City of Pocatello sought 
to replace. 93 Idaho at 778-79, 473 P.2d at 648-49. 
The impact on public safety found in both decisions 
provided the requisite urgency missing from the 
present case. 
Second, the logic holding that repair and improve- 
ment of existing facilities can qualify as an ordinary 
and necessary expense, while sound, simply cannot 
be extended so fax as to cover the circumstances of 
this case. Converting a flat parking lot into a five 
floor parking garage is not a repair, nor any recog- 
nizable form of maintenance. Likewise, while it is 
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an "improvement" o f the existing surface parking, 
the expansion is so profound as to constitute an en- 
tirely new consbuction in every meaningfir1 sense. 
Accordingly, we hold that the proposed expenditure 
is not "necessary" witkin the meaning of the pro- 
viso clause in Article VIII, § 3 and therefore the 
City must obtain the consent of the voting public 
before entering into the proposed fmancing agree- 
ment. 
As a result of our holding, there is no need for this 
Court to reach the remaining questions presented by 
the Appellant. 
C. Attorney Fees 
[6] Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal. The City requests attorney fees on 
appeal pursuant to LC. 12-121. Idaho Code 5 
12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a civil 
action to the prevailing party if the court determines 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivol- 
ously, unreasonably or without foundation. Mutual 
of Enumciav Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 ldaho 135, 
139, 983 P.2d 208, 212 (1999). The City is not the 
prevailing party on appeal, and therefore no award 
of attorney fees is wapanted. Frazier argues he is 
entitled to attorney fees under LC. 5 7-1313, which 
provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees 
for a party who has appeared and prevailed against 
a political subdivision's petition for judicial con- 
firmation. We agree, and grant Frazier an award for 
both the costs and attorney fees he incurred in this 
action. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order for an expenditure to qualify as 
"necessary" as the word is used in the proviso 
clause to A~ticle VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution, 
there must exist a necessity for making the ex- 
penditure at or during such year. Dunbar, 5 ldaho at 
412, 49 P. at 411. The required urgency can result 
from a number of possible causes, such as threats to 
public safety, Board of County Camm'rs, 96 Idaho 
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at 510, 531 P.2d at 600, the need for *394 repairs, 
maintenance, or preservation of existing property, 
Asson, 105 Idaho at 441-42, 670 P.2d at 848-49, or 
a legal obligation to make the expenditure without 
delay, see B utler, 11 Idaho at 404, 83 P. at 238. 
Whether a proposed expenditure is ordinary and ne- 
cessary depends on the surrounding circumstances 
of each case. Asson, 105 Idaho at 442, 670 P.2d at 
849; Board ofCounQ Com'rs, 96 Idaho at 510, 531 
P.2d at 600; Peterson, 93 Idaho at 776, 473 P.2d at 
646. Here, the circumstances of this case do not re- 
quire an immediate or emergency expenditwe ex- 
empting the City from the election requirement of 
Article VIlI, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Accord- 
ingly, we reverse the district court's confirmation of 
the City's authority to enter into the proposed lease 
and m s t  agreement for the expansion of airport 
parking facilities. Costs and attorney fees are gran- 
ted to the Appellant, and we remand to the district 
court pursuant to LC. 5 7-1313 and I.R.C.P. 54 for 
a determination of costs and a reasonable sum of at- 
torney fees below and on appeal. 
Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS 
concur. 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting without 
opinion.BUSH, J., pro tem, specially concurring. 
I concur in the result of the majority decision, but 
respectfully disagree with the reasoning of that de- 
cision and therefore write separately. 
I agree that the judgment of the district court should 
be reversed and remanded. However, it is not ne- 
cessary to attempt the difficult task of sorting and 
reconciling the history of case law u~terpreting the 
"ordinary and necessary expense" proviso of Art. 
VIII, § 3 of our Constitution because the specific 
question of whether or not an off street parking fa- 
cility is such an expense is already answered by the 
specific reference to "off street parkiig facility" in 
the language of Art VIII, 5 3. The express reference 
to "off street parking facility," in the context of 
making such a facility eligible for a revenue bond 
exception to the general rule, makes clear that such 
a facility cannot he an "ordinary and necessary ex- 
pense." 
The pertinent language is: 
8 3. Limitations on county and municipal in- 
debtedness.- 
"Provided, that this section shall not be construed 
to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses au- 
thorized by the general laws of the state and 
provided futther that any city may own, purchase, 
consmct, extend, or equip, within and without the 
corporate limits of such city, off street parking fa- 
cilities, public recreation facilities, and air naviga- 
tion facilities, and for the purpose of paying the 
cost thereof may, without regard to any limitation 
herein imposed, with the assent of two thirds (213) 
of the qualified electors voting at an election to be 
held for that purpose, issue revenues bonds there- 
for, the principal and interest of which to be paid 
solely from revenue derived from rates and charges 
for the use of, and the service kndered by, such fa- 
cilities as may be prescribed by law ...." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The words "off street parkimg facilities" first ap- 
peared in S.L.1949, p. 598, in the language of a 
proposed constitutional amendment, which was 
then ratified by the voters in the 1950 general elec- 
tion. Water systems, sewage collection systems, 
water treatment plants and sewage treatment plants 
were also specifically identified in the 1950 amend- 
ment. (In 1964, another amendment added port dis- 
tricts. In 1966, "public recreation facilities" wexe 
added. In 1968, "air navigation facilities" were in- 
cluded and rehabilitation of existing electrical gen- 
erating facilities joined the list in 1976.) The 1950 
amendment provided cities an alternative means of 
gaining voter approval of certain types of govern- 
ment expenses that otherwise required a 2 3  major- 
ity vote of the electorate. The 1950 amendment cre- 
ated a so-called "special h d "  alternative for the 
voters to consider. The political theory behind that 
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alternative is transparent-voters who understand 
that the cost of building a facility will he paid over 
time by fees charged for use "395 of the facility, 
rather than with direct tax dollars, will be more 
likely to vote in favor of a bond referendum. Courts 
in some other states had created such an exception 
to the general rule of voter approval for large 
spending projects by judicial interpretation of the 
particular spending imitation in their state constitu- 
tions. The Idaho Supreme Court refused to do so, as 
described ill this article on the subject: 
The issue of what constitutes an "indebtedness or 
liability" has been a recurring subject of litigation 
over the century since the adoption of the Idaho 
Constitution. In the early case of Feil v. City of 
Coewr d'Alene, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a 
far more restrictive view of this term than did the 
courts of most other states, holding that the voter 
approval requirement of aticle VILI, section 3, ap- 
plied not only to general obligation debt payable 
from property taxes, but also to indebtedness pay- 
able solely from the revenues of revenue-producing 
public works. Thus, the Feil court rejected the so- 
called "special fund" doctrine recognized as an ex- 
ception to constitution debt limitation provisions in 
the great majority of jurisdictions. Although the 
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that some 
types of obligations do not constitute "indebtedness 
or liability" within the meaning of the constitution- 
al provision, and has also held that the limitation 
does not apply to certain types of entities, it has 
never retreated from the holding in Feil in that spe- 
cial revenue debt is an "indehtedness or liability" 
within the meaning of article VIII, section 3 of 
Idaho's constitution. 
Michael C. Moore, The Idaho Constitution and 
Local Governments-Selected Topics, 31 Idaho 
L.Rev. 417,454-455 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
The Feil decision has remained the law in Idaho to 
this day, even though various attempts have been 
made over the years to hy to persuade the Idaho 
Supreme Coul? to choose a new course on the issue, 
all unsuccessful, e.g: 
RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
REXBURG URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY'S 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 
PAGE 125 
It is urged that we ovemle Feil v. City of Coeur 
d'illene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912), and apply 
the "special fund" doctrine in this case. That doc- 
trine, accepted by a great majority of cases, holds 
that a municipality does not contract indebtedness 
or incur liability, within the constitutional limita- 
tion, by undertaking an obligation which is to be 
paid out of a special fund consisting entirely of rev- 
enue or income from the property pwchased or con- 
structed. Feil d ealt with a decision by the city of 
Coeur d'Alene to purchase a municipal water sys- 
tem, to be financed by bonds which would he re- 
paid out of a fund containing only the revenues de- 
rived from operation of the water works. It was ar- 
gued'that since no indebtedness was contracted by 
the city itself-but rather only by the bond fund-the 
expenditure did not come under Idaho Const. Art. 
8, $ 3. The Feil court rejected that argument, reas- 
oning that Idaho's expansive constitutional provi- 
sion' (which, unlike several other states examined 
by the court, contained the word "liability" as well 
as "debt") included a n  indebtedness paid out of a 
fund separate %om the city's general fund. The 
court was critical of "subtleties and refkements of 
reasoning" utilized to suggest that no liabiiity is in- 
curred where a special fund is involved. 23 Idaho at 
49, 129 P. at 649. Since Feil, a series of cases have 
declined to apply the special fund doctrine. See, 
Boise Development Co. v. Boise City, 26 Idaho 347, 
143 P. 531 (1914); Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 
668,284 P. 843 (1930); Williams v. City ofEmmeft, 
51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931); Sfraughan v. City 
of Coewr d%lene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321 
(1932); O'Byyant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 
313,303 P.2d 672 (1956). 
Asson v . City of B urley, 1 05 Idaho 432, 438-439, 
670 P.2d 839,845-846 (1983). 
The Asson court went on to say: 
However, Feil and its quite extensive succession of 
authority no longer prevent application of the spe- 
cial fund exception because that exception has been 
made a part of Idaho law by way of amendments to 
Art. 8, 5 3. See. Idaho Water Resource Board v. 
m to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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137 P.3d 388 
143 ldaho 1,137 P.3d 388 
(Cite as: 143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388) 
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Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976). The 
first such amendment, passed in 1950, authorized 
cities to purchase or construct water and sewage 
systems,*396 treatment plants, and off street park- 
ing facilities to be fmanced by bonds, "the principal 
arid interest of which to be paid solely from revenue 
derived from rates and charges for the use, and the 
services rendered by, such systems, plants and fa- 
cilities ..!' Subsequent amendments have increased 
the scope of the special fund exception to include 
port districts (1964), public recreation facilities 
(19661, air navigation facilities (1968), and rehabil- 
itation of existing electrical generating facilities 
(1976). We note that, with the exception of port 
districts, indebtedness of a city for any of the pur- 
poses listed, even though not subject to the tax as- 
sessment provision of Art. 8, § 3, is nevertheless 
specifically conditioned on voter approval. The in- 
tent of the framers of the constitutional amend- 
ments, and the electorate through their ratification, 
is clear that approval of a municipality's qualified 
voters is necessiuy whether its Art. 8, 5 3 indebted- 
ness or liability is against the general fund of the 
city, and its tax revenues, or limited to a special 
fund of project-generated revenues. 
I d ,  at 439, 670 P.2d at 846 (footnotes omitted). 
The Asson decision on that issue was entirely con- 
sistent with an earlier decision on the same subject, 
issued approximately a year and a half after the 
passage of the 1950 amendment: 
Prior to the 1950 amendment to Section 3, Article 8 
of the Constitution, supra, this court had held, in a 
series of decisions, that bonds payable out of reven- 
ues of municipal utilities created an "indebtedness, 
or liability," within the provisions of that section 
and that all of the original limitations imposed 
thereby must be complied with. Feil v. City of 
Coeur ciAiene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 43 
L.R.A.N.S. 1095; Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 
668, 284 P. 843, 72 A.L.R. 682; Williams v. City of 
Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475; Straughan v. 
City of Coeur d'Alene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P:2d 321. 
Cf Annotations, 72 A.L.R. 687,96 A.L.R. 1385,146 
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A.L.R. 328. The trend toward the use of revenue 
bonds to enable municipalities to acquire needed 
utilities has continued and in order to enable the 
municipalities of this state to employ that method 
of fmancing such utilities, and to remove the re- 
strictions of the original section 3 from such tinan- 
cing operations, the 1950 amendment was proposed 
and adopted. So that henceforth, so long as the con- 
ditions contained in the amendment are observed, 
the municipalities of this state may issue revenue 
bonds for the purposes therein enumerated "without 
regard to any limitation" contained in the original 
section. 
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 60, 
256 P.2d 515,522 (1953). 
In other words, this Court has repeatedly rejected 
opportunities to treat certain kinds of projects-pro- 
posed to be funded out of their own revenues-as 
some sort of "special h d "  exception to the general 
prohibition of Art. VIII, 5 3 against long-term in- 
debtedness. However, this Court has also recog- 
nized that certain amendments made to Art. VUI, 9 
3 have created a "special fund" exception for some 
types of projects and that such amendments were 
enacted by the people to give cities the constitution- 
al power to seek voter approval in an alternative 
manner. Projects such as off street parking facilit- 
ies, which are given such favored treatment, are 
clearly not "ordinary and necessary" under the 
meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3. If an off street parking 
facility is an ordinary and necessary expense, then 
there was no reason for the legislature to propose, 
and Ule electorate to approve, an amendment to Art. 
VIII, 9 3 that had as its sole purpose the creation of 
a "special fund" exception to the general rule that 
prohibited the incurrence of a long term debt or ti- 
ability for such projects without voter approval. 
It might he argued that the use of the conjunctive 
"and" in the language of the 1950 amendment 
means that an off street parking facility could be an 
ordinary and necessary expense funded by revenue 
bonds, regardless of the fact that such a facility was 
included by name in the "exception" language of 
:aim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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137 P.3d 388 
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the 1950 amendment. However, such an argument 
runs afoul of this Court's description of the 1950 
amendment in the Schmidt v. W a g e  of Kimbe~ly 
decision, which identified *397 the purpose of the 
amendment as allowing "the municipalities of this 
state [to] issue revenue bonds for the purposes 
therein enumerated 'without regard to any limita- 
tion' contained in the original section!' Schmidt, 74 
ldaho at 60, 256 P.2d 515. If an off street parking 
facility is an ordinary and necessary expense, then 
there is no limitation on the municipality's ability to 
incur long term indebtedness to build such a facility 
and, similarly, no need for special treatment for 
such facilities in the provisions of Art. VIII, 5 3. In 
other words, the 1950 amend~nent has no meaning 
if it is a "separate" exception, independent and 
apart from the "ordinary and necessary expense" 
proviso. 
Therefore, even though this issue was not the suh- 
ject of briefing or argument by the parties, this con- 
stitutional question should be decided in the nar- 
rowest fashion possible, by focusing upon the in- 
clusion of "off street parking facilities" in the exist- 
ing language of Art. VIII, § 3. It is not necessary to 
retravel the difficult path of prior decisions dealing 
with what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" 
expense under our Constitution. Those prior de- 
cisions have created a settled landscape in the law, 
albeit an arguably rubbled one. Hence, because it is 
not necessary to the proper result in this case, the 
majority decision amounts to an unnecessary reas- 
sembling of that settled law and runs counter to our 
accepted rules of interpretation concerning our 
Constitution. This Court has previously held that 
"when a case can be decided up011 a ground other 
than a constitutional basis, the Court will not ad- 
dress the constitutional issue unless it is necessary 
Page I 1 
Additionally, as a general matter, the statutory rules 
of construction apply to the interpretation of consti- 
tutional provisions. Sweeney v. Otter, I19 ldaho 
135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 (1990). Those rules- 
when applied to the appropriate construction of Art. 
VIII, 3-support my view of the appropriate reas- 
oning for the result in this case, e.g: 
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that 
where a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, we 
are constrained to follow that plain meaning and 
neither add to the statute nor take away by judicial 
constmction. Moon v .  Investment B oar4 9 7 Idaho 
595, 596, 548 P.2d 861, 862 (1976). Statutory inter- 
pretation always begins with an examination of the 
literal words of the statute. In re Permit No. 
36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 
(1992). Unless the result is palpably absurd, we 
must assume that the legislature means what is 
clearly stated in the statute. Id We must give the 
words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, and 
there is no occasion for conshuction where the lan- 
guage of a statute is unambiguous. Sherwood v. 
Cmtw, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 
(1991). We furthermore must give every word, 
clause and sentence effect, if possible. In re Permit 
No. 36-7200, 121 ldaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851. 
Poison Creek Pub., Inc. v. Cent. ldaho Pub., Inc., 
134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 
(Ct.App.2000). 
Accordingly, because the trial court should be re- 
versed on the ultimate issue but for different reas- 
ons, I concur only in the result. 
Idaho,2006. 
City of Boise v. Frazier 
143 Idaho 1,137 P.3d 388 
for a determination of the case." Olsen v. JA. Free- 
man Co.. 117 Idaho 706. 710. 791 P.2d 1285. 1289 END OF DOCUMENT 
(1990). h e  corollary should also hold huet ia t  we 
should not attempt to decide more of a constitution- 
al issue than is necessary for a determination of the 
case. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D I ~ R I C T  OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
IN RE: 
1 
Case No. CV-08-121 
) 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CITY OF REXBURG, ) 
Petitioner. 
FACTS 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg ("Agency") seeks judicial 
confirmation of its power to enter into a bond purchase agreement with Zions Bank 
Public Finance. The money from the bonds will go to building a park in Rexburg. Bond 
Counsel and Zions Bank require the judicial confirmation of the bonds' validity before 
the agreement is completed. 
The bonds have the impressive title Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, 
Series 2008. They are secured only by a pledge of a special fund. This fund receives its 
money from property taxes-the park is expected to increase property values and the 
fund will receive money from the taxes on that increase. 
Mr. Hart, a concerned Rexburg citizen, raised three issues challenging the validity 
of the agreement and the bonds. According to Mr. Hart, the Agency is just trying to do 
what the City is forbidden from doing: the Idaho Constitution forbids a city from 
becoming indebted or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the 
city's citizens; the Agency is the "alter ego" of Rexburg; therefore the Agency should not 
be able to issue the bonds. This opinion addresses Mr. Hart's objections. 
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JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
Judge Newhouse had it about right in his 1998 Idaho District Court opinion In Re: 
Urban Renewal Agency of Boise City; the Judicial Confirmation Act gives courts the 
authority to play "superlegislature."' The Act allows local governing bodies to 
circumvent the constitutional limitations regarding public indebtedness and lending of 
credit by asking a court to confirm debts rather than obtaining permission from 213 of its 
citizens. 
Not only does the Act allow courts to dip into legislative matters, it allows the 
courts to do this in a dampened adversarial contest. The party with the real interest in 
arguing its position in these types of cases is the local governing body. That body has the 
incentive to hire counsel to argue its position. But the opposing side has no such 
incentive. Representation on the opposing side depends on the commitment of affected 
citizens, citizens with a sufficient sense of civic duty to compel them to invest costly time 
and effort. This procedural deficiency causes the Court concern about its ability to 
address the substantial legal issues posed by this case. 
But the law allows for judicial confirmation. The Act requires the Agency to 
complete certain hearing and notice requirements.' This they have done. After the 
procedural requirements are completed, the Act requires the Court to "examine into and 
determine all matters and things affecting each question submitted," and to "male such 
findings with reference thereto and render such judgment and decree thereon as the case 
 warrant^."^ The Agency has submitted 11 questions. The Court does not have the time 
to address each of these questions. (The answer to any one of these questions could fill a 
treatise.) Rather, the Court will presume that Mr. Hart has raised the most pertinent 
issues. He raised three. 
' In Re: Oban Renewal Agency of Boise City, Case No. CV-OC-98-00978-D, p.14 (Ada County District 
Court July 7, 1998) (Ex. 22 in the record). 
LC. 8 7-1306. 
3 7 "  P - >"O*?. \  
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DISCUSSION 
1. Mr. Hart raised three objections to the Agency's funding plan. 
Mr. Hart raised three objections to the Agency's tax increment financing plan. 
The first two objections are constitutional: the Idaho Constitution forbids a city from 
becoming indebted or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the 
city's c i t i~ens ;~  Mr. Hart argues that the Agency is the "alter ego" of Rexburg; therefore 
the Agency should not be able to issue the bonds. Both of these potential constitutional 
violations hinge on the argument that the Agency is Rexburg's "alter egon-the 
constitution only prohibits Rexburg from becoming indebted or lending credit, not an 
urban renewal agency. 
Mr. Hart's third challenge to the bonds is statutory. He argues that the purchase 
agreement allows the bonds to mature beyond the life of the urban renewal plan. The 
Court will first address the "alter ego" argument, and then it will address the maturity- 
date argument. 
2. The Agency is not an "alter ego" of Rexburg because the Agency has no 
ability to encumber any Rexburg resourees. 
Mr. Hart's constitutional challenges rely on the argument that the Agency is 
Rexburg's "alter ego." Mr. Hart argued persuasively that this is the case. The mayor and 
a counc?l member sit on the Agency's board; the mayor appointed the Agency's board; 
the Agency's actions will ultimately benefit Rexburg; Rexburg will collect the property 
taxes that wilt pay off the bonds; it is undisputed bat  the Agency will ultimately give the 
park to Rexburg. And, Idaho Code 3 50-2006(b)(3) allows the city council to "terminate" 
the Agency's board and appoint itself. It is very difficult to distinguish where Rexburg 
stops and where the Agency begins. 
Both parties addressed the 1972 Idaho Supreme Court case Boise Redevelopment 
Agency v. Yick Kong carp.' In Yick Kong the Corn found that Boise lacked sufficient 
"daho Constitution Art. VIlI §§ 3 and 4. 
$0 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). 
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control over the redevelopment agency to consider it the Boise's "alter ego"; so, Art. VIII 
$5 3 and 4 did not apply to the redevelopment agency.' 
Mr. Hart tried to distinguish Yick Kong from this judicial confirmation. He 
argued that post-Yick Kong amendments to Section 50-2006 make Yick Kong 
inapplicable. At the time Yick Kong was decided, a city council could not terminate a 
redevelopment agency's board and appoint itself. Now, with Section 50-2006(b)(3), a 
city council can do just that. So, Mr. Hart argues, a city now has more control over the 
agency and can be found to be an "alter ego." 
But, despite these changes, Yick Kong is still Idaho's law on the "alter ego" issue. 
First, the purpose of the Idaho Constitution's prohibitions on municipality indebtedness 
and voter approval provisions is to "prevent local government entities from incurring 
debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan to retire those debtsn7 One of the 
main reasons the Idaho Supreme Court found that Boise lacked sufficient control over the 
redevelopment agency-and why the agency was not an "alter ego" of the city-was that 
redevelopment agency lacked the ability to encumber any of the resources of the city. 
"Herein, [the redevelopment agency] has no ability to actually encumber any of the 
resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond its own funds and property 
holdings."8 Here, the Agency has no ability to encwnber Rexburg's resources. 
Idaho Code 5 50-2012(a) makes the bonds payable "solely from the income, 
proceeds, revenues, and funds of [the ~ g e n c ~ ] . ' "  Idaho Code Section 50-29 10 also 
makes clear that Rexhurg has no obligation for the Agency's bonds. So the bond owners 
are prohibited by statute from enforcing their notes as against the city. Even though the 
Agency looks like Rexburg in a dozen ways, it does not look like Rexburg in the most 
significant way-the Agency cannot encumber Rexburg's property. Yick Kong applies to 
this case. The redevelopment agency is not Rexburg's "alter ego." 
While the above is sufficient to resolve the matter, the Court makes two other 
points regarding the post-Yick Kong, Section 50-2006(b) amendment. First, thougl~ the 
Ykk Kong Corp., 94 Idaho at 880-81,499 P.2d at 580-81 (1972). 
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1 ,  137 P.3d 388,390 (2006). 
Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho at 883,499 P.2d at 582 (1972). 
. . .. . 
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ability to terminate the board and appoint itself does result in more control over the 
agency, the termination power has some restrictions. The statute requires the city council 
to pass and ordinance, which would require notice and a hearing. Second, as a practical 
matter, the city council cannot terminate the Agency's board and appoint itself because 
the purchase agreement forbids the city council from doing this. 
So the Agency is not Rexburg's "alter ego"; Yick Kong applies to this case. The 
purchase agreement and the Revenue Allocation Bonds, Series 2008 do not violate 
Article VIII $5 3 and 4. 
3. The maturity date on the bonds does not raise a concern for the Court. 
At the hearing, Mr. Hart argued that the matwity date on the bonds extends 
beyond the life of Rexburg's 1991 urban renewal plan. As the Court sees Mr. Hart's 
argument, the bonds will mature in 2021, the urban renewal plan began in 1991, the 
statutes forbids maturity dates beyond 24 years of the original plan, so the maturity date 
is too late. (According to Mr. Hart, 2015 would be the latest permissible maturity date.) 
But this argument ignores Section 50-2904's exceptions. One of the exceptions 
allows up to 30 years when the maturity date of any bond for a "specific project" extends 
beyond the 24 year. Here, the 2021 maturity date satisfies that exception. Also, the 
urban renewal plan was amended in 2005 (the North Highway, South Addition Plan). 
The Court is persuaded that this amendment reset the clock for purposes of maturity 
dates. The Agency has not violated Section 50-2904. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court contains itself to the objections raised by Mr. Hart, the contested 
issues. Those objections did not produce a constitutional or statutory violation. No other 
objections have been raised; accordingly, the Court finds that the Agency bas power to 
issue the Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds, Series 2008. The purchase 
agreement will be binding between the Agency and Zions Bank. 
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So ordered. 
Dated this g day of May, 2008. ,,,,, ,,III~II~,,,~~,,, 
+''o>:!!!.~/sp 04 $ *. ,p i~y +To$ '*. 0 Sk' 0 A* .A & 
Z .  . - 
- . i MADISON i 
District Judge 
. 
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251 E. Front S.treet, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
~acsimile: (208j384-5844 
Armbruster - ISB #I 878 
Sullivan - ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: 1 CASE NO. CV 08-121 
Petitioner. I 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE 
CITY OF REXBURG, 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on the Petition for Judicial Confirmation 
("Petition") on March 31,2008. The Petition was made pursuant to I.C. $ 7-1301, et seq. by the 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg ("Agency"). The Agency is a political 
subdivision of the state of Idaho duly established pursuant to the Urban Renewal Law of 1965, 
LC. 4 50-2001, et seq. 
The Petition requests judicial confirmation of the validity of the Revenue Allocation (Tax 
Increment) Bonds Series 2008, secured by the Agency's tax increment revenues, for the purpose 
of providing financing for the Riverside Park Urban Renewal Project, consisting of acquisition of 
land and construction of a public outdoor swimming facility, including dressing facilities, access 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE iW, JUDGMENT AND DECREE - 1 
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road, parking facilities, and related furnishings and improvements; construction and funlishing of 
a building for sporting and community events; installation of outdoor fields for soccer, football, 
baseball, and other public recreation purposes, and related improvements necessary to carry out 
the Sewnd Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal 
Project, including South Addition. 
On or about March 24,2008, Kenneth W. Hart filed a response to the Petition. On March 
27,2008, the Agency filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Judicial 
Confirmation. A hearing on the Agency's Petition was held on March 3 1,2008. 
Appearing on behalf of the Agency was Ryan P. Armbruster, Attorney for the Agency. 
Mr. Hart, a resident of the city of Rexburg, appeared at the hearing to oppose the Petition. On 
May 8,2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting the Petition. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS, based on the pleadings and 
other matters on file herein. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This Petition was made by the Agency as a political subdivision pursuant to the 
Idaho Judicial Confirmation Law, Title 7, Chapter 13, Idaho Code, as amended and 
supplemented. 
2. The Agency is an urban renewal agency created and existing under the authority 
of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, as amended and 
supplemented. 
3. The Agency possesses revenue allocation financing powers under the Local 
Economic Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended and supplemented. 
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4. The Agency is authorized by LC. $5  50-2909 and 50-2012 to issue revenue 
allocation (tax increment) bonds. 
5. In September 2005, the Agency authorized the commencement of an eligibility 
study and the preparation of an eligibility report ("Eligibility Report") which examined the then 
labeled South Addition to the North Highway Urban Renewal Area. On or about November 8, 
2005, the Agency accepted the Eligibility Report by way of Resolution No. 2005-1. On 
November 9,2005, the City Council of the City of Rexburg adopted ResolutionNo. 2005-17, 
making certain findings of fact and determining the South Addition to the North Highway 
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, to be a deteriorated or deteriorating area. 
Resolution No. 2005-17 authorized the Agency to prepare an amendment to the North Highway 
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan. On November 18,2005, the Agency adopted 
Resolution No. 2005-2, recommending adoption of the Second Amended and Restated North 
Highway Urban Renewal Plan, South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal 
Plan"). The Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan contained a revenue allocation 
financing provision. Notice of the public hearing by the City Council on the Second Amended 
and Restated Urban Renewal Plan was published in the Standard Journal and was submitted to 
the affected taxing entities. On December 1,2005, the City of Rexburg Planning and Zoning 
Commission declared the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan's conformity with 
the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Rexburg. The City Council duly conducted a public 
hearing and following said hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005, 
approving the Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and making certain findings. 
On December 23,2005, a summary of Ordinance No. 950 was published in the Standard 
Journal. Additionally, a copy of Ordinance No. 950 was transmitted to the other taxing entities. 
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6. On November 21,2007, and November 28,2007, the Agency published its Notice 
of Negotiated Private Bond Sale and Notice of Bond Purchase Agreement in the Standard 
Journal, notifying the public of its negotiation for and private sale to Zions Bank Public Finance 
(the "Underwriters") of approximately $6,300,000 of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) 
Bonds, Series 2008 (the "Series 2008 Bonds"), for improvements, authorized by the Second 
Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan and its intent to enter into a Bond Purchase 
Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") with the Underwriters. 
7. On December 4,2007, the Board of Commissioners ("Board') of the Agency 
adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, approving the Purchase Agreement with the Underwriters to 
provide for the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the Agency and the Underwriters for 
purchase from the Agency in a principal amount not to exceed $6,300,000 revenue allocation 
(tax increment) bonds. 
8. On December 4,2007, the Board of the ~ ~ e i c ~  adopted Resolution No. 2007-4, 
authorizing the issuance of the Series 2008 Bonds in a principal amount not to exceed 
$6,300,000. 
9. The Purchase Agreement between the Agency and the Underwriters requires the 
Agency to obtain a judgment confirming the validity of: 
a, the Agency's authority under the Constitution and the laws of Idaho to 
issue the Series 2008 Bonds; 
b. that the Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in 
accordance with their terms; and 
c. that the Purchase Agreement will be valid and enforceable in accordance 
with its terms. 
The Agency must also obtain an approving unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel. 
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10. Bond counsel, Michael Moore, reviewed the revenue allocation financing as set 
forth in the Purchase Agreement and submitted an affidavit to the Agency that bond counsel was 
unable to render an unqualified approving opinion regarding the issuance of bonds under the 
proposed Purchase Agreement until certain legal questions were resolved. Without an 
unqualified approving bond counsel opinion, the Series 2008 Bonds could not be issued and sold 
to the purchaser(s) under the proposed Purchase Agreement. 
1 I. On January 5,2008, the Agency published its notice of public hearing, as required 
by the Judicial Confirmation Law, to consider the filing of the Petition. The Agency held the 
hearing on January 22,2008. Likewise, as further required by the Judicial Confirmation Law, 
the Agency then convened a special meeting fourteen (14) days later to consider the resolution. 
On February 12,2008, the Agency convened its special meeting and adopted Resolution No. 
2008-1 authorizing the filing of the Petition 
12. The Agency sought a determination of the validity of any bonds issued pursuant 
to the Purchase Agreement by filing the Petition with this Court on February 13,2008 
Thereafter, the Clerk of the Court issued a Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation 
scheduling this case for hearing on March 17,2008, as  follows: 
a. Whether revenue allocation financing violates the provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation contained in Idaho 
Constitution Article 7, Section 5. 
b. Whether the revenue allocation scheme generally violates provisions of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to 
private entities as contained in Article 8, Section 4, and Article 12, Section 
4 of the Idaho Constitution and whether it further generally violates 
provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a municipality from 
incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a 
specific year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for the payment of such 
indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors, as provided in Idaho 
Constitution Article 8, Section 3. 
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c. Whether by reason of the composition, action, and operation of the Urban 
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg Board of Directors, the Urban 
Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg is an alter ego of the City of 
Rexburg and whether revenue allocation financing employed by the Urban 
~ e n e w 3  Agency of the City of Rexburg therefore violates the provisions 
of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from lending credit to 
private entities, pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 4, and 
whether it further violates provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting 
a municipality from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding 
income and revenue for a specific year, and pledging ad valorem taxes for 
the payment of such indebtedness, without the assent of qualified electors, 
as provided in Idaho Constitution Article 8, Section 3. 
d. Whether by virtue of the ability of the city council to declare itself as the 
board of commissioners of the urban renewal agency, under Section 50- 
2006(b)(2) and (3), whether exercised or not, an urban renewal agency is 
the alter ego of a municipality. 
e. Whether the revenue allocation statute impermissibly delegates the taxing 
power in that the statute does not set sufficient controls, guidelines, and 
standards as required under the doctrine of separation of powers, to govern 
the assessment and collection of tax, to ensure that the taxes collected are 
used in furtherance of the legislative purpose and in furtherance of the 
public purpose. 
f. Whether the provisions of the statute and the ordinance violate the due 
process rights of taxpayers of the state of Idaho by not requiring the 
expenditure of public funds collected from taxpayers for a public purpose. 
g. Whether implementation of revenue allocation financing violates Article I, 
Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits state laws which 
impair the obligation of contracts. 
h. Whether taxes paid to the Agency are "imposed" by the Legislature for a 
"City Purpose" in violation of Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
1. Whether the revenue allocation method of taxation violates Article 7, 
Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. 
j. Whether the amounts of the tax bear a rational relationship to the benefits 
received. 
k. Whether the Act violates the due process rights of other taxing districts. 
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13. Judicial determination of the validity of the proposed bond issuance pursuant to 
I.C. 5 7-1301, et seq. will serve the public interest and welfare. 
14. This action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction of all interested 
parties was obtained by publication and posting as provided under LC. $5  7-1305 and 7-1306. 
15. Notice of the Petition and the hearing was published in the Standard Jour~al on 
February21,2008, February 28,2008, and March 6,2008. 
16. Notice of the Petition and the hearing was posted at the main door of the 
administrative office of the Urban Renewal Agency and the main entrance to the Rexburg City 
Hall in a place normally used for posting of public notices from February 13,2008, through 
March 3 1,2008. 
17. The Petition prayed for a judicial examination and determination of the validity of 
the Series 2008 Bonds to be issued pursuant to Resolution No. 2007-4 approved by the Agency 
on December 4,2007; Purchase Agreement between the Agency and the Underwriters; and 
Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal Project, 
including South Addition, approved by the City Council of the City of Rexburg by the adoption 
of Ordinance No. 950 on December 21,2005; and a declaration that the Agency is duly 
authorized by a valid state statute to enter into the agreements authorized by Resolution No. 
2007-4, and that Resolution No. 2007-4, the Purchase Agreement, the Series 2008 Bonds, and 
other agreements authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 will be valid and binding on the parties 
thereto and on all persons interested therein in full accordance with their terms, and that all 
Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and Tax Assessor and the 
Madison County Treasurer, be authorized to carry out the duties and obligations set forth in 
Chapter 20, Title 50, Idaho Code, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho 
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Code, the Local Economic Development Act, including, but not limited to, the disbursement to 
the Agency of revenue allocation proceeds. 
18. On or about March 1 1, 2008, the Agency was notified that the hearing on the 
Judicial Confirmation could not be heard by the Court on March 17,2008. Thereafter, the Clerk 
of the Court issued a Supplemental Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Confirmation and 
Revised Hearing Date rescheduling this case for hearing on March 3 1,2008. The supplemental 
notice was published in the Standard Journal on March 14,2008, and March 21,2008. The 
supplemental notice was posted at the main door of the administrative office of the Agency and 
the main entrance to the Rexburg City Hall in a place normally used for posting of public notices 
from March 12,2008, through March 31,2008. 
19. The Response to Petition for Judicial Confirmation ("Response") filed on or about 
March 24,2008, by Mr. ICenneth Hart, a resident of the city of Rexburg, raised three issues 
challenging the validity of the Purchase Agreement and the Series 2008 bonds as follows: 
a. The revenue allocation scheme violates provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution prohibiting the City of  Rexburg from incurring indebtedness 
or lending its credit without confirmation by a supermajority of the city's 
citizens; 
b. The Agency is the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg, therefore, violating 
provisions of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting the City of Rexburg from 
incurring indebtedness or lending its credit without confirmation by a 
supermajority of the city's citizens; and 
c. The Purchase Agreement allows the Series 2008 Bonds to mature beyond 
the life of the urban renewal plan in violation of I.C. $ 50-2904. 
Mr. Hart did not raise objections to any other issues presented to the Court. The 
Response was supported by legal citation to Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 
Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972) and argument. In support of the argument that the Agency was 
the "alter ego" of the city of Rexburg, Mr. Hart argued that "[tlhe mayor and a council member 
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sit on the Agency's board; the mayor appointed the Agency's board; the Agency's actions will 
ultimately benefit Rexburg; Rexburg will collect the property taxes that will pay off the bonds; it 
is undisputed that the Agency will ultimately give the park to Rexburg. And, Idaho Code 5 50- 
2006(b)(3) allows the city council to "terminate" the Agency's board and appoint itself." 
Additionally, Mr. Hart argued post Yick Kong amendments to section 50-2006, Idaho Code, 
allowing a city council to terminate a redevelopment agency board and appoint itself, grant a city 
more control over the agency, thus becoming an "alter ego" of the city. 
20. On March 27,2008, the Agency filed its Reply Memorandum addressing the 
issues raised in Mr. Hart's Response. 
21. Mr. Hart appeared at the March 3 1,2008, hearing and argued in opposition to the 
granting of the Petition. 
22. The Memorandum Decision entered on May 8,2008, only addressed the 
objections raised by Mr. Hart. The Court presumed that Mr. Hart raised the most pertinent 
issues; therefore, there was no objection to the remainder of the issues raised by the Agency. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1 .  All issues raised by the Agency, but not specifically objected to by Mr. Hart are 
deemed to be admitted by Mr. Hart. 
2. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the Petition as the posting and publication 
requirements of LC. 5 7-1306 have been met. 
3. The Agency is authorized to issue the Series 2008 Bonds by the Local Economic 
Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, and the Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 
50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and the proposed Series 2008 Bonds and Purchase Agreement, 
when duly authorized, executed, issued and delivered, will be valid special obligations of the 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE W, JUDGMENT AND DECREE - 9 
PAGE 144 'act -v.3.doc 
Agency and enforceable in accordance with their terms under the Constitution and laws of the 
state of Idaho. 
4. Publication and posting as authorized by the Judicial Confirmation Law is a valid 
method of vesting jurisdiction in this Court over the parties and the subject matter. Smith v. 
Progressive Irrigation District, 28 Idaho 812, 156 P. 1133 (1916); Knowles v. New Sweden 
Irrigation District, 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 87 (1908). The Petition is taken as confessed by all 
persons who received actual or constructive notice thereof and who failed to appear in objection 
thereto. The Court is authorized to render the judgment and decree as set forth herein. 
5. The Agency is not an entity of the type required by the Constitution of the state of 
Idaho to submit the issuance of its revenue notes or bonds to a vote of the electorate. Boise 
Redevelopment Agency v. YickKong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). 
6 .  The Agency is not the "alter ego" of the City of Rexburg because the Agency 
cannot encumber the city of Rexburg's property. Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong 
Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 575 (1972). YickKong remains viable precedent on the "alter 
ego" issue. As a matter of law, the Purchase Agreement and the Series 2008 Bonds do not 
violate Article VIII, $5  3 and 4 of the Idaho Constitution. 
7. The maturity date of the Bonds is thirty (30) years. The Agency did not violate 
LC. 5 50-2904. 
8. As a matter of law, the Agency complied with all procedural requirements which 
are conditions precedent to and necessary to authorize the Agency to execute the agreements 
filed with the Court in support of the Petition and to issue its Bonds all as authorized under Idaho 
Code Title 50, Chapters 20 and 29, and as contemplated by Resolution No. 2007-4 of the 
Agency. 
FNDmGS OFFACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
UDGMENT AND DECREE - 10 JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
PAGE 145 v.3.doc 
- 
9. Issuance of revenue allocation bonds to implement the Project was duly 
authorized by the adoption of Ordinance No. 950 in accordance with Title 50, Chapters 20 and 
29, Idaho Code. 
10. The findings and couclusions made herein are intended to be and are legally 
binding upon all persons interested in the outcome of this proceeding including but not limited to 
all persons or entities who received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the Petition. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Petition filed by the Agency is hereby granted. 
2. The Agency has the power under the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50, 
Chapter 29, Idaho Code, the Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title 50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and 
the Constitution and other laws of the state of Idaho to issue the Series 2008 Bonds. 
3. The issuance by the Agency of the Series 2008 Bonds, as approved by the 
Rexhurg City Council in Ordinance No. 950 and as authorized by Resolution No. 2007-4 of the 
Agency, is valid and enforceable under the laws and the Constitution of the state of Idaho. 
4. The Bond Purchase Agreement, when duly authorized and executed, will be a 
valid special obligation of the Agency and enforceable in accordance with its terms under the 
laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho, and the Agency is lawfully authorized to undertake 
the rights, duties, obligations and actions provided for therein and thereunder. 
5. The Series 2008 Bonds, when issued, will be valid and enforceable in accordance 
with their terms under the laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho. 
6 .  The pledge of revenue allocation (tax increment) revenues as security for the 
Series 2008 Bonds is valid and enforceable under the laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho. 
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7. Further, all Madison County officials, including the Madison County Auditor and 
Tax Assessor and the Madison County Treasurer, are hereby authorized to carry out the duties 
and obligations set forth in the Idaho Urban Renewal Law and the Local Economic Development 
Act, including but not limited to the disbursement to the Agency of revenue allocation proceeds. 
\\,\\\\I 11 ~~~~l/l/,//+ 
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DATED this 2'( day of May 2008. * $ $..Lo :"..;\FI~yCi...Ff$ A . A %  Sk: 
- . C- 
- .  . s 
Brent J. Moss 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this & day of 9 ,2008, I caused a trueand 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Ryan P. h b r u s t e r  Ju.s. Mail 
Meghan E. Sullivan Hand Delivery 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
___ Federal Express 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, Idaho 83702 - 
Kenneth W. Hart 
367 Salem Avenue 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
U.S. Mail 
- 
Hand Delivery 
- 
Federal Express 
- 
Facsimile Transmission 
 
Deputy Clerk 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT OSB # 6640) 
R W T  & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEWNTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIiE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AMI) FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
1 ) CASENO. CV-08-121 
INRE ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
W A N  RENEWAL AGFNCY OF THE ) 
CITY OF REXBURG 1 
1 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
1 
1 
TO: The above named Respondent, its attorneys of record, and the Clerk of the above 
entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAR 
1. The Appellant, Kenneth W. Kart, a concerned citizen of Rexburg, appeals 
against the above named Respondent, the Urban Renewal Agency of the City 
of Rexburg, to the Idaho Supreme Court: from the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision of May 8, 2008, entered by the hnorable Judge 
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Brent J, Moss presiding, granting the Petition for Judicial Confinnation made 
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg. 
2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the 
Memorandum Decision described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(l) S.A.R. and 1.C. $7-1309. 
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of issues is as follows: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in its Memorandum Decision of May 
8,2008. in granting the Petition for Judicial Confimnation made by the 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg; 
b. Whether the District Court erred in finding the Urban Renewal Agency 
of the City of Rexburg was not the alter ego ofthe City of Rexburg; 
c. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Urban Renewal 
Agency of the City of Rexburg was not precluded by the Idaho 
Constitution Art. VBI $8 3 and 4 from incurring debt; 
d. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the bonds to be issued 
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg would not 
mature &er the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg had 
expired in violation of T.C. $ 50-2904; and, 
e. Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. 8 7-1313. 
4. A reporter's transcript of the following hearing is requestd, the hearing in 
this matter on March 31,2008. 
5 The Appellant requests i5e clerk's record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28 
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a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
Reporter; 
b. The Appellants have ordered and will pay the estimated Reporter's 
Transcript Fee when received; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been 
paid; 
d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid; and, 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served to 
Rule 20. 
YK , .  DATED this day of June 2008. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By: 
JON M! STEELE 
Attorney fox the Appellant 
. A 
By: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PAGE 150 
JUT /2008/WED 1 2 : 4 3  PM 
, I  
* ,  
3 FAX N o ,  "i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
P 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of June 2008, a Iruc and 
correct copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Ryan P. Armbmter US Mail 
Meghan E. Sullivan Personal Delivery 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. Facsimile 
251 E. Front Stxeet, Suite 300 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
RUNIT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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IN RE: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF ) 
THE CITY OF REXBURG ) 
) 
Petitioner-Respondent ) SUPREME COURT NO. 
1 CASE NO. CV-08-121 
VS 
) 
f CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEAL 
KENNETH W. HART, an interested party, ) 
Respondent-Appellant 
) 
APPEAL FROM: 7Ih Judicial District Madison County 
HONORABLE Brent J. Moss PRESIDING 
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Memorandum Decision, dated May 8, 2008 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Jon M Steele & KarlJ. Run#, 1020 W. Main St. Ste. 400, 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan E. Sullivan, EIAM 
& BURKE, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539 
APPEALED BY: Kenneth W. Hart 
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the Cily of Rexburg 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD: 
N/A 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED?: Yes 
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: David Marlow 
~ a t e d  t h i @ d a y e  ,2008 
DEPUTY CLERK 
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Ryan P. Annbruster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURICE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Armbmster - ISB 111878 
Sullivan - ISB 117038 
fmi JUL - 2 2008 
Attorneys for PetitionerIRespondent 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
In Re: I 
TO: APPELLANT KENNETH W. HART AND HIS ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE 
CITY OF REXBURG, 
PetitioneriRespondent. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN, that the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
CaseNo. CV 08-121 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD 
requests, pursuant to Rule 19(d), I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in the clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by LA.R. 28 and identified in the notice of 
appeal: 
1. Clerk's Record: 
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A. Notice of Rling of Petition for Judicial Confirination filed February 13, 
2008.; 
B. Urban Renewal Agency of ihe City of Rexb~rrg's Memorandum in Support 
of Judicial Confirmation Bled March 7, 2008; 
C. U~bail Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg's Exhibits to 
Memoranduin in Support of Judicial Confirmation filed March 7, 2008; 
D. Affidavit of Michacl C. Moore filed March 7,2008; 
E. Affidavit of Judy C. Coy filed March 7,2008; 
T;. Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rmbuirg's Reply Memor'mdum In 
Support of Pctitioil for Judicial Coi~firination filed March 27,2008; and 
G. Supplemental Affidavit of Judy C. Coy filed March 28,2008. 
2. 1 ce16fy that a copy of this request was scrved upon the Clellc of the Dislriol Court and 
upon all parties required toa ho servcd pursuant to Rule 20. 
4 
DATED this& day of July 2008. 
ELAM &BURKE, P.A. 
--A 
By: 
~ ~ n ~ ~ ~ s m h r u s t e r ,  of the fi m 
~ t t o & ~  for Pelitioner/Respondetlt 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
PA 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ,hi$- day of July 2008,I caused a true and coixect 
copy ofthe above and foregoing inshument to be served upon the following in the mumer 
indicated below: 
Jail M. Steele - U.S. Mail 
Karl J .  RWIR - Hand Delivety 
Rune & Stceio Law Officcs, PLLC - Federal Express 
1020 W. Ma~n Street, Suite 400 Facsimile Tra~~smission 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Appellunt 
$?J Ryan rmbruster ..-Fa 
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JOHN L. RUNFI: fTSB # 1059) 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
RUN13 & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jlnmft(lilrunfilaw.com 
Email: jmsteele~inftlaw.com 
MADISON COUNTY .-I L- 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OB THE SEVENTH JUDICPAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THJ? COUNTY OF %CADISON 
) ) CASENO. CV-08-121 
IN REf 1 
) AMEMDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE ) 
CITY OF REXBURG 
) 
1 
Respondent 1 
1 
TO: The above named Respondent, its attorneys of record, and the Clerk of the above 
entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT: 
1. The Appellant, Kenneth W. Hat, a concerned citizen of Rexburg, appeals 
against the above named Respondent, the Urban Renewal Agency of the City 
of Rexburg, to the Idaho Supreme Court &om the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision of May 8, 2008, entered by the Honorable Judge 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PAGE 156 
FRO >dl son CanlntY 2083Se8388  
4 JUL, .i2JU8iTJh U j :  32 YM 
, , 
<TUE> JUL 8 ZOOS 15: IS /ST.  I S :  I O I H a .  7SOOOOOB~ 4 C 8 
PAX No. Y .  UU.i 
Brent J. Moss presiding, granting the Petition for Judicial Confirmation made 
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg. 
2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the 
Memorandum Decision described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R. and1.C. 8 7-1309. 
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of issues is as follows: 
a. Whether the Disb?ct Court erred in its Memorandum Decision of May 
8, 2008, in granting the Petition for Judicial Canfirmation made by the 
Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg; 
b. Whether the District Court erred in finding the Urban Renewal Agency 
of the City of Rexburg was not the alter ego of the City of Rexburg; 
c. Whether the District' Court erred in fmding that the Urban Renewal 
Agency of the City of Rexburg was not precluded by the Idaho 
Constitution Art. VlIljj93 and 4 f?om incurring debt; 
d. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the bonds to be issued 
by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg would not 
matwe after the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg had 
expired in violation of LC. 8 50-2904; and, 
e. Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. $ 7-13 13. 
4. A reporter's transcript of the folloaing hearing is requested: the hearing in 
this matter on March 3 1,2008. 
5. The Appellant requests the clerk's record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28 
LA.R. 
AMENDED'NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PAGE 157 
(TUE)JUL a zoos 16: r s / s ~ .  - s : * o f ~ a .  7BOOOOOB14 c 4 
FA;! N o ,  P. 301 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
Reporter; 
b. The Appellants have ordered and wdl pay the estimated Reporter's 
Transcript Fee when received, 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been 
paid; 
d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid; and, 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this 8" clay of July 2008. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By: 
JOWL. RWFT 
~ d r n e y  for the Appellant 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 8" day of July 2008, a h e  and 
correct copy of the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon opposing 
counsel as folIows: 
RyanP, Armbrustet US Mail 
Me&m E. Sullivan P e r s o n a l  Delivery 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. Facsimile 
251 E. Front Skeet, Suite 300 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1 539 
David Marlow US Mail 
Court Reporter - Personal Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 528-8348 - X- Facsimile 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1l 
By:. 
f0WL.RUNFT \ f 
.)they for the Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
1 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF THE CITY ) 
OF REXBURG, 1 
Petitioner-Respondent, 1 ) SUPREME COURT NO. 
1 CASE NO. CV-08-121 
35435 
v. 1 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
ICEWETH W. HART, a11 interested party, ) APPEAL 
) 
Respondent. 1 
. . . . . -  - 
) 
1 
,. , 
APPEAL FROM: 7'" Judicial District Madison Couniy 
HONORABLE BrentJ Moss PRESIDING 
. ,.  
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121 
.- J 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Memorandum Decision, dated May 8, 200P 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: .Jon M Steele & Karl J. Runft, 1020 W. Main St. Ste. 4 0 0 ~  
+,:,. 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan E. Sullivan, E L A ~  
&BURKE:, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539 t.n u 
APPEALED BY: Kenneth K Hart 
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the Cily of Rexburg 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD: 
. .. 
\VAS DISTHXCI' COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQIIESrED?: 1 ' ~ s  
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: I',cr~,rn'.\/ar/on 
, , , \ \ l l~!lll/~ 
,\\\ 'l/////oDated this23day $z)qc?:!-~ ?'"yfi 6
,., "boNrY 02.~9 % 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
IN RE: 
) 
f 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF ) 
THE CITY OF REXBURG 1 
Petitioner-Res~ondent 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
) CASE NO. CV-08-121 
AMENDED 
vs I CI;F.RK :'S CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEAL 
KENNETH W. HART, an interested party, ) 
Respondent-Appellant 
APPEAL FROM: 71h Judicial District Madison Comty 
, , 
HONORABLE Brent J Moss PRESIDING 
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-08-121 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Memorandum Decision, dated May 8, 2008 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: .Jon M Steele & KarlJ. Runft, 1020 W. Main St. Ste. 400, 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan E. Sullivan, ELAM 
& BURKE, PA, 251 E. Front Street, Suite 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 83701-1539 
APPEALED BY: Kenneth W. Eiavt 
APPEALED AGAINST: Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: June 18,2008 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD: 
N/A 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRDPT REQUESTED?: Yes 
IF SO, NAME OF REPORTER: David Marlow 
Marilvn R. Rasmussen 
DEPUTY CLERK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
) 
IN RE: 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF ) 
THE CITY OF REXBURG 1 
PETITIONER- I SUPREME COURT NO 
RESPONDENT 1 CASE NO. CV-08-121 
VS CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
1 
KENNETH W. HART, an interested party ) 
RESPONDENT- ) 
APPELLANT 1 
1 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for Madison County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION SENTRETAINED 
1 Exhibits to Memorandum in SENT 
Support of Judicial Confirmation 
IN WITNESS EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this Lf day of 9 ,2008. 
V ; ,  
,,. 
:. . , ,! . :>,;?/~RILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
., . :;I I.:":~;~X!~ERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
, ,. 
<~,,! ; " <.*.''L> 5 
. . 
.. A 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
IN RE: ) 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF ) 
THE CITY OF REXBURG 
PETITIONER- ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
RESPONDENT ) 
VS SUPREME COURT NO. 
CASE NO. CV-2008-121 
KENNETH W. HART, an interested party ) 
1 
RESPONDENT- ) 
APPELLANT ) 
I, Marilyn R. Rasmussen, Clerk of the District Court of the 7'h Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and contains truc and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers 
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross 
Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for 
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 
of the Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Colvt this of 9 ,2008. 
V 
,\\,I\)\\ 11 1 !)I!/,,, MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
+\' c : ?L o/,'~JERI< OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
.$ ,,\Q,'.;:.""..: &, +, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
IN RE: 
1 
1 
URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF ) 
I 
PETITIONER- 1 
RESPONDENT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
VS ) CASE NO. CV-2008-121 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
I 
KENNETH W. HART, an interested party ) 
RESPONDENT - 
APPELLANT 
I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerlc of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
ATTORNEYS 
FOR APPELLANT 
Jon M. Steele 
Karl J. Runft 
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
ATTORNEY 
FOR RESPONDENT 
Ryan P. Armhruster 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE 
251 E. Front St., Sle 300 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
IN WITNESS WI-IEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this Y day O~&J ,2008 
, , , CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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